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“Make things as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
(attributed to) Albert Einstein

Abstract
Modern embedded systems are a type of special-purpose computer systems. They are
widely used in industry and are becoming increasingly complicated due to the advances
in electronic techniques. Design errors in software account for a large percentage of the
computer system failures. In this thesis, we concern ourselves with online checking the
correctness of the control software applied to such kind of embedded systems that are
identified as safety-critical, whose failure or malfunction may cause severe damages.
The existing validation and verification techniques can not completely ensure that the
embedded software does behave as desired after it is released or deployed. Against
this background, we present an online model checking mechanism aimed to ensure the
correctness of the actual execution trace, instead of the universal correctness, of the em-
bedded software system. Notice that we don’t mean to propose a faster model checking
algorithm. The basic idea is to check during system execution a sequence of bounded
models that cover the actual execution trace of the software system under investigation.
Errors detected in the bounded models may indicate potential errors in the source code
of the target system. The bounded models are derived from the behavioral model of the
target system using the actual state information monitored periodically during system
execution. The online model checking problem is reduced to online reachability analysis,
which tries to look ahead finitely many steps on the model level. The properties to be
checked are specified in linear temporal logic. Because the checking process is done on
the model level, both safety and liveness properties can be handled during runtime.
By doing model checking online, we are able to reach those states that locate arbitrarily
deep in the state space and to predict potential errors even if the checking process falls
behind the execution of the target system. The state space explosion problem can thus
be avoided to some degree because the models to be checked are always bounded ones.
However, doing model checking online has to suffer from the limited execution time allo-
cated to each checking cycle. To deal with this problem, we speed up online reachability
analysis by reducing workload and adopting the symbolic state-based search algorithm
as well as using parallel computing. We present a general framework for integration of
online model checking with a real-time operating system, which can be implemented on
different hardware architectures from single-core, or multi-core to multiprocessor. The
RA component of the TCAS software is taken as case study to demonstrate the appli-
cability of our online model checking method. In addition, we extend the application of
the online model checking mechanism to hybrid systems.

Zusammenfassung
Moderne eingebettete Systeme sind spezielle Computersysteme. Sie sind in der Indus-
trie weit verbreitet und als Ergebnis der Fortschritte der Halbleitertechnologie immer
komplexer geworden. Designfehler in Software machen einen großen Prozentsatz der
Fehler in Computersystemen aus. In dieser Arbeit befassen wir uns mit der Online
U¨berpru¨fung der Korrektheit von Kontrollsoftware in eingebetteten Systemen, die als
sicherheitskritische identifiziert sind.
Die vorhandenen Validierungs- und Verifikationstechniken ko¨nnen nicht vollsta¨ndig sich-
erstellen, dass sich die eingebettete Software wirklich wie gewu¨nscht verha¨lt, nachdem
sie freigegeben oder eingesetzt wurde. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellen wir einen Online
Model Checking Mechanismus vor, um die Korrektheit eines aktuellen Ausfu¨hrungs-
pfades, anstatt die gesamte Korrektheit der eingebetteten Software, sicherzustellen.
Es ist dabei nicht das Ziel, einen schnelleren Model Checking Algorithmus vorzule-
gen. Die Grundidee des Ansatzes ist es, eine Folge von partiellen Modellen, die den
aktuellen Ausfu¨hrungspfad der zu u¨berpru¨fenden Software u¨berdecken, wa¨hrend der
Systemausfu¨hrung zu u¨berpru¨fen. Die Fehler, die in den partiellen Modellen erkannt
werden, ko¨nnen mo¨gliche Fehler im Quellcode des zu u¨berpru¨fenden Systems anzeigen.
Die partiellen Modelle entstehen aus dem Verhaltensmodell des zu u¨berpru¨fenden Sys-
tems mittels der aktuellen Zustandsinformation, die wa¨hrend der Laufzeit periodisch
aufgenommen wird. Das Online Model Checking Problem reduziert sich zu Online Er-
reichbarkeitsanalyse, wobei in jedem U¨berpru¨fungszyklus nur endlich viele Schritte auf
der Modellebene verfolgt werden. Die zu u¨berpru¨fenden Eigenschaften sind Formeln in
Linearer Temporaler Logik. Sowohl Sicherheits- wie auch Lebendigkeitsu¨berpru¨fungen
lassen sich dabei auf Erreichbarkeitsanalyse wa¨hrend der Laufzeit zuru¨ckfu¨hren.
Mittels Online Model Checking sind wir in der Lage, die Zusta¨nde, die sich beliebig
tief in dem Zustandsraum befinden, zu erreichen. Dazu ko¨nnen wir auch potenzielle
Fehler vorhersagen, selbst wenn der Checking Prozess hinter der Ausfu¨hrung des zu
u¨berpru¨fenden Systems zuru¨ckfa¨llt. Das Problem der Zustandsraumexplosion kann zu
einem gewissen Grad vermieden werden, da Online Model Checking eine vereinfachte
Form von Bounded Model Checking mit geleitenden initialen Zusta¨nden ist, welches
zur Laufzeit angewandt wird. Andererseits leidet Online Model Checking unter der
beschra¨nkten Ausfu¨hrungsfrist, die fu¨r jeden U¨berpru¨fungszyklus festgelegt wird. Um
dieses Problem zu lo¨sen, beschleunigen wir die Online-Erreichbarkeitsanalyse durch
gezielte Verringerung der Arbeitsbelastung und die Verwendung eines symbolischen zu-
standsbasierten Suchalgorithmus sowie mittels Parallel Computing. Wir pra¨sentieren
einen allgemeinen Rahmen fu¨r die Integration von Online Model Checking in ein Echtzeit-
betriebssystem. Dieser Ansatz kann auf unterschiedlichen Hardware-Architekturen, von
Single-Core- oder Multi-Core- bis hin zu Multiprozessor-Architekturen, implementiert
werden. Die RA-Komponente der TCAS Software dient als Fallstudie, um die Anwend-
barkeit unserer Online Model Checking Methode zu demonstrieren. Daru¨ber hinaus
erweitern wir die Anwendung des Online Model Checking auf Hybridsysteme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays embedded systems are playing an increasingly important role in our daily life.
Embedded systems are computer systems integrated into technical products, such as
flight control, automotive drive-by-wire, nuclear reactor management, and others. The
advances in electronic techniques enable the hardware of embedded systems to run highly
sophisticated software. Therefore, more functionality can be implemented in software.
E.g., modern cars usually have 20 to 70 electronic control units (ECUs) with millions of
lines of code [1]. More specifically, the engine control unit, the most powerful ECU on
most cars, executes concurrently up to 100 (software) tasks [2].
Autonomous and Autonomic Systems
By observing the evolution of cars in the past several decades, we are able to envision
that the development trends for embedded systems are moving from automated towards
autonomous and autonomic systems. E.g., driverless cars are capable of sensing the
environment and navigating without human intervention. In 2012, Google cofounder
Sergey Brin said that Google will have autonomous cars available for the general public
within five years [3]. Amazon is now exploring the use of drones, a kind of unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV), for its package delivery service [4].
It follows that new software technology tends to add autonomy to modern embedded
systems so that they are able to operate on their own with little or even no directions from
humans [5]. Autonomous and autonomic are the two aspects of autonomy: autonomous
indicates self-directed to make the system fulfill some goal(s) independently, whereas
autonomic implies self-managing to keep the system robust against adversarial impacts,
no matter what happens in the environment.
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In academia, more attention is paid to autonomic computing [6], which aims to make
embedded systems capable of managing themselves in response to changes in the sys-
tem objectives or in the environment by means of self-configuration, self-optimization,
self-healing and self-protection. E.g., the RoSES project [7] proposes a general ap-
proach to building robust distributed embedded systems capable of configuring them-
selves by adding or removing components in the field rather than in the factory. The
project of Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 614 “Self-Optimizing Concepts and
Structures in Mechanical Engineering” [8] presents a design methodology for tomor-
row’s self-optimizing electro-mechanical systems whose behaviors are characterized by
the communication and cooperation between the components with inherent “intelli-
gence”. Here the self-optimization is implemented by means of changing the parameters
or the structure of the system components. In addition, an organic programming ap-
proach [9] is presented for cyber-physical systems capable of self-adapting to changing
environments.
Safety Problems
Many embedded systems are safety-critical and long-lived systems. For safety-critical
systems, failures may cause high costs and even endanger human lives. In general, a (dis-
tributed) computer system may fail due to external and/or internal reasons [2]. External
reasons are related to the system specification itself or to the operational environment,
e.g., mechanical stress, wrong input, temperature, and so on. The main internal reasons
for failure may be: (i) random physical faults in hardware; (ii) design faults in hardware
and/or software; or (iii) communication failures in a distributed environment.
According to [2], “Field data on the observed reliability of many large computer systems
indicates that a significant and increasing number of computer system failures are caused
by design errors in the software and not by physical faults of the hardware.”
Software errors are caused usually by the unmanaged complexity of the system design.
The increasing complexity of the embedded software makes subtle errors extremely dif-
ficult to figure out or to reproduce in a laboratory environment. Although safety-critical
systems are usually designed to be fault-tolerant, experience shows that software errors
are still unavoidable.
We have to mention this widely known accident. On June 4, 1996 the Ariane 5 launcher
went into self-destruction mode 37 seconds after liftoff. The failure was caused by a soft-
ware error in the inertial reference system: a 64 bit floating point number (representing
the horizontal velocity) was converted to a 16 bit signed integer. Consequently, the con-
version failed and the guidance and altitude information was lost. Indeed the program
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was the same as the one that had worked perfectly in Ariane 4, while the continuous
dynamical systems around the software had changed. In the new physical environment,
the trusted code unfortunately led to a catastrophe [10].
In 2005 a Boeing 777-120 aircraft experienced an in-flight upset event due to a software
design error [11]. According to the investigation conducted by the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau, the problem stemmed from an error in the ADIRU1 software. The error
had existed in previous releases of the ADIRU software, but had been masked by other
code. The error was eventually exposed by a series of events that was unlikely to have
been revealed in the testing and certification process for the unit [12]. Due to the software
error, the fault-tolerant software used the erroneous data to make wrong decision.
David Cummings described also a case study they encountered in checking the flight
software for NASA’s Mars Pathfinder spacecraft [13]. A simple test which should produce
an even result (2, 4, 6, and so on) was inserted into the software. They observed just
once that the check had failed. They were “never able to reproduce the failure, despite
repeated attempts over many thousands if not millions of iterations.”
Another case study is about Toyota’s unintended acceleration problem [14]. Nowadays
cars’ throttles are mostly electronic instead of mechanical. Between the sensor under the
gas pedal and the actuator in the fuel injector many things are likely to go wrong in a
“drive-by-wire” system. It’s been reported since 2009 that Toyota Corollas can accelerate
unexpectedly at low speeds. A careful examination of the car’s software (i.e., firmware)
indicated that it could have failed in the way described in the case, not necessarily that
it did fail [15]. Toyota’s engine-control code contains more than 11,000 global variables.
The program structure is very complex. Various studies over the years determined that
functions with a cyclomatic complexity2 of greater than 10 have a higher risk of defects
[16]. Many functions in Toyota’s code have a cyclomatic complexity of higher than 50. In
particular, the cyclomatic complexity of throttle-angle sensor function is more than 100.
It is really difficult to check and ensure the correctness of such a complicated software.
Needless to say, it is quite important to ensure the correctness of embedded software.
Unfortunately, no existing verification and validation techniques can completely ensure
that a software system does behave as desired after it is released or deployed.
Existing Solutions: Testing, Model Checking, and Online Monitoring
For industrial designs testing is the mainstream solution to the safety problem of modern
embedded software. Software testing [17] tries to find defects by executing a program
1An acronym for Air Data Inertial Reference Unit.
2An integer-based metric used to measure the complexity of a program by counting the number of
linearly independent paths through the program.
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to see whether the required results are met or not. There is no way to completely test
a program of a moderate complexity. For untested inputs, undiscovered errors in deep
corners may show up during system execution. Even if an error is found by testing, it
is usually difficult to figure out the reason(s) for the error.
Different model checking techniques [18] play a supporting role in ensuring the safety of
large complex systems. Model checking needs to explore exhaustively the state space
of the behavioral model of the software system under investigation within reasonable
time and memory consumption. The complexity of autonomous and autonomic systems
exacerbates the state space explosion problem. Even the reachability problem can not
be solved completely when the state space is too large.
To challenge the state space explosion problem, many effective methods have been pro-
posed in the literature: partial order reduction [19], compositional reasoning [20], ab-
straction interpretation [21], bounded model checking [22], to name just a few. Partial
order reduction exploits the commutativity of the executed transitions in asynchronous
systems, which results in the same states when executed in different orders, to reduce the
state space that needs to be searched. Compositional verification is a divide-and-conquer
approach to mitigating the state space explosion in concurrent systems. Assumptions
on the environment are needed to guarantee the correctness of the individual compo-
nents. It is usually a non-trivial task to find the right assumptions and to check the
refinement of the environment against the assumptions. Abstraction is usually used in
the Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) paradigm [23], where
the abstraction of the behavioral model is refined iteratively until either a definite result
is obtained or the refined model becomes intractable. Bounded Model Checking (BMC)
tries to search for an error path of length up to some finite bound from initial states.
Theoretically, there does exist a completeness threshold [24] for the bound, but it is
usually too large to perform BMC up to this threshold in practice.
Without doubt these improvements do make model checking applicable to more complex
systems, but at the cost of making the checking process more complicated and thus error-
prone, because the correctness of the checking program itself is difficult to be verified
exhaustively.
Note that the above mentioned checking techniques and the like are traditionally applied
during the software development phase before the software system is deployed in the field.
In this sense, they belong to the oﬄine verification category.
Of course, there exist also other oﬄine checking techniques, such as theorem proving,
static analysis, simulation, and the like. All these oﬄine checking methods fail to ensure
definitely the correctness of large complex systems during the system development phase.
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Therefore, different online monitoring techniques (see Section 3) come into play. The
concept of online monitoring dates back to the assembly language era. Online monitoring
has been used in program debugging, profiling, optimization, and so on. Nowadays online
monitoring is applied to checking for the correctness of the actual execution trace of the
(software) system under observation. In this sense, it is also called runtime verification.
The basic idea of online monitoring is to observe the state information while the target
system is running, and then analyze based on the collected data whether the target
system behaves normally with respect to the given properties. In practice, the analysis
can be carried out on the spot or at some time later. The granularity of observation may
have a large impact on online monitoring. If it is too coarse, important information may
be missed; if it is too fine, the monitoring overhead will be too high. On the other hand,
the properties to be checked are usually derived from the system requirements, whereas
the execution trace to be monitored is at the code (i.e., implementation) level. The
semantic gap between the properties and the execution trace makes it usually difficult
to connect correctly the low level events (i.e., state information) with the corresponding
high level elements in the properties.
Our Solution: Online Model Checking
Given the source code and the (behavioral) model of the software program as well as the
properties to be checked, obviously, the semantic gap between the properties and the
behavioral model is more narrow than the semantic gap between the properties and the
source code of the target program. The behavioral model describes the system behaviors
at a higher level of abstraction. It may be generated based on the system requirements
or extracted from the source code of the target system. Anyway, it is relatively easier to
establish the semantic relationship between the source code and the behavioral model
of the target system, i.e., the mapping function from the low-level concrete states to the
high-level abstract states, as well as the semantic relationship between the behavioral
model and the properties to be checked. In other words, the behavioral model can bridge
the semantic gap between the source code and the properties to be checked.
To a fairly large degree, the correctness of the behavioral model can reflect the correctness
of the (source code) implementation of the target system. Because many implementation
details are abstracted away, the behavioral model is usually much simpler than the source
code. However, for large complex systems, such as autonomous and autonomic systems,
the behavioral model is still too complex to be explored exhaustively by oﬄine checking
techniques.
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Against this background, we present the concept of online model checking, which is
the contribution of this thesis. Online model checking can be seen as an extension
of online monitoring. Like online monitoring, online model checking also observes the
state information of the target system at runtime and then checks the correctness of
the current execution trace against the given properties. Unlike online monitoring,
online model checking does not try to figure out potential errors from the collected data.
Instead, it tries to identify a partial model of the target program based on the observed
state information and then to search for errors in the obtained partial model. Errors
found in the partial model may indicate potential errors in the current execution trace or
even predict errors that may happen in the near future. The counterexample produced
by means of online model checking can be used to discover the root cause of the errors.
Considering that model checking is usually a time consuming process, it seems to be an
“impossible mission” to do model checking online while the target system is running.
This thesis tries to give a possible solution following the principle of making things “as
simple as possible, but not simpler”3. On the one hand, compared with (oﬄine) model
checking, online model checking is obviously simple; on the other hand, compared with
online monitoring, online model checking is not that much simpler.
It is worth mentioning that online model checking is a complementary technique to the
existing solutions. It is originally proposed to be used during runtime after the target
program is deployed so as to provide an additional defense mechanism against potential
design errors in the program. Of course, it can also be used as an aid in software testing
to improve the test coverage, but this topic is outside the scope of this thesis.
Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explains the basic concepts
and techniques used in the thesis to make the thesis self-contained; Chapter 3 details the
online monitoring techniques presented in the literature and discusses the differences and
similarities between online monitoring and online model checking; Chapter 4 presents
our online model checking mechanism as well as different speed-up techniques to improve
the performance of online model checking; Chapter 5 proposes a lightweight method to
decide the monitoring points in the target program; Chapter 6 integrates online model
checking with an RTOS as a verification service and analyzes the monitoring overhead
as well as the communication overhead; Chapter 7 provides a case study to demonstrate
the applicability of online model checking; Chapter 8 extends the application of online
model checking to hybrid systems; finally, we draw conclusions and point out possible
future research directions in Chapter 9.
3attributed to Albert Einstein.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
To make the thesis self-explanatory, the following sections provide the definitions of the
terms used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Fault, Error and Failure
There are no unique and commonly accepted precise definitions of the concepts fault,
error and failure in the literature related to dependable computing. Here we adopt the
definitions of fault, error and failure proposed by Avizienis et al. in [25].
A failure indicates that some externally observable state of a system deviates from the
intended one, provided that there is output from the system; otherwise, there is no
failure, even if something does go wrong inside the system. That is, a failure refers to
some misbehavior of the system that can be observed by the user, be it a human user
or another computer system.
In contrast, an error indicates that some internal state of the system deviates from the
desired one, i.e., something goes wrong inside the system. Error(s) may or may not
result in failure(s).
A fault is “the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error”, which can be internal or
external relative to the system under investigation.
Let’s take an example presented in [26] to further clarify the terms fault, error, and failure
at the software level. Given a system with the fault of missing the free statement in its
program, whenever the piece of code that should free memory is executed, the program
enters an error state: memory is allocated but never released. As long as the consumed
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memory keeps below a certain threshold, there is no failure observable from outside.
However, once the memory limits of the system are approached, a failure is observed.
2.2 Behavioral Model
The behaviors of a computer system can be modeled at various levels, e.g., at four levels
from low to high: the physical level, the digital logic level, the information level and
the external level [27]. In this thesis our interest is in the behaviors of a computer
system at the information level, i.e., software system. We’d like to detect errors in a
software system by doing model checking online while the software system is running.
For this purpose, we need to specify formally a behavioral model in terms of states and
transitions so as to reflect the computations of the software system at some abstraction
level and/or from some perspective.
While a software system is running, the values of the variables of the software system will
be updated over time. A state captures the values of the system variables at a particular
instant of time. Given a state, the values of the system variables can be changed by
executing an action, which results in an evolution of the system from the current state
to a next state. Such a pair of states (before and after the action is executed) indicates a
transition of the software system. A run of the system can thus be defined as a sequence
of (possibly infinite) states connected by transitions.
Let V = {v1 : D1, v2 : D2, · · · , vn : Dn} be the set of the system variables v1, v2, · · · , vn
ranging over the finite domains D1, D2, · · · , Dn respectively. A state is just a valuation
s : V → {D1, D2, · · · , Dn} for the variables in V . Given a valuation (i.e., a state)
〈v1 = d1, v2 = d2, · · · , vn = dn〉 with vi ∈ V and di ∈ Di for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. We can use
the formula (v1 = d1)∧(v2 = d2)∧· · ·∧(vn = dn) to represent it, where each proposition
vi = di is regarded as an atomic, basic element. Generally, atomic propositions have the
form vi = di. An atomic proposition vi = di is true in a state s if s(vi) = di. It is easy
to see that each state indicates a set of atomic propositions true in this state. On the
other hand, there may be more than one state in which the atomic proposition vi = di
holds. Hence, a formula can be interpreted as a set of all such states that make it true.
Similarly, a transition (s, s′) is a valuation of variables in the current state s and in the
next state s′. To distinguish the variables in the current state from the ones in the next
state, we rename the variables in the next state as V ′ = {v′1 : D1, v′2 : D2, · · · , v′n : Dn}.
Thus, for each variable vi in V , there is a corresponding (next state) variable v
′
i in V
′.
Now we are able to represent a set of transitions using a logic formula, too. This formula
is called transition relation, denoted as R(V, V ′).
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Given a software program P, the program variables and their value domains are available.
Let AP be the set of atomic propositions. Formally, the behaviors (or computations) of
the software program over AP can be modeled as a kind of state transition graph called
Kripke structure, denoted as M = (VM , DM , RM , IM , LM ), where
• VM = {v1 : D1, v2 : D2, · · · , vn : Dn} declares the set of the system variables and
their corresponding value domains,
• DM = D1 ×D2 × · · · ×Dn defines the state space of M ,
• RM ⊆ DM ×DM is the transition relation of M ,
• IM ⊆ DM is the initial condition of M , and
• LM : DM → 2AP is a labeling function that associates each state with the set of
atomic propositions (in AP ) true in that state.
In the state space of M , there is a transition between two states s and s′, if RM (s, s′)
holds. For the sake of convenience, we suppose the transition relation RM to be total.
That is, for every state s ∈ DM there exists a state s′ ∈ DM such that RM (s, s′) holds.
In fact, we can always make RM total by adding an auxiliary transition to each state s
without successors so that RM (s, s) holds.
A path (or run) ρ of M from a state s is an infinite sequence of states ρ = s0, s1, s2, · · ·
such that s0 = s and RM (st, st+1) holds for all t ≥ 0. Let S0 be the set of initial states
of M , i.e., S0 = {s ∈ DM | s |= IM}. A state s is reachable, if there exists a path ρ with
some prefix s0, s1, · · · , st in M such that s0 ∈ S0 and st = s. Notice that not all of the
states in DM are reachable from the given initial states. The set of reachable states of
M , denoted as S, are those states in DM reachable from the set S0 of initial states. For
large complex systems, especially parallel systems, it is usually difficult to identify all
the reachable states of the system model. In general, it is undecidable whether a state
of the system model is reachable or not [28].
Let’s take a simple transition system described in [18] as an example to explain the
above notions. The Kripke structure M of the simple system is defined as follows:
• VM = {x : D, y : D} where D = {0, 1},
• DM = D ×D = {(1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0)},
• RM (x, y, x′, y′) ≡ x′ = (x+ y) mod 2 ∧ y′ = y,
• IM ≡ x = 1 ∧ y = 1, and
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• LM ((1, 1)) = {x = 1, y = 1}, LM ((0, 1)) = {x = 0, y = 1},
LM ((1, 0)) = {x = 1, y = 0}, and LM ((0, 0)) = {x = 0, y = 0}.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates a graphical representation of the Kripke structure of this example.
The state space of the system consists of four states (1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (0, 0). The
initial state (1, 1) is pointed to by an incoming edge without a source. It is easy to see
that the states (1, 0) and (0, 0) are not reachable from the initial state (1, 1). The path
ρ = (1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 1), · · · is the only path that starts from an initial state. This path
is the only valid behavior (or computation) of the transition system.
11 01 10 00
Figure 2.1: A Kripke structure example
2.3 Property Specification
Property specification defines formally a set of implementation-independent constraints
that a software system under investigation needs to satisfy. The properties are usually
specified in some logical formalism, e.g., temporal logic, automata, or regular expression,
etc., which describes how the behaviors of the software system should evolve over time.
It is usually difficult to decide whether or not a given specification is complete, i.e., it
covers all the properties that the software application should satisfy. It is also hard
to prove that what we write does capture exactly what we mean. In this thesis, we
simply suppose that the properties are correctly specified. Therefore, a model or an
implementation of the software system is proved to be correct, it means implicitly that
it is correct with respect to the given property specification.
2.3.1 Linear Temporal Logic
In this thesis, our concern is the correctness of the individual executions of the software
program under investigation. Therefore, linear temporal logic (LTL) [29] is adopted to
specify the properties that the software system is required to satisfy. LTL can specify
the ordering of states in time without defining time explicitly.
Given a behavioral model M over AP of the software program to be checked, an LTL
property over AP has the form Af , where A is a path quantifier meaning “for all paths”,
and f is a path formula specifying a (characteristic) predicate on the paths of the model
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M . For technical convenience, we consider LTL formulas in positive normal form, i.e.,
negations (if any) are applied only to atomic propositions. An LTL formula f in positive
normal form is inductively defined as follows:
• true and false are LTL formulas;
• if p ∈ AP , then p and ¬p are LTL formulas;
• if x and y are LTL formulas, then x∨y, x∧y, Xy, Fy, Gy, xUy, and xRy are LTL
formulas, where X (neXt), F (Future), G (Global), U (Until) and R (Release) are
temporal operators.
Let ρ = s0, s1, · · · , si, si+1, · · · be a path in the model M . We define the suffix of ρ
starting from si as ρ
i = si, si+1, · · · . The semantics of an LTL formula with respect to
the path ρ in M is formally defined below [18]:
1. M,ρ |= p iff p ∈ LM (s0).
2. M,ρ |= ¬p iff p 6∈ LM (s0).
3. M,ρ |= x ∨ y iff M,ρ |= x or M,ρ |= y.
4. M,ρ |= x ∧ y iff M,ρ |= x and M,ρ |= y.
5. M,ρ |= Xy iff M,ρ1 |= y.
6. M,ρ |= Fy iff M,ρi |= y for some i ≥ 0.
7. M,ρ |= Gy iff M,ρi |= y for all i ≥ 0.
8. M,ρ |= xUy iff M,ρj |= y for some j ≥ 0 and M,ρi |= x for all 0 ≤ i < j.
9. M,ρ |= xRy iff for all j ≥ 0, if for every i < j, M,ρi 6|= x then M,ρj |= y.
11 01 10 00
s0
s1 si
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• • •
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• • • • • •
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• • • • • •
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p:
xUy:
xRy:
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• • •
y
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y y y x,y
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• • •
y y
s1s0
• • •
y
Xy:
Figure 2.2: The visualized explanation of some LTL formulas
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Intuitively, an LTL property defines the characteristics of those valid paths by imposing
certain constraint(s) on some placeholder(s) in the paths as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. For
example, the formula p requires that p holds in the first state of the path, xUy specifies
that x holds along the path until in some states where y holds, while xRy specifies that
y holds along the path up to and including the first state where x holds. In the latter
two cases, x is not required to hold eventually.
We usually go to check the negation of an LTL property, which describes the charac-
teristics of those error paths. In a model with finitely many states, an infinite path is
represented as a finite sequence of states of the form (s0, s1, · · · , si−1)(si, · · · , sn) with
si = sn for i ≥ 0, where (s0, s1, · · · , si−1) is a finite prefix in case of i > 0 (or empty
otherwise), and (si, · · · , sn) an ending loop (i.e., infinite suffix) of the path. Therefore,
an error path (counterexample) can be identified either by its finite prefix (finite witness)
or by its ending loop (infinite witness) that satisfies some specific constraint(s) derived
from the LTL formula.
There are two basic types of properties in LTL: safety and liveness. A general LTL
property can be expressed as conjunction of a safety property and a liveness property
[30]. Informally, a safety property means that something “bad” does never happen
during program execution, while a liveness property means that something “good” does
eventually happen [31].
Let Σ = 2AP . Then, Σ∗ represents the set of finite sequences of states, and Σω the set of
infinite sequence of states. For any two finite paths α, β ∈ Σ∗, βω denotes the sequence
of states obtained by infinitely repetition of β, and α · βω the infinite sequence of states
obtained by concatenation of α and βω. Formally, an LTL formula f over AP is a safety
property, if and only if (∀α ∈ Σω. α |= f) ⇐⇒ (∀i ≥ 0. (∃β ∈ Σω. α[0..i] · β |= f)); f is
a liveness property, if and only if (∀α ∈ Σ∗. (∃β ∈ Σω. α · β |= f)) [30].
As for a safety property, there exists no specific constraint(s) to the infinite suffix β of
the path satisfying it. That is, a counterexample of a safety property is a path with
a finite prefix α whose last state contradicts the property. As for a liveness property,
some desired state(s) must happen infinitely often along the path satisfying it. That is,
a counterexample of a liveness property is a path ending with an infinite suffix β that
contains no desired state(s).
For example, the safety property Gp, as shown in Fig. 2.3 (a), requires that something
good (p) always holds (or something bad (¬p) never holds); the liveness property FGp,
as shown in Fig. 2.3 (b), means no matter what happens along a finite prefix, eventually
something desired (p) will happen infinitely often.
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Figure 2.3: (a) Safety property Gp and (b) Liveness property FGp
2.3.2 Bu¨chi Automaton
Given an LTL property f , we usually first transform its negation ¬f into an equivalent
Bu¨chi automaton denoted as B¬f , and then go to check whether B¬f is satisfiable with
respect to the given model M , or not. The size of B¬f is, in the worst case, exponential
in the number of the subformulas of f . There are many algorithms in the literature
[32–37] that generate optimized Bu¨chi automata from LTL formulas. In practice, the
commonly used requirements are not very sophisticated [38]. Indeed, the LTL formulas
and their Bu¨chi automata are usually not that much complicated.
Of course, we can also directly specify properties using Bu¨chi automata. In fact, Bu¨chi
automata are more expressive than most temporal logic specification languages [39].
However, complementing directly a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton involves an ex-
ponential blow-up [40]. In this sense, we prefer LTL to Bu¨chi automata.
Informally, a Bu¨chi automaton is an extension to a finite automaton in terms of accep-
tance condition. A finite automaton is a type of state transition graph with transitions
labeled with symbol(s) and some states marked as accepting states. An accepting run of
a finite automaton is a finite path from a start state to some accepting state. Instead, an
accepting run of a Bu¨chi automaton is an infinite path from a start state to an ending
loop containing some accepting state(s) in it. In effect, the accepting state appears along
the path infinitely often.
Let Σ = 2AP be the set of atomic propositions (or symbols in the context of automaton).
Formally, a Bu¨chi automaton B over Σ is defined as B = (Q,∆, Q0, F ), where Q is a
finite set of states; ∆ : Q × Σ → Q is a transition function; Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial
states; and F ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states.
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Figure 2.4: (a) BGp and (b) BFGp
For example, Fig. 2.4 shows two Bu¨chi automata BGp and BFGp generated from the LTL
formulas Gp and FGp respectively. In Bu¨chi automata, the start states are denoted by
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an edge without a source and the accepting states by concentric circles. The transitions
between states are labeled by predicates (i.e., symbols).
Let M be a model and Bf a Bu¨chi automaton generated from an LTL formula f (with
respect to M). An infinite path ρ = s0, s1, · · · , si, si+1, · · · of M is accepted by Bf , i.e.,
M,ρ |= f , if and only if there exists a run γ = q0, q1, · · · , qi, qi+1, · · · in Bf such that
(i) q0 is a start state of Bf ;
(ii) Bf moves from the state qi to the next state qi+1, if the state si in M satisfies the
predicate on the transition (qi, qi+1); and
(iii) some accepting state of Bf appears in γ infinitely often.
Here we use “path” in the model M and “run” in the Bu¨chi automaton Bf to distinguish
the two sequences of states in different contexts. In addition, we also say that the path ρ
matches the run γ in case that the first two conditions hold. Since the Bu¨chi automaton
Bf is usually nondeterministic, it is possible that the same path of M may match more
than one run in Bf .
Note that if at some state qi of Bf , the state si in M meets no predicate on any transition
emanating from qi, then we say that there is an undefined transition emanating from qi.
It is easy to see that the Bu¨chi automaton BGp (resp. BFGp) in Fig. 2.4 accepts exactly
the paths that satisfy the LTL formula Gp (resp. FGp). In addition, at the state q0 in
BGp as well as at the state q1 in BFGp there exists (implicitly) an undefined transition
with the predicate ¬p on it.
Recall that a (nontrivial) LTL property is either safety or liveness or a conjunction of a
safety property and a liveness property [30]. It is useful to distinguish between safety and
liveness so that the model checking algorithms can deal with them in different efficient
ways. We can use Bu¨chi automata to determine whether a property is safety or not.
Let f be an LTL property and Bf a Bu¨chi automaton
1 generated from f . Recall that
a safety property claims that something “bad” does never happen, this is equivalent to
saying that any infinite run in Bf is accepting, i.e., no “bad thing” occurs. There is no
additional constraint(s) on the accepting states of the Bu¨chi automaton. If a “bad” thing
does happen, there is no way to remedy it; otherwise, it follows that something “good”
would eventually happen. This means that a finite prefix is sufficient to contradict f in
case that f is a safety property. This finite run in Bf must eventually end with some
undefined transition. We call a finite run in Bf bad prefix (or “bad thing”), if there is no
1In Bf those states from which no accepting state is reachable are redundant, and thus deleted.
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way to extend this finite run to an infinite run in Bf . In other words, there is no way to
remedy this “bad thing”. Consequently, f is a safety property, if Bf has bad prefix(es)
but no constraint(s) on the accepting states, i.e., any infinite run in Bf is accepting.
Formally, a finite prefix α ∈ Σ∗ in Bf is a bad prefix, if and only if ∀β ∈ Σω. α · β 2 f .
That is, there is no way to extend α to an infinite run in Bf .
From BGp it is easy to know that Gp is a safety property. Let’s introduce a special state
qe to help visualize the undefined transition in BGp as illustrated in Fig. 2.5. Obviously,
any run to the state qe is a bad prefix that contradicts Gp.
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Figure 2.5: Visualize the undefined transition in BGp
Bf can also be used to determine whether f is liveness, or not. f is a liveness property,
if Bf has no bad prefix but a constraint on the accepting states, i.e., from each accepting
state there must exist a path back to itself. No bad prefix means that no finite run can
contradict a liveness property. For any finite run that ends with an undefined transition,
this finite run can always be extended to an infinite run. For a liveness property, all the
undefined transitions (if any) in Bf are indeed redundant. Since from every state there
is a path to an accepting state in Bf , a “good” thing can, of course, eventually happen.
E.g., every finite run that leads to the undefined transition in BFGp can be extended to
an infinite run, and this infinite run can eventually reach the accepting state q1.
It is worth pointing out that there is a special Bu¨chi automaton which accepts any path.
In this sense, we say that this automaton is universal. On the contrary, if an automaton
accepts no path, it is said to be empty. A set Qi of states in the given Bu¨chi automaton
B is universal, if B becomes universal by redefining the set of initial states to be Qi.
The automata mentioned above label the transitions with symbols (i.e., predicates). In
contrast, we can also label the states of the automata with predicates. Thus, a Kripke
structure, which defines a model M , can be seen as a state labeled automaton with all
reachable states accepting.
For technical convenience, we define the Bu¨chi automaton Bf of the given LTL property
f as a state labeled automaton. Let APf be a set of atomic propositions derived from f .
The Bu¨chi automaton Bf = (VB, DB, RB, IB, LB, FB) is defined in a way similar to the
definition of the behavioral model M , where VB and DB are a set of variables and their
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(finite) domains, RB ⊆ DB×DB is a transition relation, IB ⊆ DB is an initial condition,
LB : DB → 2APf is a labeling function, and FB ⊆ DB is an acceptance condition.
For example, the state labeled automata for Gp and FGp are illustrated in Fig. 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: (a) BGp and (b) BFGp
A run γ of Bf is an infinite sequence of states γ = q0, q1, q2, · · · such that q0 |= IB and
RB(qt, qt+1) for t ≥ 0. Let inf(γ) be a set of states that appear infinitely often in γ. A
run γ is accepting if and only if inf(γ) ∩ {q | q |= FB} 6= ∅, i.e., at least one accepting
state q |= FB appears in the ending loop of γ.
2.4 LTL Model Checking
Given a finite state model M and an LTL property f , LTL model checking [18] aims to
answer the question: is it true that M,ρ |= f for any initialized path ρ of M (i.e., ρ is
an infinite path starting from some initial state of M)?
To solve this problem, we usually need to determine whether or not there exists an
initialized path ρ in M such that M,ρ |= ¬f? i.e., the path ρ is a witness against the
property f . Let B¬f be a Bu¨chi automaton generated from the negation of f . Then,
we need to decide whether there exists an initialized path ρ that is accepted by B¬f .
Recall that the model M can be seen as a Bu¨chi automaton with all the reachable
states accepting. Let L(M) represents a set of (initialized) paths of M and L(B¬f ) a
set of accepting runs of B¬f . If the intersection of L(M) and L(B¬f ) is empty, then f is
satisfied with respect to M ; otherwise, any path ρ ∈ L(M)∩L(B¬f ) is a counterexample.
Therefore, we’d better determine whether L(M) ∩ L(B¬f ) = ∅ or not. The complexity
of this process is PSPACE, i.e., polynomial in the size of the product of M and B¬f .
L(M)∩L(B¬f ) contains exactly all the accepting paths in the product ofM and B¬f that
violate the property f . Generally, let M = (VM , DM , RM , IM , LM ) over AP and B¬f =
(VB, DB, RB, IB, LB, FB) over AP¬f , then the product of M and B¬f over AP ∪ AP¬f
is a (Bu¨chi) automaton denoted as M ×B¬f = (V,D,R, I, L, F ), where V = VM ∪ VB,
D = DM ×DB, R = RM ∧RB, I = IM ∧ IB, L : D → 2AP∪AP¬f labels each compound
state (s, q) ∈ DM ×DB with the set of atomic propositions in AP ∪AP¬f true in (s, q),
and F = FB is acceptance condition.
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An infinite path pi of M ×B¬f is a sequence of compound states (s0, q0), (s1, q1), · · · in
M ×B¬f such that
• ρ = s0, s1, · · · is an infinite path of M with IM (s0) and RM (st, st+1) for t ≥ 0,
• γ = q0, q1, · · · is an infinite run of B¬f with IB(q0) and RB(qt, qt+1) for t ≥ 0,
• LM (st) is consistent with LB(qt) for t ≥ 0 with respect to the common propositions.
Let inf(pi) be the set of (compound) states that appear infinitely often in pi. An infinite
path pi of M ×B¬f is accepting if and only if inf(pi) ∩ {(s, q) | q |= FB} 6= ∅.
LTL model checking algorithms can be implemented by exploring an explicit state space
or a symbolic state space. As for explicit state space, we need to construct explicitly
the state transition graph of M ×B¬f as it is. In contrast, as for symbolic state space,
the set of states and the set of transitions in M × B¬f are represented symbolically as
Boolean formulas. This symbolic representation of states as well as of transitions can be
implemented using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [41] or Conjunctive Normal Form
(CNF). In the former case BDD-based tools, whereas in the latter case SAT solvers, are
usually used to solve the LTL model checking problem.
2.5 Bounded Model Checking (BMC)
Symbolic state based model checking can handle efficiently a much larger state space than
explicit state based model checking. However, the state space may grow exponentially in
the number of the variables in the behavioral model under investigation. That is, doing
model checking in a symbolic way does relieve the state space explosion problem to some
extent, but still suffers from the state space explosion problem. Against this background,
bounded model checking (BMC) is presented in [22], and later widely accepted in industry
and academia.
Unlike traditional model checking, bounded model checking tries to search for counterex-
amples in the initialized paths of length bounded by some integer k. If no error is found,
we increase the bound k until either an error is found, or some precomputed upper
bound (Completeness Threshold) is reached, or until the problem becomes intractable.
This method is incomplete if the completeness threshold is not reached.
In practice, BMC is usually encoded as a propositional satisfiability (SAT) problem.
Given a model M and an LTL property f , the SAT problem is defined as follows:
|[M,f ]|k = |[M ×B¬f ]|k = (IM (s0) ∧ IB(q0)) ∧ (|[M ]|k ∧ |[B]|k) ∧ |[C]|k
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where
• IM (s0) and IB(q0) are the initial conditions of M and B¬f respectively,
• |[M ]|k =
k∧
i=1
RM (si−1, si) and |[B]|k =
k∧
i=1
RB(qi−1, qi) encode the paths of length
k in M and B¬f respectively,
• the path constraint |[C]|k =
k∨
i=0
F (qi) if F is a finial condition in case that f is a
safety property, or |[C]|k =
k−1∨
l=0
((sl = sk)∧ (ql = qk)∧ (
k−1∨
i=l
F (qi))) if F is a fairness
condition in case that f is a liveness property.
It is worth pointing out that in case of f being invariant, the SAT problem is simplified
as |[M,f ]|k = IM (s0) ∧ |[M ]|k ∧ |[C]|k = IM (s0) ∧ (
k∧
i=1
RM (si−1, si)) ∧ (
k∨
i=0
F (si)) with
the final condition F = ¬f .
BMC can be implemented by explicit state-, BDD- and SAT- based search algorithms.
The paper [42] compares the performance of these three search algorithms on 62 bench-
marks drawn from commercial designs. The experimental results indicate that “BDD-
based BMC is much faster” for finding deep counterexamples (of length, say, k > 60),
while “SAT-based BMC is more effective than BDD-based BMC” for finding shallow
counterexamples (of length, say, k ≤ 60), but surprisingly “explicit state-based BMC
(by means of random search) is comparably effective.” As for the performance of SAT-
based BMC, the experimental results [22] done at IBM, Intel and Compag show that “if
k is small enough (typically not more than 60 to 80 cycles, depending on the model itself
and the SAT solver), it outperforms BDD-based techniques.” “The deeper the bug is
(i.e., the longer the shortest path leading to it is), the less advantage (SAT-based) BMC
has.” In addition, the experimental results [43] indicate that “SAT solvers are quite effec-
tive in eliminating logic that is not relevant to a given property.” In other words, “SAT
solvers appear to have significant potential for identifying that set of variables once a
suitable property is given.” Of course, the performance of the BMC algorithms depends
also strongly on the underlying hardware executing them as well as the complexity of
the problems to be checked, and others.
In this thesis, we present an online model checking mechanism using the BMC technique
to ensure the correctness of the actual execution trace within the next k (transition) steps
starting from each (current) state monitored during the execution of the software system
under investigation.
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Related Work
The work closely related to our online model checking are monitoring techniques in the
sense that they need to observe the state information during system execution and then
to check the correctness of the current execution trace of the target system. The concept
of monitoring can date back to the assembly language era. Since then people have
been using monitoring for testing, debugging, profiling, performance analysis, program
optimization, and more. As a consequence, different monitoring techniques have been
proposed since 1960. A comprehensive survey of program monitoring [28] was published
in 1981, which examined the concepts, goals and limitations of the monitoring techniques
at that time. The renewed interest in monitoring techniques nowadays is due to the
increasing complexity of the software systems. A recent survey [44] in 2004 identified a
wide spectrum of monitoring tools in the literature.
Generally, monitor observes the execution of the target system to sample the information
of interest and then diagnoses, based on the collected data, whether the system behaves
normally. The observed system may be a monolithic program, a parallel program, a dis-
tributed system, a real-time system, a hardware system, a network, or any combination
thereof. The information of interest can be collected at various levels of abstraction,
such as system level, process level, function level and statement level. The monitor can
be implemented in the same process as the target system. In this case, the monitoring
code is embedded in the target program. The monitor and the target system can also
be implemented as separate processes on the same processor or on different processors.
Monitoring is classified as online, if the collected data is analyzed while the target system
is running; otherwise, it is classified as oﬄine. Online monitoring is also called runtime
monitoring. The interaction between the monitor and the target system is synchronous,
if the target program must wait until the diagnosis is finished; asynchronous, if it does
not need to wait for the result of the diagnosis.
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In order to gain further insight into the (runtime) monitoring technique, some selected
representative methods are described below in more detail.
Alamo
A Lightweight Architecture for Monitoring (Alamo) [45] is developed for monitoring
C and Icon programs against safety properties. Prior to compilation, Alamo employs
automatic program instrumentation to identify monitoring points and insert events into
the source code of the target program. Typical events are memory references, heap
allocations, procedure calls, I/O operations, and others. Control switches between the
Execution Monitor (EM) and the Target Program (TP). The EM sends event request
for desired events and transfers control to the TP. The TP executes until a desired event
occurs, reports the event and transfers control back to the EM. Upon receiving the event
report, the EM goes to check a predicate related to the event. The EM and the TP are
implemented as coroutines executing within the same address space. Therefore, the EM
is allowed to inspect the state of the TP for additional information, such as the values
of the variables, if necessary.
Anna Consistency Checking System
Anna (Annotated Ada) is an Ada extension for specifying constraints (Boolean expres-
sions) as formal comments on Ada constructs, such as type, object, statement, excep-
tion, and others. Given an Ada program with annotations (formal comments), the Anna
Consistency Checking System [46] transforms the annotations into checking functions
and inserts into the Ada program the calls to these functions at the points of poten-
tial specification violation, e.g., assignments, procedure calls and type conversions. To
improve the performance of the self-checking program in a multiprocessor system, for
each checking function, a buffer task and a checking task are introduced, which execute
concurrently with the Ada program being checked. The buffer task maintains a queue of
check requests. The checking function enqueues check requests with data to the buffer
task. The checking task dequeues them and performs the consistency checks. Upon
detection of an inconsistency, the checking task can ignore the inconsistency, report the
inconsistency to the Ada program, or terminate the Ada program.
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BEE++
BEE++ [47] is an object-oriented application framework for the development of dis-
tributed dynamic analysis tools. The distributed program being monitored is instru-
mented a priori with sensors. A sensor provides a placeholder for an event that is either
user-defined or predefined by BEE++. Whenever a sensor is encountered during pro-
gram execution, an event (loaded with runtime data) is generated and sent off to one or
more analysis tools bound to that sensor. These tools are used individually or in concert
to detect the desired correctness or performance of the program. BEE++ provides a
symmetric communication model similar to client-server approach, while allowing the
client (the target program) and the server (the analysis tool) to be placed in the same
entity, thereby providing peer-to-peer functionality. Events flow between the target pro-
gram(s) and the analysis tool(s) over two distinct communication pathways: Firehose
and Trickle. Firehose is used for high bandwidth communication from the target pro-
gram(s) to the analysis tool(s) through an event collection buffer. Trickle is designed for
asynchronous target program control and asynchronous monitoring in a way similar to
the ptrace facility in Unix to control the thread/process and read/write data. BEE++
supports a variety of system architectures ranging from single processes to parallel and
networked programs. Multiple clients (executing either as separate threads or processes)
are able to connect to a single analysis tool and a single clients is able to connect to
multiple analysis tools (running either on the same node or on different nodes). In the
latter case, the client sends the events just to one analysis tool which in turn forwards
the events to the other tools.
Observer-Worker System
An observer-worker system [48] aims to online check the behaviors of a distributed system
in operation. It consists of two distinct components: a worker and an observer. The
worker is an actual implementation of the system behaviors based on the given system
specification. The observer is a formal model of some adequately selected aspects of the
system behaviors that should be observed. The formal model is derived from the system
specification, and thus can be used as observer for different implementations of the same
system specification. The complexity of the formal model is restricted so as to guarantee
that the correctness of the formal model can be verified exhaustively. In this sense,
the observer can be seen as a reference, i.e., a correct implementation of the selected
system behavior to be observed. The actual implementation (the worker) is continuously
checked agains the reference (the observer) by comparing the worker behaviors with the
observer behaviors at some observable output level. For this purpose, the observer need
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to know and to access the runtime information of the worker behavior. There are two
ways in doing so: a) the worker informs explicitly the observer whenever an event of
interest occurs; b) the knowledge of the worker behavior is directly accessible to the
observer.
DynaMICs
Dynamic Monitoring with Integrity Constraints (DynaMICs) [49] is a software tool that
supports the generation of constraints, the construction and insertion of constraint-
checking code, and the tracing of failures with respect to requirements. A constraint
is specified as event-condition-action. The event defines what and when the variables
of interest need be monitored as well as when the constraint should be checked. The
condition defines in first order logic the relationships between program variables, asser-
tions on individual variables, and others. The action defines the response to a constraint
violation, such as recording state in a history log, saving state for error recovery, per-
forming state rollback, or initiating graceful degradation. For each constraint there is a
set of instrumentation points in the program code at which the constraint-checking code
is executed. The constraint-checking code may be an inline sequence of instructions,
a function call, or a trigger that initiates the constraint check on a separate process.
DynaMICs provides analysis tools to identify automatically the instrumentation points
at the source code, intermediate code, or object code level. The work of the monitor is
delegated either to the process executing the program code or to another process not
necessarily on the same processor.
Falcon
Falcon [50] is a set of tools that support online capture of the application-level in-
formation, online analysis of the captured program information and online steering of
the parallel program under investigation, which result in online modification of the pro-
gram’s execution. The information to be monitored ranges from single program variables
to program (compound) states constituted of multiple program components running in
parallel. The target program is instrumented a priori with the sensors and actuators
generated from the given monitoring specification. Sensors are used to obtain the state
information during program execution; whereas actuators to modify the execution of the
target program. A single central monitor resides on a remote machine. Multiple local
monitors execute on the target program’s machine so that they are able to rapidly inter-
act with the program. However, they may also run concurrently on different processors,
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using a buffer-based mechanism for communication between the target program and
the monitoring threads. A local monitor can also inspect the program variables asyn-
chronously with the execution of the target program by employing probe code without
requiring prior instrumentation of the target program. A steering client runs as a sepa-
rate program on a remote machine. It provides an interface for the user to interact with
the target application. Several steering servers operate as threads in the application’s
address space, thereby gaining direct access to the application components and the abil-
ity to execute asynchronously with application threads. They read incoming monitoring
events from the local monitors and respond to these events with appropriate steering
actions. Each steering server shares with each local monitor a circular buffer located
in jointly accessible memory. A steering server can perform simple program changes
by enabling probe code, or perform more complex changes by enacting the actuators
embedded in the application code.
Jass
Java with Assertions (Jass) [51] is a pre-compiler for Java programs annotated with
assertions. The assertions are special formatted comments instrumented into the target
Java program. Jass translates the assertions into Java code so that they can be checked
during program execution. The assertions are defined as boolean expressions of Java
extended with certain keywords as well as existential and universal quantifier over finite
sets. Besides the usual assertions, such as method pre- and postconditions, class invari-
ants, loop invariants and variants, and the like, Jass additionally supports refinement
checks and trace assertions. Refinement checks are used to test whether a subclass is a
behavioral subtype of its superclass. Trace assertions are used to monitor whether the
trace of actual method invocations is valid.
JPaX
Java PathExplorer (JPax) [52] is a general-purpose monitoring mechanism, which can be
easily extended to other programming languages. JPaX extracts the events of interest
from the execution trace of the target program and then analyzes these events via a
remote observer process, which may run on a different processor. JPaX consists of three
main modules: an instrumentation module, an interconnection module, and an observer
module. The instrumentation module instruments the target program using the given
instrumentation script. During runtime the instrumented program emits the events
of interest to the interconnection module. The interconnection module transmits these
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events further to the observer module. Upon receiving these events, the observer module
dispatches them to a set of observer rules, each of which performs a particular analysis.
The observer module currently provides two kinds of analysis: logic-based monitoring
and error pattern analysis. The former checks the execution trace against the properties
written in high level logics, such as safety properties and bounded liveness properties in
linear temporal logic; the latter analyzes the execution trace using various error pattern
detection algorithms.
MaC
Monitoring and Checking (MaC) [53] is an integrated framework for monitoring real-
time systems, which can check general requirements related to an execution trace and to
numerical computation. MaC consists of three components: a filter, an event recognizer,
and a runtime checker. The filter is a collection of code fragments that can extract state
information of the target system, such as the values of the variables and the function
calls, and then send it to the event recognizer. These code fragments will be inserted into
the implementation of the target system at the source code level or at the executable
code level. From the received state information the event recognizer tries to detect
the occurrence of an event defined at the requirements level in the given monitoring
script, and then sends the detected event to the runtime checker. In addition, the event
recognizer may also forward the values of the variables of interest to the runtime checker.
Based on the events (and the values) it received thus far, the runtime checker is able to
check the conformance of the sequence of events to the specification of requirements as
well as the correctness of the requirements related to numerical computation.
MoP
Monitoring-oriented Programming (MoP) [54] is a general monitoring architecture inde-
pendent of any specific programming language as well as any specific monitoring logic.
Each MoP tool specializes this architecture to support specific programming languages
and specific property logics. MoP consists of modules of three levels: process controllers
at the interface level, code generators at the language level, and logic engines at the
logic level. The workflow of the architecture is from the process controllers through the
code generators to the logic engines and then from the logic engines through the code
generators back to the process controllers. The properties to be checked are expressed
in some formal logic and inserted as annotations in the form of comments at various
user selected places in the target program. The process controller takes the annotated
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program as input and extracts the formal specifications from the annotations as output.
The code generator takes the formal specifications as input and transform them into the
formulas in some intermediate format as output. The logic engine then takes the formu-
las as input and produces abstract pseudocode for checking the formulas as output. The
pseudocode is target language independent, therefore, the logic engine can be reused
for different target languages. The code generator now takes the pseudocode as input
and translates it into code fragments of the target language as output. The process
controller then takes the code fragments as input and generates the executable code of
the monitored program. The code fragments can be embedded into the target program
or implemented as a different process, potentially on a different machine. In the latter
case, the target program is instrumented so as to transmit the events of interest to the
monitoring process.
Noninterference Monitoring
Noninterference Monitoring [55] is a hardware monitoring system designed for testing
and debugging real-time software systems without interfering with the execution of the
target system. The monitoring mechanism is implemented by using an auxiliary hard-
ware (MC68000 processor) connected with the internal buses of the target system. In
the monitoring phase, the activities of the target system are recorded at the user-defined
conditional breakpoints. The runtime information can be collected at three abstraction
levels: process level (e.g., system calls), function level (e.g., function calls) and instruc-
tion level (e.g., step-by-step execution trace). The target program is restricted to be
written in a block-structured programming language in which a block is a function (or
a procedure) and the scope of each variable is determined statically. The collected ex-
ecution history of the target system is post-processed independent of the execution of
the target system. The raw bus data is recorded in machine-level code, which contains
not only the key values of the events of interest but also some redundant information.
In the post-processing phase, the collected data is reorganized into meaningful informa-
tion so as to represent the execution history in higher level logical views, e.g., process
precedence graph and function calling tree.
Sentry System
The Sentry System [56] is a low precision and low cost monitoring system for sequential
and concurrent C programs. A sentry is a monitoring program generated from the given
target program with annotations. The annotations in the target programs are specially
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formatted comments derived from the properties to be checked. These comments are
later replaced by the calls to macros for communication with the sentry. The sentry
and the target program run in parallel and communicate with each other via shared
memory. The target program is non-blocking in the sense that it never waits for the
sentry. This means that some snapshots of the program state may be overwritten by
the target program before being read by the sentry. In other words, some snapshots
may be lost, hence, the precision is low. The sentry is able to check both safety and
progress properties. Generally, the sentry reads a snapshot as it becomes available and
then evaluates the properties. If a violation is detected, the sentry sends a signal to the
target program, which may initiate some user-defined recovery action.
Temporal Rover
Temporal Rover [57] is a code generator. Given a program instrumented a priori with
temporal properties as comments at some points in the source code, Temporal Rover
parser converts this annotated program into an identical program except that the prop-
erties are now implemented in source code, too. This program code of the properties
is compiled and linked as part of the program under investigation. During program
execution, the correctness of the properties is checked by executing the generated code.
Temporal Rover is able to deal with Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Metric Temporal
Logic (MTL), an extension to LTL by supporting relative time and real-time constraints.
In the case that a liveness property being checked keeps failed so far, Temporal Rover
concludes conservatively that so far the property is failed, because it does not know
during runtime whether or not the program will continue executing. The user is allowed
to define reaction to the checking results. In addition, Temporal Rover has a special
code generator targeted for embedded systems and concurrent systems. The generated
verification code is allowed to be executed in a separate process or processor. The host
and target code communicate via serial port, remote procedure call (RPC), or any other
communication protocols.
Runtime Monitors for Distributed Hard Real-Time Systems
Validation of distributed systems needs to account for the interactions among nodes (or
processes). Given a distributed hard real-time system under observation (SUO), which
contains a fixed set of nodes and a fixed set of interconnects between nodes, the following
three monitoring architectures at a conceptual level are presented in [12]:
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1. (Single) Bus-Monitor Architecture: The monitor is attached to the data bus of the
SUO, i.e., the monitor and the SUO share a common bus. The monitor receives
messages over the bus just like any other process in the system and then does error
checks based on the collected messages. If a violation is detected, the monitor will
send messages to the other processes through the shared bus.
2. Single Process-Monitor Architecture: A dedicated monitor bus is introduced. Each
process pi in the SUO is attached to the data bus as well as the monitor bus. In
addition, pi is instrumented to send data to the monitor over the monitor bus.
The monitor checks the correctness of the incoming data and signals the processes
in the SUO if a violation is detected.
3. Distributed Process-Monitor Architecture: Each process pi in the SUO has its
own monitor Mi, which may be implemented on the same hardware as pi. The
distributed monitors are attached to a dedicated monitor bus for communicating
with each other in order to reach agreement on diagnoses.
Online Failure Prediction
Recall that a failure is a kind of misbehaviors that can be observed from outside the
system (see Section 2.1). Online failure prediction [26] aims to assess the potential
occurrence of a failure in the near future in terms of seconds or minutes based on
the measurements of the actual system parameters, such as resource usage, CPU load,
system calls, etc., during runtime. There exists a wide spectrum of techniques dealing
with online failure prediction in the literature. Almost 50 failure prediction methods
have been surveyed in [26]. According to the type of the system parameters monitored
at runtime, online failure prediction methods are classified into four categories as follows:
1. Failure Tracking: The occurrence of failures is tracked in terms of, say, the time
of the occurrence and the types of the failures. This data can be analyzed to
predict the potential failures that may come up in the near future. E.g., the
probability distribution of the time to the next failure can be estimated based on
the knowledge obtained from the previous failure occurrences. Due to sharing of
resources, system failures may occur close together in a temporal as well as in a
spatial sense.
2. Symptom Monitoring: An error inside the system may cause abnormal behaviors
of the system parameters, such as memory usage, disk I/O, and unusual function
calls. These side-effects are called symptoms of the error. By analyzing the system
parameters monitored at runtime it is possible to detect symptoms that indicate
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an upcoming failure. E.g., a functional relationship between the selected system
parameters and the probability of failure occurrence can be established based on
the previously recorded training data. By applying this function to the selected
system parameters measured during runtime, it is possible to estimate the proba-
bility that a failure will occur. From a set of reference data points (i.e., training
data) it is also possible to derive a decision boundary that partitions the data
points into either failure-prone or non-failure-prone. Failure prediction can then
be accomplished by checking on which side of the decision boundary the current
date point is. In addition, failure prediction can also be performed by comparison
of the currently measured value to the expected value computed from the system
model with failure-free behaviors. If they differ significantly, an upcoming failure
is predicted. Failure can also be predicted by analyzing several successive samples
of the system parameters monitored during system operation.
3. Detected Error Reporting: When an error inside the system is detected, an error
event is usually reported using some logging mechanism. The error reports that
have occurred within some time interval (data window) before the current time
can be analyzed so as to decide whether or not a failure will occur in the near
future. E.g., from a set of event reports (training data) it is possible to identify
some conditions or patterns that indicate the occurrence of failures. Based on the
distribution of error types, the error generation rate, and the like, it is also possible
to predict upcoming failures.
4. Undetected Error Auditing: Auditing searches for incorrect states (undetected
errors) inside the system by checking on data that has or has not been used or
produced. It can be applied oﬄine as well as during runtime. E.g., memory
auditing inspects data structures by checksumming. Failures can then be predicted
based on the undetected errors found by auditing.
Quantitative Verification at Runtime
Quantitative verification [58] is an extension of conventional model checking to proba-
bilistic models, which are typically variants of Markov chains, annotated with costs and
rewards. The properties to be checked are expressed quantitatively in temporal logic
extended with probabilistic and reward operators. Quantitative verification at runtime
[59] deals with self-adaptive software, which is capable of adapting autonomously to
changes in the environment. For this purpose, the probabilistic model of the software
system is augmented with the parameters that reflect the changes in the environment
in terms of, say, failure rates and costs/rewards. Whenever the changes in the environ-
ment are monitored, quantitative verification will be triggered to check whether or not
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the system model under the updated environment still satisfies the given quantitative
properties. In case that a violation is detected, adaptive maintenance will be carried
out. Quantitative verification can also help to make adaptive decisions so as to ensure
that under the updated environment the system model after adaptation continues to
satisfy the given quantitative properties.
Online Monitoring vs. Online Model Checking
Compared to oﬄine verification techniques, such as testing, model checking, theorem
proving, and the like, online monitoring is rather lightweight due to its concern with the
correctness of the actual system execution1 against the given properties, which makes it
scale up well to deal with large complex systems. Generally speaking, online monitoring
consists mainly of the following two parts:
• Observer : record the state information during system execution;
• Analyzer : analyze the collected data to figure out (or sometimes predict) anomaly
in the target system.
Different monitoring techniques in the literature implement the observer as well as the
analyzer in different ways. Online model checking does bear some similarity to online
monitoring. It consists also of an observer and an analyzer. However, the implementa-
tion of the observer and the analyzer for online model checking is quite different from
the existing monitoring techniques to our knowledge.
Given the source code of a target program and its behavioral model, we assume that a
transition of the behavioral model corresponds to a predefined unit of execution of the
target program. Here, a unit of execution is supposed to be atomic and thus determines
the smallest distinguishable states of the program. It may be a statement or a composi-
tion of several statements within a basic block. A state is allowed to be monitored only
before or after a smallest unit of execution of the target program.
The properties to be checked usually fall into two categories [28]: state predicate and
process predicate. A state predicate is a boolean function defined on the state space of the
target program, which is attached to a specific point of control in the program code. A
process predicate is a boolean function defined on the set of sequences of program states,
which is attached to a range of control points rather than a single point of control in
the program text.
1i.e., a sequence of states monitored while the target system is running.
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Online checking a state predicate is trivial for both online monitoring and online model
checking due to its association with a specific point of control. For online monitoring,
the state predicate is checked at the time when the program’s execution reaches the
related point of control. For online model checking, the state predicate may be checked
before the program’s execution reaches the related point of control (see Chapter 7).
Online checking a process predicate has to do with a sequence of program states. For
a variable occurring in the property to be checked, the observer needs to probe every
change in the value of this variable. It is important to decide the appropriate locations
in the program code at which the program state should be monitored. The granularity
of observation can thus have a large impact on online monitoring. If it is too coarse,
important information may be missed; if it is too fine, the monitoring overhead will
be too high. E.g., if the monitor tries to check for overflow after every arithmetic
operation, it has to introduce more additional delay into the execution of the target
system. In case that the property is derived from the system requirements, the semantic
gap between the property and the execution trace make it usually difficult to establish a
correct relationship between the low level state information and the high level (atomic)
elements in the property.
Unlike online monitoring, online model checking does not directly check the correctness
of the actual execution trace. Instead, a sequence of partial (behavioral) models of the
target program that covers the actual execution trace is checked during runtime. The
analyzer is thus implemented as online model checker. Errors found in some partial
model may indicate errors in the actual execution trace or even predict errors that may
happen in the future. To make online model checking available, each partial model
covers the system behaviors up to a bounded length of k steps (for some appropriate
positive integer k). Here, a step is a unit of execution of the program code, which
corresponds to a transition in the behavioral model. By partitioning the program model
into a finite set of k-bounded partial models, each state information observed at runtime
is just used to decide which partial model should be checked next. Consequently, the
observer needs to probe the state information at runtime more or less every k steps. The
granularity of the observation is decided by the predefined bound k. This is different
from what the observer of online monitoring does, which needs to monitor the values of
the variables of interest whenever they are updated. In addition, the behavioral model
is usually generated at a higher abstraction level than the source code of the target
program. Compared to the source code, it is easier for the program model to establish
a correct semantic relationship with the properties to be checked.
Of course, model checking is usually time consuming. Doing model checking online is a
challenge. This is what the thesis tries to overcome.
Chapter 4
Online Model Checking
Mechanism
No matter how fast a model checking algorithm does execute, it has to explore (explicitly
or implicitly) all possible behaviors of the program model under investigation. This
feature of exhaustive exploration makes the model checking process not only memory
consuming but also time consuming, not to mention the state space explosion problem.
It looks unrealistic and impossible to do model checking online while the target program
is running. In this thesis, we don’t mean to propose a faster model checking algorithm to
ensure the universal correctness of the program model to be checked. Instead, we’d like to
present an online model checking mechanism whereby efficient model checking techniques
can be exploited during runtime to ensure the correctness of the actual execution trace
of the target program. What’s more, several acceleration techniques are also presented
to speed up the online model checking process.
4.1 Online Model Checking
Briefly speaking, online model checking aims to ensure the correctness of the actual
execution trace with respect to the given property by means of exploring during runtime
a sequence of those (bounded) behavioral models that cover the execution trace of the
target program.
4.1.1 Problem Statement
As a prerequisite for online model checking, the following information needs to be pre-
pared in advance:
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• Source code P of the software application to be online checked, which is written in
a sequential programming language and instrumented with finitely many monitor-
ing points so as to probe actual state information during program execution (see
Chapter 5).
• Behavioral Model M of the software application, which is obtained in the software
development phase or abstracted from the source code P (see Chapter 5). There
may exist different behavioral models built at different levels of abstraction and/or
from different perspectives, which reflect accordingly the behaviors of the software
application at different levels of abstraction and/or from different perspectives.
• Mapping function α(s) = ŝ, which links each (concrete) state s of the program code
P with the corresponding (abstract) state ŝ of the program model M if any, or else
with a special state null if no appropriate abstract state is available. For different
behavioral models of the same software application, there may exist respectively
different mapping functions.
• LTL Property f , which specifies a characteristic predicate on the valid paths with
respect to the given program model M .
For a software program under investigation, let P be the source code and M a behavioral
model (at some level of abstraction and/or from some perspective) of P, then the map-
ping function α(s) = ŝ from the state space of P to that of M is determined. Given any
property f to be checked, online model checking aims to explore whether f holds along
the execution trace of P during program execution by checking f against a sequence of
(bounded) models derived from M following the program state monitored at runtime.
Errors in the behavioral model may indicate potential errors in the source code of the
target program; therefore, instead of checking the correctness of the actual execution
trace itself with respect to the property f , the basic idea of the online model checking is
to check f against a set of bounded models that covers the actual execution trace of P.
Executing P results in a sequence of (possibly infinite) program states, called execution
trace. A (program) state consists of a point in the control flow of P together with an
assignment of values to all the variables of P at this point of control. The state space of
P is a Cartesian product of the definition domains of all the components that constitute a
state. Not all the states in the state space of P can be reached by executing P, regardless
of the input values. It is intuitive to think of an execution trace of P as a trajectory of
a point moving through space [28].
Fig. 4.1 below illustrates the three possible relationships between the behavioral model
and the source code (implementation) of the target program:
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(i) equivalent – each concrete path ρ corresponds to an abstract path ρ̂ and vice versa;
(ii) over-approximate – each concrete path ρ corresponds to an abstract path ρ̂, but
not the other way round, i.e., the state space of the model is larger in this case;
(iii) under-approximate – each abstract path ρ̂ corresponds to a concrete path ρ, but
not the other way round, i.e., the state space of the model is smaller in this case.
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Figure 4.1: Three relationships between system model and system implementation
It is easy to reason that in the case of over-approximation, if no error is found in the
behavioral model, there is no error in the program code, too. This checking result is a
true positive. However, if an error path ρ̂ is found in the model, there may not really
exist a corresponding error path ρ in the program code as depicted in Fig. 4.1 (ii),
i.e., the error path ρ̂ is spurious. This checking result is a false negative. In the case
of under-approximation, if an error path ρ̂ is found in the model, there must exist a
corresponding error path ρ in the program code. This checking result is a true negative.
However, if no error is found, there may still exist errors in the program code, because
not all of the concrete paths, say the error path ρ, are reflected in state space of the
model as depicted in Fig. 4.1 (iii). This checking result is a false positive.
Since we check the (behavioral) model instead of the actual execution trace of the target
program, it is possible to deal with not only safety properties but also liveness properties.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, a general LTL property can be decomposed into a safety
property and a liveness property whose conjunction is the original [30]. It is fair to say
that a nontrivial LTL property is either safety or liveness or a conjunction of a safety
property and a liveness property. Without loss of generality, let f = x ∧ y where x is a
safety property and y a liveness property. Then, we have ¬f = ¬x ∨ ¬y, which means
any counterexample against f is either a finite witness against the safety property x or
an infinite witness against the liveness property y.
Therefore, it is sufficient for us to concern ourselves with online model checking for safety
properties as well as for liveness properties respectively.
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4.1.2 Online Model Checking for Safety Properties
Given a behavioral model M and a safety property f to be checked, let B¬f be the
Bu¨chi automaton generated from ¬f . Obviously, B¬f accepts exactly those paths that
contradict f . Recall that a finite bad prefix is sufficient to contradict a safety property
(see Section 2.3). Consequently, it is possible to reduce the safety checking problem to
the invariant checking problem, which can be solved by reachability analysis. However,
if B¬f is nondeterministic, which is usually the case, it is not that easy to decide whether
a finite prefix is a bad prefix or not, especially when f contains some redundancy. One
possible solution is to build a deterministic automaton B′¬f from B¬f by means of the
subset construction [40]. The set of accepting states of B′¬f is set to be those states that
are universal. Now we need to simply check the invariant that the product of M and
B′¬f never reaches an accepting state of B
′
¬f .
Note, however, that B′¬f is, in the worst case, exponential in the size of B¬f , and thus
doubly exponential in the size of f , i.e., the number of subformulas of f . What’s more,
not every nondeterministic automaton can be transformed to an equivalent deterministic
one. E.g., the LTL formula FGp, no deterministic automaton can accept all those paths
that satisfy FGp [30].
According to [40], a safety property f may fall into one of the following three types:
(i) intentionally safe – all the bad prefixes against f are informative. E.g., Gp, all its
bad prefixes are informative in the sense that they reflect the whole reason why
Gp is violated.
(ii) accidentally safe – not all the bad prefixes against f are informative, but every
computation that violates f has at least one informative bad prefix. E.g., G(p ∨
(Xq∧X¬q)) = Gp, the minimal bad prefixes against Gp are also the bad prefixes of
G(p∨(Xq∧X¬q)), but they do not reflect the whole reason why G(p∨(Xq∧X¬q))
is violated.
(iii) pathologically safe – there exists at least one computation that violates f but has
no informative bad prefix. E.g., (G(q∨FGp)∧G(r∨FG¬p))∨Gq∨Gr, from its
negation (F(¬q∧GF¬p)∨F(¬r∧GFp))∧F¬q∧F¬r = F¬q∧F¬r∧(GFp∨GF¬p),
it is easy to see that its bad prefixes coincide with the bad prefixes of Gq ∨Gr.
Due to the existence of the liveness subformulas FGp and FG¬p in the formula,
no bad prefixes of Gq∨Gr, which is always finite, can tell the whole reason against
(G(q ∨ FGp) ∧G(r ∨ FG¬p)) ∨Gq ∨Gr.
The safety properties that are accidentally safe or pathologically safe contain redundancy
in them. E.g., the subformula Xq∧X¬q = X(q∧¬q) is unsatisfiable, thus can be safely
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removed from G(p∨ (Xq∧X¬q)); the subformula GFp∨GF¬p is equivalent to Gtrue,
thus can be safely removed from F¬q ∧ F¬r ∧ (GFp ∨GF¬p), too.
To simplify the problem, we assume that f contains no semantic redundancy or at least
no syntactic redundancy. This assumption is reasonable and feasible. If a safety formula
contains some liveness subformulas, these liveness subformulas are definitely redundant.
We’d better optimize the given formula so that all the liveness subformulas are deleted.
The resulting formula is thus syntactically safe in the sense that X, G and R are the
only temporal operators allowed. As a consequence, it is rather simple to figure out
those states that are universal in the Bu¨chi automaton B¬f , whereby there is no longer
need to build the deterministic automaton from B¬f .
Let’s redefine the acceptance condition of B¬f as the set of all such states in B¬f that
are universal. Now we need to simply check the invariant that the product of M and
B¬f never reaches an accepting state of B¬f . In this sense, the new acceptance condition
of B¬f is also called finial condition, which defines a set of targets (or error states) with
respect to f .
Of course, for the simple formula f = Gp, B¬f is trivial and the acceptance condition is
¬p. We need to search only the state space of M for a finite path that reaches an error
state satisfying ¬p. For a general safety property, we have to search the state space of
M ×B¬f for an error path in M . In the worst case, the whole state space of M ×B¬f
needs to be explored. If the state space of M × B¬f in terms of states and transitions
is too large, it is impossible to conduct an exhaustive exploration within a reasonable
time and memory consumption. In industry, for a complex software system, the state
space of its behavioral model M alone may be too large to be searched exhaustively
for checking a simple safety property like Gp. That is, even for a simple property, it
is difficult to prove it completely (during the software development phase) [60]. This is
one reason why we present the concept of online model checking.
By doing reachability analysis during runtime, we only need to search a smaller partial
state space in M ×B¬f that covers the actual execution trace of the target program in
operation. The basic idea [61] is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. While the software system is
running, whenever a monitoring point is reached, the current state si, i.e., the values
of the system variables of interest, will be probed. The corresponding abstract state
ŝi = α(si) (if any) can thus be delivered to the online model checker. This in turn will
trigger a new checking process: a partial state space starting from ŝi in M × B¬f will
be explored within a predefined time limit (i.e., checking cycle) allocated to the online
model checker in order to see whether there exists an error path from ŝi to a set of
error states defined by the final condition of B¬f . In this way, the state space explosion
problem can be avoided to a large extent.
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Figure 4.2: Online reachability checking
Due to the limited checking time, only finitely many (transition) steps in M ×B¬f , say,
the next k steps starting from the monitored state can be explored in each checking
cycle. Let I(ŝi) be the initial condition derived from the state ŝi monitored in the
i’th checking cycle. The partial state space being explored in this checking cycle can
thus be specified as I(ŝi) ∧ |[M ]|k ∧ |[B]|k. Recall that |[M ]|k =
k∧
i=1
RM (si−1, si) resp.
|[B]|k =
k∧
i=1
RB(qi−1, qi) encodes the paths of length k in M resp. B¬f (see Section 2.5).
The path constraint |[C]|k =
k∨
i=0
FB(qi) tests if some state qi |= FB within k steps. As a
consequence, the online reachability problem in the i’th checking cycle can be formally
defined as
|[M,f ]|ik = |[M ×B¬f ]|ik = I(ŝi) ∧ |[M ]|k ∧ |[B]|k ∧ |[C]|k.
Figure 4.3: Bounded model checking during runtime
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It is easy to see that online reachability checking is a kind of bounded model checking
[22] applied during runtime as illustrated in Fig. 4.3.
Traditional bounded model checking is done oﬄine in a way as illustrated in Fig. 4.4:
starting from k = 0, if no error is found in any initialized path of length bounded by k,
we progressively increase the bound k by 1, looking for errors in longer and longer traces,
until either an error is found, or the complete threshold is reached, or until the checking
problem becomes intractable. In our case, we leave the bound k unchanged all the way,
instead, we change the initial condition I(ŝi) of the paths of length k in each checking
cycle as illustrated in Fig 4.3. In effect, we are searching deeper and deeper in the state
space of M × B¬f while the state space being checked in each cycle is relatively small.
Therefore, by doing BMC during runtime it is quite possible to find deep, corner-case
errors (if any) in the large state space of a highly sophisticated software system.
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Figure 4.4: Traditional bounded model checking
In each checking cycle, the online model checker may return the following three possible
checking results:
• unsafe: the checking process is finished in time, and an error path is found. How-
ever, in case that the system model is an over-approximation, the result may be
a false negative. Anyway, the error path is useful for the user to figure out the
reason.
• safe: the checking process is finished in time, but no error path is found. However,
in case that the system model is an under-approximation, the result may be a false
positive. Otherwise, the software system is safe within the next k steps relative to
the current monitored state ŝi.
• unknown: the checking process is enforcedly terminated due to timeout. In this
case, the state space of the bounded model is not exhaustively explored. Since no
error is found before timeout, it is reasonable to believe optimistically that there
might be no error in the neighborhood of the currently monitored state.
38 Chapter 4. Online Model Checking Mechanism
4.1.3 Online Model Checking for Liveness Properties
Now let’s consider the case that f is a liveness property. If we make every state in B¬f
accepting, then B¬f becomes universal, i.e., it accepts any path. That is, there is no
way to contradict a liveness property using any finite prefix. A run in B¬f is accepting,
if and only if it goes through some accepting state infinitely many times. For finite state
automata, this means that we have to look for an accepting loop. A loop is accepting,
if some state in it is accepting.
Every execution trace of a software system can be thought of as a trajectory of a point
moving through space. It is not easy to detect a loop in it during runtime, because this
requires to look backward into the “history” or look forward into the “future”. Since
we check the behavioral model, instead of the execution trace, of the software system,
both the “history” and the “future” are accessible, theoretically speaking, it is possible
for us to online check a liveness property during program execution.
Nevertheless, even on the model level it is still not easy to detect a loop during runtime,
especially when the loop is too long to be detected in one checking cycle, e.g., its length
is greater than the predefined bound k. Fortunately, we can avoid detecting a loop by
means of the state-recording translation [62] from liveness checking to invariant checking,
which can then be solved by online reachability analysis.
Recall that an infinite path (s0, s1, · · · , si−1)(si, · · · , sn) with sn = si is usually made up
of two parts: the finite prefix (s0, s1, · · · , si−1) and the infinite loop (si, · · · , sn−1, sn).
Let’s call (s0, s1, · · · , si−1) the stem, (si, · · · , sn−1) the loop body, and sn (i.e., the second
occurrence of si) the loop closure. The basic idea of the state-recording translation is to
memorize the starting point si of every (potential) loop, a loop then is detected at some
state sn whenever sn = si.
Given M ×B¬f = (V,D,R, I, L, F ) with V = VM ∪ VB, D = DM ×DB, R = RM ∧RB,
I = IM ∧IB, L : DM×DB → 2AP∪AP¬f , and F = FB. In order to do the state-recording
translation, three auxiliary variables are introduced: (i) h ∈ D stores the starting state
of a potential loop; (ii) vl ∈ {st, lb, lc} marks the location of a state in the path with st
for stem, lb for loop body, or lc for loop closure; (iii) vf ∈ {true, false} indicates the
occurrence of an accepting state in the loop body. In addition, the symbol ~ is used
to stand for an arbitrary but fixed state in D. The state-recording translation is then
done by adding additional predicates to the initial condition and the transition relation
of M × B¬f respectively. As a result, we can redefine the product of M and B¬f as
M ×B¬f = (V ′, D′, R′, I ′, L′, F ′), where
• V ′ = V ∪ {vl : Dl, vf : Df} with Dl = {st, lb, lc} and Df = {true, false};
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• D′ = D ×D ×Dl ×Df ;
• R′((r, h, vl, vf ), (r′, h′, v′l, v′f )) ≡ R(r, r′) ∧ (R1 ∨R2 ∨R3 ∨R4 ∨R5) with
R1 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (h′ = ~) ∧ (vl = st) ∧ (v′l = st) ∧ ¬vf ∧ ¬v′f ,
R2 ≡ (h = ~) ∧ (h′ = r′) ∧ (vl = st) ∧ (v′l = lb) ∧ ¬vf ∧ (v′f → r′ ∈ F ),
R3 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (v′l = lb) ∧ (vf → v′f ) ∧ (v′f → vf ∨ r′ ∈ F ),
R4 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (h′ = r′) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (v′l = lc) ∧ vf ∧ v′f , and
R5 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (vl = lc) ∧ (v′l = lc) ∧ vf ∧ v′f );
• I ′(r, h, vl, vf ) ≡ I(r) ∧ (I1 ∨ I2) with
I1 ≡ (h = ~) ∧ (vl = st) ∧ ¬vf , and
I2 ≡ (h = r) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (vf → r ∈ F );
• L′(r, h, vl, vf ) = L(r);
• F ′ ≡ (vl = lc).
The initial condition I is partitioned into two categories characterized by the predicates
I1 and I2 respectively. For each (old) initial state r ∈ I, r may be the starting point of
some potential loop, or it may be not the starting point of any potential loop. The former
case is governed by I2, r is then saved in h, and vl = lb, indicating that r is located in the
body of a potential loop. If vf is set to true, then r must be an accepting state; otherwise,
it doesn’t matter. The latter case is governed by I1, r is not saved, h is thus set to the
default value ~, and vl = st, indicating that r is located on the stem of the path. In this
case, r being accepting state or not is meaningless, therefore, vf = false. Consequently,
we may have three (new) initial states in I ′: (r, h = ~, st,¬vf ), (r, h = r, lb,¬vf ), and
(r, h = r, lb, vf ) for r ∈ F .
Generally, for each (old) state r ∈ D, let x 6= r be any ancestor of r, then we may
have the following seven types of new states in D′: (r, h = ~, st,¬vf ), (r, h = r, lb,¬vf ),
(r, h = r, lb, vf ), (r, h = x, lb,¬vf ), (r, h = x, lb, vf ), (r, h = r, lc, vf ) and (r, h = x, lc, vf ).
The transition relation R is partitioned into 5 categories characterized by the predicates
R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5 respectively. For each (old) transition (r, r
′) ∈ R, R1 is applied to
the state (r, h = ~, st,¬vf ) to get (r′, h = ~, st,¬vf ), which are located on the stem of
the path, i.e., no state is recorded; R2 is also applied to the state (r, h = ~, st,¬vf ), which
makes the state r′ recorded, thus we have (r′, h = r′, lb,¬vf ) and (r′, h = r′, lb, vf ) (for
r′ ∈ F ) located in the body of a potential loop; R3 is applied to the following four states
(r, h = r, lb,¬vf ), (r, h = r, lb, vf ), (r, h = x, lb,¬vf ), and (r, h = x, lb, vf ) to produce
(r′, h = r, lb,¬vf ), (r′, h = r, lb, vf ), (r′, h = x, lb,¬vf ) and (r′, h = x, lb, vf ) accordingly,
which are all located in the loop body; R4 is applied to the state (r, h = r
′, lb, vf ) to
obtain (r′, h = r′, lc, vf ), which indicates that the previously saved state r′ does occur
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again, thus, the potential loop is indeed a loop; R5 is applied to two states (r, h = r, lc, vf )
and (r, h = x, lc, vf ) to produce (r
′, h = r, lc, vf ) and (r′, h = x, lc, vf ) respectively.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates a state-recording process with respect to a path of M×B¬f . From s0
to si−1 is the stem of the path, which is obtained by applying I1 and then applying R1
finitely many times. At the state (si−1,~, st,¬vf ), applying R2 we have (si, si, lb,¬vf ),
in which the first occurrence of si is saved in h , indicating the starting point of a
potential loop. Since si is not accepting, thus vf = false. Afterwards, applying R3
finitely many times until the state sj is reached. Since sj is an accepting state, thus vf
is changed from false to true, indicating that an accepting state has occurred in the
loop body. Repeatedly applying R3 thereafter until R4 is applicable, which indicates
that si is reached again. Consequently, we get the state (si, si, lc, vf ), i.e., the end of the
loop. Thus, an accepting loop is detected. It is easy to see that the accepting loop is
(synchronously) detected as soon as the saved state occurs the second time. Since then
only R5 is applicable, thus h, vl and vf remain unchanged.
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Figure 4.5: A state-recording process
The new definition of M ×B¬f accepts a path whenever vl = lc, which indicates that an
accepting loop with respect to B¬f is detected. As a consequence, the liveness checking
problem is transformed into the invariant checking problem.
Let |S| be the number of (reachable) states and |T | the number of the transitions in the
original M ×B¬f . After the state-recording translation is applied, the number of states
is O(|S|2) and the number of transitions is O(|S| · |T |).
The above state-recording translation can be used to detect the shortest counterexample
(if any). If it doesn’t matter whether or not the counterexample is the shortest one, then
we do not need to take any state as the starting point of a potential loop. Instead, we
record only those accepting states as starting points. Thus, a loop is detected, whenever
a saved accepting state occurs again. In this way, the auxiliary variable vf is no longer
useful. As a result, we need to redefine the initial condition and the transition relation
of M ×B¬f as follows:
• I ′(r, h, vl, vf ) ≡ I(r) ∧ (I ′1 ∨ I ′2) with
I ′1 ≡ (h = ~) ∧ (vl = st)
I ′2 ≡ (h = r) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (r ∈ F )
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• R′((r, h, vl, vf ), (r′, h′, v′l, v′f )) ≡ R(r, r′) ∧ (R′1 ∨R′2 ∨R′3 ∨R′4 ∨R′5) with
R′1 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (h′ = ~) ∧ (vl = st) ∧ (v′l = st)
R′2 ≡ (h = ~) ∧ (h′ = r′) ∧ (vl = st) ∧ (v′l = lb) ∧ (r′ ∈ F )
R′3 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (v′l = lb)
R′4 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (h′ = r′) ∧ (vl = lb) ∧ (v′l = lc)
R′5 ≡ (h = h′) ∧ (vl = lc) ∧ (v′l = lc)
Let |F | be the number of accepting states, which is usually smaller than |S|. Following
this translation, the number of states is O(|S| · |F |) in the worst case. In addition, the
size of state is also smaller, since vf is not used. Of course, there are also other ways to
optimize the state-recording translation, but this is not the focus of this thesis.
4.1.4 Discussion
Before a software application is released (or deployed), it has usually already been verified
or validated intensively by means of different checking techniques, e.g., static analysis,
simulation and testing as well as model checking, and others. Therefore, it is reasonable
to believe that the remaining errors (if any) may locate quite possible in some deeper
corner in the state space of the software system. The online model checking mechanism is
a relatively lightweight solution to detect such kind of subtle errors. We’ve addressed that
the online model checking problem can be reduced to the online reachability checking
problem. We now discuss in the general sense some points that should be noticed.
Falsification instead of Verification
Obviously, our online model checking is by nature a lightweight and incomplete method.
It is suitable to falsify instead of verify the behavioral model against the given property.
Due to its working on the model level, the online model checker is able to look into the
near future in the system model. Thus, it can not only detect the error that has already
happened, but also the error that has not happened yet, as illustrated in Fig. 4.6.
bs0 bs1
bs2 bsi
Figure 4.6: Online model checking process
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If the partial state space starting from the current (abstract) state, say ŝi, overlaps with
an unsafe region marked as
⊗
, the (potential) error can be detected by the online model
checker even if the unsafe region is located much far away from the initial state(s), say
ŝ0, of the system model. In case that the actual execution trace (see the dotted line) has
already gone through the unsafe region, then the error has already happened. Otherwise,
the error has not happened yet. In this sense, the online model checker is able to predict
potential error(s) during system execution.
Let k be the predefined bound of the partial state space that needs to be explored from
each monitored state and k′ the number of steps that have been actually searched by
the online model checker in each checking cycle. Then, an error located at the (k′+1)’th
step can not be seen by the online model checker in the current checking cycle. E.g., the
unsafe region near the state ŝ2 in Fig. 4.6 can not be seen by the online model checker
in the second checking cycle.
Monitoring Points
There are a finite number of monitoring points. They are distributed in the source code
of the software program to be checked such that
• any two adjacent monitoring points are at distance at most k steps1;
• any location other than monitoring point in the source code is at distance at most
k steps from some monitoring point;
• between any two locations with distance greater than k steps there must exist
some monitoring point.
In Section 5.3 we’ll discuss how to determine the monitoring points in the the control
flow graph derived from the source code of the target program. For any two adjacent
monitoring points x and y in the control flow graph, it is easy to reason that there may
be more than one (loop free) path between x and y. Let δmax(x, y) be the maximum
distance between x and y. In addition to the above mentioned three conditions, we’d
like to make k − δmax(x, y) ≤ ε as illustrated in Fig. 5.3, where ε > 1 is an integer far
smaller than k. That is, for any monitoring point x, the succeeding monitoring point y
is located at most k and at least k − ε steps away from x.
No matter what property is to be checked, the state information is always monitored
at each predefined monitoring point. That is, the locations of the monitoring points
1Here one step means one transition (step) in the model of the target program.
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keep unchanged. There is no need to adjust the monitoring points in the source code
for online checking different properties. That is, after the monitoring points have been
instrumented in the source code, we are able to build the executable of the software
program once and for all.
Pre-Checking and Post-Checking
In each checking cycle the online model checker just uses each (current) state si mon-
itored during program execution to locate a starting point ŝi = α(si) in state space of
the program model (see Fig. 4.2). Thereafter, it conducts (semi-)exhaustive search for
errors independent of the execution of the target program. Theoretically speaking, the
online model checker may run ahead of or fall behind the progress of the target program.
We say that the online model checker is in the pre-checking mode, if it has explored at
least k steps before timeout, i.e., k ≤ k′; otherwise, it is in the post-checking mode, i.e.,
k′ < k, as illustrated in Fig. 4.7, where the bullets represent the states monitored during
system execution. It is easy to see that in the pre-checking mode the searched region
has already covered the next monitored state before timeout, while in the post-checking
mode the searched region may not cover the next monitored state, provided that the
online model checker conducts an exhaustive search. Otherwise, the next monitored
state may not be covered in both cases.
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− _rear: int
− _capacity: int = ARRAY_SIZE
− _cur_cap: int
# enqueue(incoming_struct: Monitor_Node): void
# dequeue(outgoing_struct: Monitor_Node*): void
# checkFullQueue(): int
# checkEmptyQueue(): int
+ MonitorQueue()
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+ writeIntoQueue(): void
+ readFromQueue(buffer: char*): void
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Figure 4.7: Pre-checking and Post-checking
For a nontrivial LTL formula f , we usually have to search in the state space of M×B¬f .
Given an execution trace of the program to be checked, let s0  s1  · · · si  · · · be
the sequence of states monitored during runtime at the locations l0, l1, · · · , li, · · · in the
source code. For each state si, there is a unique state ŝi = α(si) in M . For the sake of
simplicity, we also use si to refer to ŝi in M in case of no ambiguity. Generally, si may
be compatible with more than one state in B¬f . On the one hand, the automaton B¬f
is usually not deterministic; on the other hand, there may be more than one path going
through the states s0, s1, · · · , si in M , which matches more than one run in B¬f . Let Qi
be the set of states in B¬f such that for any state qi ∈ Qi, the compound state (si, qi) is
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reachable via a path through the states s0, s1, · · · , si from some initial state in (s0, q0).
Strictly speaking, in each checking cycle the online model checker should conduct the
search in the partial state space of M × B¬f starting from the set of states (si, Qi) at
least k steps in depth.
Ideally, we assume that the online model checker conducts an exhaustive search. Let si
be the state monitored at the location li for the current checking cycle and sj be the
state monitored at the location lj for the next checking cycle. The starting points in the
next checking cycle are then calculated based on the current starting states (si, Qi) and
the next monitored state sj . Formally, let forwardReachableSet(si, Qi, k, ε) be the set
of the (compound) states in M × B¬f that are forward reachable from (si, Qi) within
[k − ε, k] steps in the current checking cycle.
In the pre-checking mode the online model checker can reach the states at least k steps in
depth. Hence, we are able to obtain forwardReachableSet(si, Qi, k, ε) as a byproduct.
Consequently, (sj , Qj) = {(s, q) ∈ forwardsReachableSet(si, Qi, k, ε) | s = sj} are the
starting points of the next checking cycle.
In the post-checking mode the online model checker may not reach the states up to k
steps in depth before timeout. A possible solution is to resume the search work in the
next checking cycle until forwardReachableSet(si, Qi, k, ε) is obtained. There is also a
simple but not precise way to calculate (sj , Qj). That is, we can simply set Qj to all
the states in B¬f that are compatible with sj , i.e., Qj = {q ∈ Q | sj |= LB(q)}. As
a consequence, the states in (sj , Qj) are not ensured to be reachable from some initial
state of M × B¬f . Thus, the checking result may be not precise in case that some
compound state (sj , qj) does reach an error state, but is not reachable from any initial
state of M ×B¬f , i.e., the detected error is spurious.
In some special cases, there is no need to calculate (si, Qi) for each monitored state si.
E.g., the property f = Gp, the automaton B¬f is trivial, therefore, the search is carried
out in M ; from the automaton BFGp in Fig. 2.6 (b) it is easy to see that the states q0
and q1 are always reachable without any constraint on the paths to them, thus, we have
Qi = {q0, q1} for each si.
Variables of Interest
In the case that there are too many variables in the behavioral model M , considering
the monitoring overhead and the communication overhead between the target program
and the online model checker, it is better to monitor only the most important variables
in the system model, e.g., the program counter, the variables occurred in the property
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to be checked, and the variables in the cone of influence of the property, etc.. The user
should decide what variables are of most interest in the system model.
Let V˜ (⊂ V ) be the subset of the variables to be monitored during system execution.
This incomplete information may not identify an individual state, but a set of states in
the behavioral model, whose valuations on the variables in V˜ equal to the observed ones.
That is, there may exist more initial states in each checking cycle. This, in turn, means
that the workload of the online reachability analysis may become heavy. One possible
solution is to calculate an abstraction M˜ of the system model based on the variables in
V˜ . In this way, each monitored state can be mapped to a unique state in M˜ .
In this thesis, we assume that all the variables in M can be monitored during runtime.
Producer-Consumer Problem
During system execution a sequence of (concrete) states are probed whenever a mon-
itoring point is reached. These states are stored in a (ring) buffer. In each checking
cycle, the online model checker tries to take a state from the buffer as a new start-
ing point, and then goes to search for an error path in the state space derived from
the behavioral model and the property to be checked. This procedure is similar to the
producer-consumer problem as shown in Fig. 4.8.
Runtime
Execution Trace
put take Online
Model Checking
Ring
Buffer
Figure 4.8: Producer-Consumer problem
In our case, we do not restrict the communication manner between the target system
and the online model checker, be it synchronous or asynchronous. To reduce the impact
of the online model checker on the execution of the target system, we do assume that
the monitored states are put into the buffer without blocking. That is, if the buffer is
full, the oldest state will be replaced by the latest one. On the other hand, if the buffer
is empty, i.e., no state is available, the online model checker will resume the search work
of the last checking cycle, provided that the work has not finished yet.
The buffer is used to balance the precessing speed of the both sides to some degree.
Ideally, no state in the buffer would be dropped by the online model checker. In reality,
it is not always the case. The producer might produce more data than the consumer
could consume in time. Generally, the online model checking is carried out in the state
space of M × B¬f . Let si be the starting point of the last checking cycle, and sj the
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starting point of the new checking cycle. If more than one state between si and sj is
dropped by the online model checker, then it is not easy to calculate precisely (sj , Qj),
because sj may be far away from si in the state space. In this case, the error detected
may be spurious. Of course, this is no longer a problem for the invariant checking that is
carried out in the state space of M , since every monitored state is reachable from some
initial state of M .
In this thesis, if the search is carried out in the state space of M ×B¬f , we assume that
no (monitored) state is dropped by the online model checker, i.e., the buffer is large
enough to record all the states monitored during runtime.
Others
The user is allowed to check different properties during runtime, i.e., the properties to be
checked are not necessary to be predefined in advance during the software development.
The properties that have not been checked during the software development, or have been
checked during the software development, but not completely proven, can be checked at
runtime after the software is deployed.
The study [63] indicates that “many informal requirements are specified as properties
of segments of program executions.” In practice, it is usually not necessary to check the
whole software program during runtime, instead, it is better to focus on some specific
component or piece of code in the component, which is considered to be safety critical.
4.1.5 Prototype Implementation and Experimental Results
Given the behavioral model M and the property f , be it safety or liveness, theoretically,
we are able to check M against f during runtime by means of online invariant checking.
The invariant derived from M and f partitions the state space of M × B¬f into two
non-overlapping regions: the set of valid states and the set of invalid states. What we
need to do is to search for the potential error states in the partial state space of M×B¬f
starting from each (abstract) state monitored during system execution.
As a proof of concept, we’ve implemented a prototype of the online model checking al-
gorithm using the explicit state based breadth first search (BFS). We adopt the explicit
state based instead of the symbolic state based search because by searching the explicit
state space we are able to observe the internal structure of the system model and its
influence on the performance of the online model checker. In addition, the implementa-
tion is relatively simple, it’s a good starting point for us to learn intuitively the details
of the online model checking mechanism.
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Online Model Checking Algorithm for Safety Properties
Suppose that the time limit allocated to the online model checker is T time units. Each
monitored (concrete) state is first mapped to the corresponding abstract state and then
stored in the predefined ring Buffer during system execution. Algorithm 4.1 shows the
pseudo code of the online model checking algorithm for safety properties. This algorithm
is simplified in the sense that for each monitored state s the starting points for a new
checking cycle are calculated in a simplified way: (s,Qs) = {(s, q) | q ∈ Q∧ s |= LB(q)},
i.e., s is composed with any state q in B¬f such that s |= LB(q).
The algorithm is straightforward: the online model checker waits until the Buffer is not
empty, then it takes a state s from the Buffer. After calculating the starting points
(s,Qs), it then goes to search the partial state space starting from (s,Qs) layer by layer
until some error state is reached, or the whole partial state space has been explored, or
the timeout occurs, whichever happens first. In the former two cases, the online model
checking algorithm will terminate itself with the output unsafe or safe accordingly. In
the latter case, the online model checker will output safe, if it has explored at least k
steps in depth; or unknown, otherwise. Afterwards, a new checking cycle starts. The
online model checker tries to take a new monitored state from the Buffer. If there is a
state available, then it will repeat the above mentioned process; otherwise, it will resume
the search work in the last checking cycle.
Concretely speaking, the algorithm is made up of the following three parts:
• lines 3-9: in the first checking cycle, the online model checker deals with the
initial state s, which is stored in the Buffer initially. r set is the set of starting
(compound) states derived from s and B¬f for the first checking cycle. If no
error state is found in it, the states in r set are pushed into the queue for further
processing, followed by a null as delimiter between layers. The index of layer starts
with zero. step records the index of the current layer being processed.
• lines 12-25: in the current checking cycle, the online model checker goes to explore
the state space of M × B¬f layer by layer (by means of BFS). For each state r
(other than null) in the queue, its successors are calculated. r is stored in the
auxiliary queue tmp queue. The states in next(r) are then pushed into the queue
for further processing in case that no error state is found in it. Otherwise, the
online model checker will terminate itself with the output unsafe. Notice that the
states of two adjacent layers in the unfolded state transition graph may coexist
in the queue. The delimiter null is just used to separate them. When a null is
encountered, it indicates that all the states in the current layer have been checked,
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therefore, step needs to be increased by one. It is worth pointing out that a state
r′ in next(r) will not be added into the queue if r′ ∈ tmp queue ∪ queue, i.e., r′
has already occurred in the current layer. That is, the number of states in queue
may decrease to zero. In this case, the online model checker will terminate itself
with the output safe. Otherwise, it will continue to check the states in the next
layer until the timeout occurs.
• lines 27-38: when the timeout occurs, the online model checker will output safe,
if at least k steps in depth has been explored; or unknown, otherwise. Thereafter,
a new checking cycle starts. If the Buffer is not empty, the online model checker
takes a new current state s and then calculates a new set r set of the starting
points for the new checking cycle. Similar to the initial case, the states in r set
are pushed into the queue followed by null, if no error is found in it, and step
is reset to 0. If no state is available in the Buffer, the online model checker will
simply resume the search work left in the last checking cycle.
Algorithm 4.1: Explicit State-based Model Checking Algorithm
input : M,B, T, k
output : safe, unsafe, unknown
1 begin
2 wait ( isEmpty(Buffer) == false) //wait until Buffer 6= ∅
3 set timer to T time units //initial checking cycle
4 s←− Buffer //pop
5 r set = {(s, q) | q ∈ IB ∧ s |= LB(q)} //s ∈M
6 i f ∃r ∈ r set s.t. r.q ∈ FB then return unsafe
7 queue = r set //initialize queue
8 queue←− null //insert delimiter of layers
9 step = 0
10 tmp queue = ∅ //auxiliary queue
11 while isEmpty(queue) == false do
12 r = (s, q)←− queue //dequeue
13 i f r 6= null then //r is not delimiter of layer
14 tmp queue←− r //enqueue
15 next(r) = {(s′, q′)| s′ ∈ next(s) ∧ q′ ∈ next(q) ∧ s′ |= LB(q′)}
16 for each r′ ∈ next(r) do
17 i f r′.q ∈ FB then return unsafe
18 i f r′ 6∈ tmp queue ∪ queue then queue←− r′ //enqueue
19 endfor
20 else //null is dequeued (delimiter of layers)
21 step++
22 tmp queue = ∅
23 i f isEmpty(qeueue) == false then queue←− null //delimiter
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24 else return safe
25 endif
26 i f isT imeout(timer) then
27 i f step ≥ k then output safe
28 else output unknown
29 set timer to T time units //new checking cycle
30 i f isEmpty(Buffer) == false then //Buffer 6= ∅
31 s←− Buffer //pop
32 r set = {(s, q) | q ∈ Q ∧ s |= LB(q)} //s ∈M
33 i f ∃r ∈ r set s.t. r.q ∈ FB then return unsafe
34 queue = r set //initialize queue
35 queue←− null //insert delimiter of layer
36 step = 0
37 tmp queue = ∅
38 endif
39 endif
40 endwhile
41 end
The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the number of the states and transitions
in the partial state space having been searched. In theory, compared to the simplified
solution, it is usually more time-consuming to determine precisely the starting points
for a new checking cycle. How to calculate the exact starting points efficiently is a topic
worth further research. In practice, it should be acceptable to sacrifice accuracy for
speed. Although the online model checker might report spurious errors, theoretically, it
does not overlook real errors (if any) in the partial models having been checked.
Online Model Checking Algorithm for Liveness Properties
As for liveness checking, we have to search for an error loop in the state space of M×B¬f .
To this end, for each (compound) state r = (s, q), we introduce a “memory” of r,
denoted as memo(r), to memorize those accepting states that can reach r. Initially,
memo(r) = {r}, if q is an accepting state; or memo(r) = ∅, otherwise. We need then to
modify the for loop in Algorithm 4.1 in the following way:
16 for each r′ ∈ next(r) do
17 i f r′.q ∈ FB ∧ r′ ∈ memo(r) then return unsafe
17′ memo(r′) += memo(r) //update the memory of r′
18 i f r′ 6∈ tmp queue ∪ queue then queue←− r′ //enqueue
19 endfor
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It is easy to reason that an accepting loop (counterexample) can be detected, if r′ is an
accepting state and belongs to memo(r), because r′ is reachable from r and vice versa.
In this case, the algorithm returns unsafe. Otherwise, memo(r′) is updated by inheriting
the memory of r (line 17′).
Experimental Results
Two experiments have been carried out on the Linux platform with Pentium-IV 3.00Ghz
CPU and 1GB RAM. Our goal is to determine how far away the online model checker is
able to look into the near future from each (monitored) state of the given model within a
predefined time interval. The explicit state models are selected from the benchmark set
BEEM [64]. They are finite state machines (FSM) derived from mutual exclusion algo-
rithms, communications protocols, and so on, in research or industry settings. However,
the corresponding source code is not available. This is not a problem because we focus
on the model checking part, not on the state monitoring part. The real execution trace
can be replaced by the “execution trace” generated randomly from the corresponding
finite state machine. Thus, for each monitored state si, we have ŝi = si.
Model Type State Transition Avg. Out-Degree
Max. Out-
Degree
BFS 
Height
Max.
Stack
Boolean 
Variables
Min. Look-
ahead
Max. Look-
ahead
Avg. Look-
ahead
sorter_1 Controller 20544 30697 1.5 5 198 617 36 40 299 103
collision_1 Communications protocol 5593 10792 1.9 5 57 617 25 26 81 48.7
synapse_2 Protocol 61048 125334 2.1 18 41 2349 46 7 28 21.5
driving_phils_2 Mutual exclusion algorithm 33173 81854 2.5 9 150 3702 27 31 97 65.7
blocks_1 Planning and Scheduling 7057 18552 2.6 6 19 4263 23 8 21 14
peterson_1 Mutual exclusion algorithm 12498 33369 2.7 5 54 1862 30 13 39 31.7
szymanski_1 Mutual exclusion algorithm 20264 56701 2.8 3 72 2064 27 13 90 49.7
hanoi_1 Puzzle 6561 19680 3 3 256 4376 36 56 103 75.9
iprotocol_2 Communications protocol 29994 100489 3.4 7 91 443 39 18 451 50
phils_3 Mutual exclusion algorithm 729 2916 4 6 17 518 18 156 357 265
cyclic_scheduler_1 Protocol 4606 20480 4.4 8 55 1819 40 23 437 278
rushhour_1 Puzzle 1048 5446 5.2 9 73 535 28 66 248 150.7
rushhour_2 Puzzle 2242 12603 5.6 10 80 906 32 36 408 116.4
pouring_1 Puzzle 503 4481 8.9 9 13 348 16 42 101 71.9
reader_writer_2 Protocol 4104 49190 12 19 13 4097 25 4 16 9.9
pouring_2 Puzzle 51624 1232712 23.9 25 15 44509 18 1 4 2
Table 4.1: Experimental results of online invariant checking
One experiment is conducted for online invariant checking. 16 models are selected from
the BEEM benchmark set. The features of these models are given in the number of
states, the number of transitions, the average degrees of states, the height of BFS, and
the maximal stack of DFS as well as the number of Boolean (state) variables. The
invariant to be checked is f = Gp, where the propositional formula p is derived from the
set of the states in each model. The experiment is designed to compute for each model
how many steps (i.e., transitions) the online model checker is able to look ahead from
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each state in the model within T = 1ms2. The experimental results in Table 4.1 show
the minimal, the maximal and the average look-ahead from the states of each model.
It is easy to see that the out-degrees of the states and the number of the Boolean variables
have a large influence on the look-ahead performance of the online reachability checking.
The other experiment is conducted for online liveness checking. The selected model is
driving phils 2, which is derived from a mutual exclusion algorithm of processes accessing
several resources, motivated by “The Driving Philosophers” [65]. The property to be
checked is f = G(ac0 → Fgr0), where the proposition ac0 denotes that process 0 requests
a resource and the proposition gr0 denotes that the resource is granted to process 0. In
other words, if process 0 requests a resource, the resource will be granted to it eventually.
This is a liveness property, its negation is F(ac0∧G(¬gr0)). The Bu¨chi automaton B¬f
is illustrated in Fig. 4.9. It shows that the error path must end with a loop satisfying
G(¬gr0), i.e., ¬gr0 holds in each state on the loop.
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Figure 4.10: Experimental results of online liveness checking
In this experiment, the checking cycle is set to T = 5ms, i.e, the online model checker
has at most 5ms to do the search work in each checking cycle. The monitored states are
sampled every five steps from the execution trace generated randomly from the model.
The experimental result in Fig. 4.10 is obtained by running 2000 checking cycles. The
X-axis represents the checking cycles and the Y-axis (transition) steps checked in each
checking cycle. The property is not violated at least up to these 2000 checking cycles.
The minimal look-ahead is 23 steps, the maximal look-ahead is 74 steps and the average
look-head is 57.2 steps relative to the corresponding monitored states.
2The actual runtime may be more than 1ms in case that the timeout signal is not processed in time.
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Extend Online Model Checking Algorithm by means of Random Search
As far as explicit state based search is concerned, random search is a natural way to
improve the performance of our online model checking algorithm in terms of the look-
ahead steps (in each checking cycle) so that those models with a high density of states
can also be checked efficiently during runtime.
The paper [42] also justifies the random search approach by saying that “since BMC is
generally used to find counterexamples in contrast to proving that a property holds”, and
“the ability to use a random search is an advantage of the explicit state engine”, although
“this process may miss executions and thus counterexamples”. The experimental results
in [42] indicate that the explicit state based random search for BMC is surprisingly “as
effective as SAT-based BMC in finding short counterexamples for safety properties”.
Here the “short” counterexamples are at a depth of at most 50 steps in the state space.
In our case, a simple solution is to conduct a random BFS by introducing a new func-
tion select(r, dlim) to select randomly dlim successors of r if necessary, where dlim is a
predefined threshold on the out-degrees of the states in the model. If |next(r)| ≤ dlim,
select(r, dlim) = next(r). Otherwise, |next(r)| > dlim, then select(r, dlim) selects ran-
domly or in some heuristic way dlim states from next(r). As a result, the for loop in
Algorithm 4.1 can be modified in the following way:
16 for each r′ ∈ select(r, dlim) do
17 acceptance checking code
18 i f r′ 6∈ tmp queue ∪ queue then queue←− r′ //enqueue
19 endfor
Experimental Results
Two experiments have been carried out on a Linux platform with Intel Core 2 Duo
3.00Ghz CPU and 4G RAM. The model used is driving phils 2, which has 33,173 states
and 81,854 transitions. The average out-degree of the model is 2.5, the maximal out-
degree is 9 and the minimal one is 1. The state variables are encoded into 27 Boolean
variables. The timer is set to T = 5ms for each checking cycle. The experimental results
in Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12 are obtained by running 200 checking cycles respectively.
For online invariant checking, the minimal, maximal and average look-ahead are 63, 146
and 113.3 steps respectively in the case dlim = 2; 48, 103, and 85.8 in the case dlim = 3;
47, 102, and 83.0 in the case that no random search is used. The liveness property to
be checked is also G(ac0 → Fgr0). The minimal, maximal and average look-ahead are
44, 143, and 99.4 steps respectively in the case dlim = 2; 23, 85 and 64.5 in the case
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dlim = 3; 30, 96 and 64.8 in the case that no random search is used. Considering that
the average out-degree of the model is 2.5, we are not able to gain much improvement
in performance by setting dlim to 3. However, we do gain better performance by setting
dlim to 2.
Figure 4.11: Online invariant checking by means of random BFS
Figure 4.12: Online liveness checking by means of random BFS
In the prototype the function select(r, dlim) is implemented to select states randomly.
In practice, the source code is usually validated by simulation and testing in the soft-
ware development phase. Some heuristic information learned in this process, e.g., which
control branch is more important, can be used to weight the related transitions in the
model. Accordingly, the function select() can be implemented in such a way that im-
portant transitions have more chance to be selected. If a state is reached more than one
time, at each time a well-defined select() function should select different successors of
this state. In addition, the threshold dlim can also be adjusted dynamically. In effect,
the function select() samples randomly the bounded paths of the model during runtime.
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4.2 Accelerating Online Model Checking
Doing model checking online has to suffer from the limited execution time allocated to
each checking cycle. The performance of online model checking depends on the search
algorithm, the underlying hardware and the operating system as well as the complexity of
the problem to be checked. Therefore, we can accelerate online model checking by means
of reducing the workload, speeding up the search engine and using parallel computing.
4.2.1 Reducing Workload
After the given model checking problem is transformed into the reachability problem, the
product of M and B¬f is reformulated as a finite automaton, denoted still as M×B¬f =
(V,D,R, I, L, F ) for the sake of convenience.
Oﬄine Forward Exploration
The transition relation R(r, r′) defines a one-step transition relation in the state space
of M × B¬f . That is, applying R to any (compound) state r ∈ D, we get the one-step
successors of r. Let R1 = R, then we define the two-step transition relation R2(r, r′′) =
∃r′.R1(r, r′) ∧ R1(r′, r′′). Now applying R2 to any state r ∈ D, we are able to get the
two-step successors of r. Theoretically, starting from R1 we are able to oﬄine calculate
multi-step transition relations R2, R3, · · · , Rk in the state space of M ×B¬f . Applying
Rm for 1 ≤ m ≤ k to any state r ∈ D, we are able to get the m-step successors of r.
Recall that for safety properties there is no way to extend a bad prefix to an infinite run
which is accepting (see Section 2.3). That is, once an error state is reached, the states
that follow it are all identified as error states. As a consequence, it is safe to search for
error states by multi-step jumping in the state space of M ×B¬f .
Let s be a state monitored at the location l for the current checking cycle. Upon receiving
s, the online model checker first calculates a set r set of the compound states compatible
with s as starting states of this checking cycle, and then simply applies Rk to r set to
see whether or not the the k-step successors of the states in r set may reach some error
state. It is worth pointing out that if an error state is detected, inbetween s and the the
error state there may exist other error states, i.e., the error state detected by multi-step
jumping may be not the one closest to s.
Now let s′ be a state monitored at the location l′ for the next checking cycle. Notice that
the distance d(l, l′) of any two adjacent monitoring points l and l′ falls into the integer
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interval [k − ε, k]. Therefore, the set r′ set of the starting states in the next checking
cycle is r′ set = {r′ | r′ ∈ forwardReachableSet(s,Q, k, ε) ∧ r.s = s′}. Similarly, by
applying Rk to r′ set, the online model checker is able to see whether or not the k-step
successors of the states in r′ set may reach some error state. In this way, as illustrated
in Fig. 4.13, the online model checker avoids searching step by step in the state space of
M ×B¬f .
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Figure 4.13: k-step forward jump
In practice, if Rk is not available due to the complexity of the behavioral model M , then
applying some Rm for 1 < m < k can also speed up the online checking process.
Taking this oﬄine forward exploration into account, the pre-checking and post-checking
defined in Section 4.1.4 is no longer suitable. We say that the online model checker is
in the pre-checking mode, if there is one and only one state available in the ring buffer;
otherwise, it is in the post-checking mode, i.e., there is more than one state available.
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Figure 4.14: d-step forward jump
Although on the model level the distance d(l, l′) of any two adjacent monitoring points
l and l′ may be not unique, d(l, l′) (∈ [k − ε, k]) is unique with respect to the given
actual execution trace of the program to be checked. If this unique d(l, l′) is available
during runtime, then we can also make the online model checker each time take from
the buffer two states s and s′ in a row whenever it is in the post-checking mode. Instead
of jumping k steps forward, the online model checker in this case jumps d(l, l′) steps
forward, provided that s is monitored at the location l and s′ at the location l′, as
illustrated in Fig. 4.14. In this way, it is relatively easy to to calculate the exact starting
points for the new checking cycle. Notice that d(l, l′) and d(l′, l′′) may be not equal.
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Oﬄine Backward Exploration
The final acceptance condition F (ofM×B¬f ) defines the set of error states. Let’s extend
the (initial) unsafe condition F to become F ∗ = F0 ∨ F1 ∨ · · · ∨ Fn by oﬄine backward
exploration up to n steps starting from F0 = F , where Fi = {r | R(r, r′) ∧ r′ ∈ Fi−1}
for 0 < i ≤ n, as illustrated in Fig. 4.15. In effect, the workload of the online model
checker is reduced to a large degree by calculating in advance the backward reachable
set F ∗ from the (original) set F of error states.
*
Figure 4.15: Speed up online model checking
Due to time and memory limits, it is usually difficult for the online model checker to
explore forward too deep in the state space in each checking cycle. Therefore, the bound
k of the online depth-limited search should be set to a relatively small number. However,
the calculation of F ∗ is carried out oﬄine, whereby time and memory are no longer a big
problem. In addition, many existing efficient approaches to reachability analysis can be
used to calculate F ∗. As a consequence, it is possible to explore backward much deeper
in the state space to be checked. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that n is much larger
than k. Of course, this doesn’t mean that n is large enough to solve the problem being
checked. The calculation of F ∗ still suffers from the state space explosion problem, n is
a limit obtained under a reasonable time and memory consumption.
Without the oﬄine backward exploration, the online model checker is able to look ahead
ideally k steps in each checking cycle; with the oﬄine backward exploration, the online
model checker is now able to look ahead ideally k + n steps.
As for the liveness checking problem, although we can transform it into the safety check-
ing problem by means of state-recording translation (see Section 4.1.3), the state space
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is increased quadratically in the number of states, not to mention the number of tran-
sitions. To make the online liveness checking process more efficient, we’d better make
the computation during runtime as simple as possible, but not simpler.
Loop detection is the key to the liveness checking problem, which usually leads to addi-
tional time and memory consumption. A possible solution is to leave the loop detection
done oﬄine. The point is to calculate beforehand a new acceptance condition F0 ⊆ F
such that for any (compound) state (si, qi) |= F0, there exists a loop of length w (w ≥ 1)
through (si, qi) in M ×B¬f , i.e., F0 =
w∨
t=1
Ctl with C
t
l = ∃r1, r2, · · · , rt.F (r0) ∧R(r0, r1)
∧ R(r1, r2) ∧ · · · ∧ R(rt−1, rt) ∧ (rt = r0). Then, as illustrated in Fig. 4.16, we need to
check during runtime whether or not the states in F0 is reachable.
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Figure 4.16: Speed up liveness checking
For a finite state system, the upper bound of w is the depth of backward breadth first
search starting from the accepting states in M×B¬f . In practice, it is usually difficult to
reach this upper bound due to the state space explosion problem. Since F0 is calculated
oﬄine, many existing model checking techniques can be exploited to calculate F0. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that w is much larger than k.
In the case that F0 can not be calculated precisely, let F˜0 (⊂ F0) be the partial solution
obtained within a reasonable time and memory consumption. Then, F ′ = F − F˜0 is the
set of accepting states unknown whether or not there exists a loop through them. We are
able to apply the variant of the state-recording translation to M×B¬f , whereby only the
states in F ′ are selected as the starting points of the potential loops (see Section 4.1.3).
In this way, the state space to be searched can be further reduced to some degree.
The focus of this thesis is on the online model checking mechanism and its applica-
tions. It is reasonable to assume that the multi-step transition relation Rm and/or the
backward reachable set F ∗ (if any) are provided in advance.
4.2.2 Online Symbolic Model Checking
Although there still exists some room to optimize the explicit state based model checking
algorithms, for many complex systems, it is not convenient to store and operate on the
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large state transition graph represented explicitly in terms of states and transitions due
to the huge memory and time consumption. It is widely accepted that the symbolic
state based checking methods are able to handle efficiently a much larger state space
than the explicit state-based ones. By symbolic state based model checking, the states
and the transitions between states are represented implicitly as formulas in quantified
propositional logic (see Section 2.2).
Online Symbolic Model Checking Algorithm
Given Rm and F ∗, for the sake of convenience, let M×B¬f = (V,D,Rm, I, L, F ∗) denote
the finite automaton obtained by the following oﬄine preprocessing :
1. reduce the general model checking problem to the reachability checking problem;
2. calculate a multi-step transition relation Rm for some m > 1; and
3. extend the set F of error states to F ∗ by n-bounded backward reachability analysis.
As a consequence, we are able to conduct the online model checking by means of jumping
in the state space of M ×B¬f , as described in Algorithm 4.2. The algorithm is mainly
composed of the following three parts:
• lines 3-7: in the first checking cycle, the online model checker deals with the initial
state s, which is stored in the Buffer initially. r set is the starting (compound)
states derived from s and B¬f for the first checking cycle. If r set contains error
state(s), then the online model checker will terminate itself with the output unsafe.
jump records the number of jumps made by the search algorithm.
• lines 9-12: in the current checking cycle, r′ set is the set of m-step successors of
the set r set of (current) states. If no error state is found in it, r set is reset to
r′ set. The online model checker will continue to jump another m steps until the
timeout occurs.
• lines 14-21: when the timeout occurs, the online model checker will output safe,
if at least k steps in depth has been searched; or unknown, otherwise. Thereafter,
a new checking cycle starts. If the Buffer is not empty, the online model checker
takes a new current state s and then calculate a new set r set of starting points
for the new checking cycle. If no state is available in the Buffer, the online model
checker simply resumes the search work left in the last checking cycle.
Algorithm 4.2: Online Symbolic Model Checking Algorithm
input : M ×B¬f = (V,D,Rm, I, L, F ∗), T, k
output : safe, unsafe, unknown
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1 begin
2 wait ( isEmpty(Buffer) == false) //wait until Buffer 6= ∅
3 set timer to T time units
4 s←− Buffer //take the first monitored state
5 r set = {r ∈ I |r.s = s} //s ∈M
6 i f r set ∧ F ∗ 6= ∅ then return unsafe
7 jump = 0
8 while r set 6= ∅ do
9 r′ set = {r′ ∈ D | Rm(r, r′) ∧ r ∈ r set} //jump forward m steps
10 i f r′ set ∧ F ∗ 6= ∅ then return unsafe
11 jump+ +
12 r set = r′ set
13 i f isT imeout(timer) then
14 i f m ∗ jump ≥ k then output safe
15 else output unknown
16 set timer to T time units
17 i f isEmpty(Buffer) == false then //Buffer 6= ∅
18 s←− Buffer //take a new monitored state
19 r set = {(s, q) | q ∈ Q ∧ s |= LB(q)} //s ∈M
20 jump = 0
21 endif
22 endif
23 endwhile
24 end
BDD-based vs. SAT-based Search Engine
Both BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) [41] and CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form) can be
used to represent symbolically the set of states and the transition relation between states.
The online symbolic model checking algorithm can be implemented using BDD-based
or/and SAT-based search engine.
The paper [42] compared the performance of the two search engines on 62 benchmarks
drawn from commercial designs. The experimental results indicate that “SAT-based
BMC is more effective than BDD-based BMC” for finding shallow counterexamples
(of length, say, k ≤ 60), while “BDD-based BMC is much faster” for finding deep
counterexamples (of length, say, k > 60). In addition, the experiments done at IBM,
Intel and Compag [22] confirm that “if k is small enough (typically not more than 60 to
80 cycles, depending on the model itself and the SAT solver), it outperforms BDD-based
techniques.” “The deeper the bug is (i.e., the longer the shortest path leading to it is),
the less advantage (SAT-based) BMC has.”
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To our knowledge, it is more convenient to use BDD to calculate the (multi-step) suc-
cessors of any set of states. But in some cases the size of the BDD representation (of
some intermediate result) may be exponential independent of any variable ordering. By
using SAT solver, the successors are not directly calculated, instead, the error paths of
length k are searched (see Section 2.5). There are pros and cons to both BDD-based and
SAT-based methods. In this thesis, we prefer SAT-based to BDD-based search engine.
4.2.3 Parallel Computing
By applying the symbolic model checking technique together with the multi-step transi-
tion relation Rm and the extended set F ∗ of the error states we are able to improve the
performance of the online model checker to some degree. But this is still not the end of
the story.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we concern ourselves with the correctness of the embedded
software applications. Many embedded applications are growing in complexity so as to
fulfill more functionality. The underlying hardware demands higher performance but
lower energy consumption. The interconnected multiple single core processors do not fit
this need any more. As a result, “multicores have become an unavoidable reality”[66].
The added computational power is thus available for other purposes, say, online model
checking, in our case. This can be fulfilled by installing additional (general-purpose)
operating systems to gain more functionality.
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Figure 4.17: Multiple virtual machines (VMs) hosted on multicore processor
However, when the multiple operating systems are running on a multicore processor, it
is a challenge to make them do not interfere with each other, e.g., shared memory access,
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interrupt handling, time management, and so on. Different virtualization techniques,
such as container and virtualization [67], can solve this problem. Considering that many
model checking tools work on top of general-purpose operating systems, a better solution
is to insert an embedded virtualization layer below the multiple operating systems [68],
as illustrated in Fig. 4.17. The hypervisor “virtualizes and arbitrates access to the cores,
memory and devices” to ensure that “each operating system can properly execute in its
own isolated partition” [68].
In this way, we are able to take the advantage of the parallelism of the multicore processor
to improve the performance of the online model checker. Instead of just using one model
checker, theoretically, two or more online model checkers can be used to run in parallel
to speed up the online model checking process.
4.2.4 Prototype Implementation and Experimental Results
In cooperation with Mona Qanadilo and Sufyan Samara from An-Najah National Uni-
versity, Nablus, Palestine, we’ve implemented a simplified version of the online symbolic
model checking algorithm using SAT solver [69]. The checking process is illustrated in
Fig. 4.3. The starting points for each checking cycle (except the first one) are decided in
a simple way similar to that of the explicit state-based implementation in Section 4.1.5.
We adopt a SAT-based instead of BDD-based search algorithm. On the one hand, the
modern SAT solvers are now able to handle efficiently large SAT problems with hundreds
of thousands of variables. According to [42], “SAT-based BMC is more effective than
BDD-based BMC” for finding shallow counterexamples, in particular, “SAT solvers are
quite effective in eliminating logic that is not relevant to a given property.” This means
that “SAT solvers appear to have significant potential for identifying that set of variables
once a suitable property is given.” On the other hand, the size of the BDD representation
(of some intermediate result) may be exponential independent of any variable ordering
in some special cases.
Optimizing SAT Solver for Online Model Checking
The SAT solver we used is zChaff3, because we are more familiar with the implementation
details of zChaff. First of all we need to tune zChaff for online model checking.
Converting a general propositional logic expression into its CNF representation usually
needs to introduce many auxiliary variables and thus results in a larger formula with
3http://www.princeton.edu/~chaff/zchaff.html
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excessive number of variables. The experimental results in [70] indicate that the original
variables have more influence than the auxiliary variables on deduction. zChaff is a
general SAT solver. It does not distinguish the original variables from the auxiliary
ones in the given CNF representation. We’d like to make zChaff distinguish the original
variables from the auxiliary ones and then give the original variables priority over the
auxiliary variables in the assignment process of the SAT solver. For this purpose, we
modified the decision strategy VSIDS (Variable State Independent Decaying Sum) of
zChaff in favor of the original variables.
It is easy to see in Fig. 4.3 that the only difference among the individual SAT problems
in different checking cycles is the initial condition I(ŝi), which indicates the values of the
variables (of interest) monitored at runtime. Since each conflict clause4 learned by the
SAT solver is an implication of some clauses of the given SAT problem, it is redundant
and has nothing to do with the valuation of the variables. Therefore, the conflict clauses
learned in the previous checking cycles can be directly reused in the later checking cycles
to reduce the space to be searched.
To switch from the current checking cycle to the next checking cycle, we’d like to make
zChaff restart in an efficient manner. The restart operation in zChaff simply undoes
the assignments of those variables at the decision levels greater than 0. Without loss of
generality, let’s assume that the monitored variables v1, v2, · · · , vn be ordered in this way.
The initial conditions I(ŝi) and I(ŝi+1) of any two checking cycles in a row usually have
some common part, i.e., the valuation of some variables keeps unchanged. Therefore, we
make zChaff backtrack to the first variable vj (at the decision level j) whose valuation
has been changed in the initial condition I(ŝi+1). Of course, if v1 (at the decision level 1)
is such a variable, then we have to backtrack to the decision level 1 in this case. However,
as long as j > 1, we are able to reuse the deduction results done for v1, v2, · · · , vj−1 in
the next checking cycle. In particular, if the initial conditions I(ŝi) and I(ŝi+1) happen
to be the same, then we simply make zChaff resume the search work in the new checking
cycle, provided that the work has not been completely done.
Experimental Results of Online Model Checking Using Parallel Computing
Theoretically, by introducing Rm and F ∗, we are able to make the online symbolic model
checker look ahead more steps in each checking cycle. A further improvement can be
done using parallel computing. In doing so, we have multiple SAT-based online model
checkers work in parallel on the 64 bit Windows platform with 2.13GHz i3 CPU and
4GB RAM.
4A redundant clause that captures the causes of an inconsistency discovered during the search (for a
solution to the SAT problem) so as to prevent the same conflict from occurring again.
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The case study is the MSI protocol with transient states taken from the NuSMV5 soft-
ware package. It is a basic cache-coherence protocol, which specifies that “There are
three processors, each with one level of cache that stores 1-bit of data and has a 1-bit tag.
The caches are write-back, write-allocate. The bus arbitration is round-robin. There is
a memory with two 1-bit locations.”
We generate the transition relation in CNF from the NuSMV specification of the MSI
protocol and then unroll the transition relation up to k steps. Table. 4.2 lists the
number of total variables, the number of original variables and the number of total
clauses of |[M ]|k for k = 35, 40, 45 and 50 respectively. The original variables account
for about 24% of the total variables in each case. The property to be checked is an
invariant of the form AGp, from which the path constraint |[C]|k is derived in CNF.
The monitored states are sampled every k steps from the execution trace generated
simply by “executing” the model itself. Thus, we have si = ŝi.
k Total Variables Original Variables Total Clauses
35 6662 1620 22663
40 7602 1845 25873
45 8542 2070 29083
50 9482 2295 32293
Table 4.2: MSI model |[M ]|k with path of different lengths
The decision strategy adopted in the SAT solver has a large effect on the performance
of the online model checker. Should we use different decision strategies or use the same
decision strategy in the SAT-based online model checkers running in parallel? To answer
this question, we make two SAT solvers use different decision strategies: the original
VSIDS and the modified VSIDS (in favor of the original variables). Then, we do online
model checking for the MSI protocol with k = 35, 40, 45 and 50 from 201 different initial
states, i.e., 201 checking cycles. In this experiment, we do not set any time limit for
each checking cycle, just let the online model checkers run to the end and then start
the new checking cycle. From one checking cycle to the next checking cycle, the learned
clauses are reused by the SAT solvers. If one SAT solver works faster than the other
one, it will “consume” more initial states than the other SAT solver, i.e., it will run more
checking rounds. This is confirmed by the experimental results illustrated in Fig. 4.18
and in Fig. 4.19. The former shows that the SAT solver with modified VSIDS decision
strategy runs more checking cycles in all the four cases; the latter shows the cumulative
execution time (in seconds) of each SAT solver in all the four cases. It is easy to see that
the SAT solver with modified VSIDS decision strategy takes less execution time while
it runs more checking rounds in three of the four cases.
5http://nusmv.fbk.eu
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In this experiment, we use Round Robin scheduling algorithm, which gives each online
model checker equal priority. Although the two online model checkers do not run on
a real parallel hardware system, the experimental results do reflect the fact that the
decision strategy in favor of the original variables has a better performance on average,
which conforms with the conclusion in [70]. Consequently, we adopt the same decision
strategy (i.e., modified VSIDS) for the SAT solvers working in parallel.
Figure 4.18: Performance of the two decision strategies
Figure 4.19: Cumulative runtime of the two decision strategies
In addition, Fig. 4.20 shows the performance comparison of the modified VSIDS strategy
with the original VSIDS and the static order strategy obtained by online checking the
MSI protocol for k = 50 from 201 different (monitored) states. We zoom in on the results
obtained in the checking cycles from 90 to 128. It is easy to see that the performance
of the modified VSIDS strategy on average is more stable than the other two strategies
in the sense that there exist no large fluctuations in execution time from one checking
cycle to the next.
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Figure 4.20: Performance of the three decision strategies for k = 50
How many online model checkers running in parallel can obtain a better performance?
We use 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 SAT-based model checkers respectively to online check the MSI
protocol for k = 50 from 201 different initial states (i.e., 201 checking cycles). In this
experiment, we also do not set any time limit for each checking cycle, just let the SAT
solvers run to the end and then start the new checking cycle. Given a setting of multiple
model checkers working in parallel, the maximum cumulative runtime of them indicates
the performance of this setting. E.g., in the setting of 5 SAT-based model checkers, we
take the maximum cumulative runtime of the 5 SAT solvers. The experimental results in
Fig. 4.21 illustrate the maximum cumulative runtime (in seconds) of the SAT solver(s)
in each setting.
Figure 4.21: Performance comparison of multiple SAT-based model checkers
It is easy to observe that the setting of 2 SAT-based model checkers outperforms all the
other four settings. The possible reasons are analyzed as follows:
• The experimental results indicate that the learned clauses shared between different
checking cycles do improve the performance of the SAT solvers. But the more SAT
66 Chapter 4. Online Model Checking Mechanism
solvers working in parallel, the less (initial) states each SAT solver can consume,
thus the less the learned clauses are produced to prune the state space for each
SAT solver.
• Each SAT solver has to access cache and memory frequently. We use Round
Robin scheduling algorithm, which gives each model checker equal priority. The
more SAT solvers working in parallel, the higher the probability of access conflicts
due to requesting data at the same time. The memory is a shared resource among
different SAT solvers. If we run more than two SAT-based model checkers in
parallel, it means more synchronization overhead. In this sense, our platform does
not simulate the parallel feature very well.
In this experiment, we notice that the learned clauses have a large impact on the perfor-
mance of the SAT solver. In the setting of 5 SAT-based model checkers, one SAT solver
consumes only 8 (initial) states, but its total execution time is even more than that of
the single solver setting, in which 201 (initial) states are processed.
Considering the price-performance ratio, it is better to use 2 SAT-based model checkers
working in parallel. In addition, we’ve tried to make the 2 SAT solvers share the shortest
learned clauses with each other, but the performance improvement is not satisfying due
to the additional communication overhead. Therefore, we keep the 2 SAT-based model
checkers working independent of each other.
Figure 4.22: Two online model checkers working in parallel
Now let two SAT-based model checkers work in parallel as illustrated in Fig. 4.22. Every
T time units only one model checker is allowed to take a state from the ring buffer. Each
model checker has 2T time units to do the search work. To simulate a general buffer
setting, we use a randomly generated Boolean value to decide whether the ring buffer is
empty or not. For each model checker, if the ring buffer is empty, the model checker will
either resume the search work of the last checking cycle, provided that the work has not
finished yet; or else simply wait until the next checking cycle starts. Otherwise, there is
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a state, say ŝi, available, then within the given 2T time units, the online model checker
tries to search for an error path of length up to k steps in the partial state space derived
from ŝi.
Given the model derived from the MSI protocol for k = 35, the experimental results in
Fig. 4.23 demonstrate the execution of one online model checker in the checking cycles
from 33 to 65 with the predefined time limit 2T = 0.08s. The highlights are described
as follows:
• In the checking cycles 45, 47, 49 and 53 the online model checker can not get a
state from the ring buffer and the search work of the last checking cycle has been
done, therefore, it does nothing but waits for the next checking cycle.
• In the checking cycles 37 up to 40 the online model checker can not get a state
from the ring buffer, since the search work of the checking cycle 36 has not finished
yet, therefore, it resumes the search work of the checking cycle 36.
• In the checking cycle 44 the online model checker resumes the search work of the
checking cycle 43 and finally gets a definite result this time, i.e., no error path of
length k ≤ 35 starting from the given state is found.
Figure 4.23: Execution of one online model checker with the random buffer setting
Let T be the predefined time limit for each checking round. If the online model checker
does not finish the search work within this limited time, it is usually difficult to measure
what percentage of the state space of the behavioral model has been searched within the
given T time units. There is a simple way to estimate this percentage coarsely. Given
a monitored state si, we have the SAT solver run to the end to get the total runtime in
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the bounded model derived from si, denoted as Ttotal. Then, T/Ttotal estimates coarsely
the percentage of the state space derived from si that has been searched by the model
checker in one checking cycle.
Let’s take the MSI protocol for k = 20 as example, which has 3842 variables (including
945 original variables) and 13033 clauses. Recall that for online model checking we do
not need to set k to a large number (thanks to the oﬄine forward and/or backward
exploration). For an initial state, the total runtime Ttotal we measured is about 1.6s.
Then, T = 0.08s indicates that about 0.08/1.6 = 5% of the state space of the bounded
model derived from this state has been searched in one checking cycle.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we present the concept of online model checking, which is the main topic
of this thesis. Online model checking is a lightweight and incomplete method applied at
runtime to falsify, instead of verify, the given behavioral model against the LTL property
to be checked. The errors found in the behavioral model may indicate the errors in the
source code of the target software system.
In theory both safety and liveness properties can be checked during system execution by
online model checking. The basic idea is to reduce the online model checking problem
to the invariant checking problem, which can be solved by online reachability analysis.
Doing model checking online suffers from the limited execution time allocated to each
checking cycle. Its performance depends mainly on the search algorithm and the under-
lying hardware as well as the complexity of the problem to be checked. The workload
of the online model checker can be reduced to some degree by introducing the m-step
transition relation Rm and the n-step backward reachable set F ∗. The performance of
the online model checker can be further improved by using a symbolic state-based search
engine and making more than one online model checker working in parallel.
As a proof of concept, we’ve implemented an explicit state-based and a symbolic state-
based online model checking algorithm. The explicit state-based online model checker is
mainly used to observe the internal structure of the behavioral model and its influence on
the performance of the online model checker. The experimental results indicate that the
density of states in the model and the number of state variables are the two main factors
affecting the speed of the online model checker. The symbolic state-based online model
checker adopts a tailored SAT-solver as its search engine. The experimental results in
different parallel settings indicate that two online model checkers working in parallel can
offer a better price/performance ratio.
Chapter 5
Model Generation and Source
Code Instrumentation
We’d like to apply the online model checking mechanism to embedded control software.
In practice, a software application after release may still contain subtle errors that have
escaped from being detected in the development life cycle. For a safety-critical system,
it is meaningful to catch in time these deep, corner-case errors in the embedded software
during system execution. As explained in Chapter 4, given the source code of the
program to be checked, in order to do online model checking, we need to instrument the
source code with finitely many monitoring points (once and for all) on the one hand,
and to obtain a (behavioral) model of the target program on the other hand. In this
chapter, we focus on model generation and source code instrumentation.
5.1 Embedded Control Applications
Embedded control software is used to control an external environment, which may be
artificial or biological objects, e.g., physical plants and humans. This environment (i.e.,
the controlled objects) is connected to the computer system, on which the control pro-
gram is running, through sensors and actuators or through other input-output interfaces.
The execution of such a kind of software application must meet various timing and other
constraints that are imposed on it by the (real-time) behaviors of the controlled objects.
But this doesn’t mean that the control program has to run as fast as possible. Instead, it
means that all the tasks of the control program should finish execution in the worst-case
by their deadlines. The deadlines are dictated by the controlled objects. A deadline is
hard, if missing it may result in severe consequence(s); otherwise, it is soft [2].
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Our concern is the software applications in such domains as automotive, aerospace, man-
ufacturing control, and the like, which exhibit time-periodic and multimodal features.
Modern control software in these domains is becoming increasingly complicated due to
the following requirements [71] on it:
• operate in distributed and embedded computing environments;
• communicate through different protocols;
• adapt to changes in operating environments; and
• behave in a dependable manner for safety critical systems.
A platform-independent programming abstraction is presented in [72] for specifying the
behaviors of embedded control software with (hard) real-time constraints. According to
[72], a typical control application consists usually of periodic (software) tasks governed
by a mode-switching logic for activating or deactivating tasks. Each (operational) mode
contains a (fixed) set of tasks active in this mode.
E.g., a typical fly-by-wire control system has five operational modes: takeoff, cruise,
autopilot, degraded and landing modes. In each of these modes, different sensing tasks,
control laws, and actuating tasks need to be executed. That is, some tasks are added
to, while others are removed from, the task set of the current mode. For instance, in the
takeoff mode, the landing gear is not needed; in the autopilot mode, the inputs are taken
from a supervisory flight planner, instead of from the pilot’s stick; and in the degraded
mode, some of the sensors and actuators are disabled due to damage.
Intuitively, modes impose some structure on the behaviors of the given control applica-
tion [73]. The control application is in one mode at a time, i.e., there is only one active
mode at any given time. The mode-switching logic determines the possible transitions
from one mode to other modes. It is a kind of finite state machine, in which each state
represents a mode and each transition specifies a possible switching between two differ-
ent modes. A mode switch can result in removing some tasks and adding others. After a
mode switch is finished, all subsequent actions follow the definition of the target mode.
A mode switch may happen while a task is still running. In this case, this task needs to
be continued in the target mode.
In each mode, a set of tasks are executed periodically following some scheduling strat-
egy. A task is a piece of application-level code, which typically implements a control
algorithm. Tasks communicate with each other as well as with sensors and actuators by
drivers. A driver is a piece of system-level code, which provides an abstract interface
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to (physical) devices by transporting and converting values between ports. A port is
abstracted as a typed variable. It keeps its value over time, until it is updated.
There are sensor ports, actuator ports, and task ports as well as mode ports. The
sensor ports are updated by the environment, i.e. sensor ports are treated as elementary
sources of values. All other ports are updated by their respective drivers. A driver may
provide sensor readings for the input ports of a task; or load task results into actuator
ports; or provide task results for the input ports of other tasks.
The task ports are used to communicate data between concurrent tasks or transfer data
from one mode to the next. In general, a task has input ports and output ports. A
typical task has also an internal state, the values at which are inaccessible outside the
task. What’s more, a task has a function from its input ports and the current state to its
output ports and the next state. This function is usually implemented by a sequential
program written in some programming language, say, C code.
In effect, a driver is a function that converts values of sensor ports and mode ports of
the current mode to the values for the input ports of the tasks in the target mode, or
loads the input ports with constants. Once the input ports of a task are updated by
a driver, the task is ready to run. That is, the task is put into a ready queue, from
which the scheduler of the operating system chooses tasks for execution following some
scheduling scheme.
Generally, a task may be mapped to a software-programmable component (in most cases)
with a local operating system, e.g., general-purpose processor (CPP) or application-
specific instruction set processor (ASIP). A task may also be mapped to a hardware
component, e.g., field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or application-specific inte-
grated circuit (ASIC).
In this thesis, we are concerned with the tasks running on top of some real-time operating
system.
5.2 Model Generation
A model is an abstraction of some aspect of a system [71]. The (bounded) models for
online model checking can be obtained at system development phase or by abstraction
from the source code of the program under investigation.
To deal with the increasing complexity of software products, Model-based Development
(MBD) becomes more and more popular in developing software applications in the au-
tomotive, aerospace and other industries. The investigation [74] shows that using MBD
72 Chapter 5. Model Generation and Source Code Instrumentation
can help to shorten the development time, reduce the development costs, improve the
product quality, just to mention some aspects. MBD aims to reduce the complexity
by means of building the design models at multiple levels of abstraction and/or from
different perspectives, analyzing the models, and transforming the models into concrete
(code) implementation [71]. Thus, for a software application developed using MBD, the
design models at different levels of abstraction can be reused for online model checking.
It’s worth pointing out that using MBD does allow verification activities such as model
checking, theorem proving, simulation and testing to be conducted at the model level
in the early design phase. Many errors can thus be detected and corrected early in the
development life cycle, and this, in turn, does decrease the number of errors discovered
during the integration or system test phase. However, for large complex systems, it is
still difficult to prove the correctness of the behavioral model(s) due to the state space
explosion problem. E.g., for composing two mode transition diagrams of a flight guidance
system even in a constrained way, “there are typically over 1020 reachable states” [75].
On the other hand, the code generator used by MBD is usually too complex to be proved
for correctness. According to [74], “some companies are the opinion that the current
code generators are not applicable to generate high safety relevant code.” Indeed, not
all software applications are developed using MBD. Traditional hand-coded software
development is still useful, especially for developing ultrahigh safety critical systems.
In this case, the behavioral models at different levels of abstraction can be generated
directly from the source code of the software application to be checked. In fact, source
code itself is a kind of model describing how the program will behave when executed
[71].
As mentioned in Section 5.1, a mode transition diagram is a kind of finite state machine,
which is generated during the software development phase. Online model checking can
also be used to verify the mode-switching logic against the desired properties specified in
LTL. The execution result of a task in the current mode may trigger a transition to some
next mode. In this sense, each task can be seen as atomic. A typical task is implemented
by a sequential program written, say, in C code, which repeats the following three steps:
receive input data, update internal state and produce output. Therefore, the monitoring
point can be inserted “between the portions of C code which produce output and receive
new input” [76].
In this thesis the attention is paid to checking the functional correctness of a task, which
is identified as important among the others in the task set, during program execution.
Since the focus is on the internal behaviors of the task to be checked, the timeliness of
the task is beyond our concern. It is up to the scheduler to ensure the timeliness of the
tasks in the system.
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5.3 Source Code Instrumentation
We need to identify a finite set of monitoring points in the source code of the program to
be checked. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that the target program is written in
a restricted subset of C that conforms to the (mandatory) requirements of the MISRA-C
coding standard. The monitoring points are determined by partitioning the control flow
graph derived from the source code into a finite set of subgraphs.
5.3.1 MISRA C
The C programming language is widely used to develop the embedded software for
safety critical systems in industry. However, some linguistic features of the C language
are either specified indefinitely or implementation-dependent. To avoid the traps and
pitfalls of C, guidelines for writing safe, portable and reliable code in C are highly
demanded. The Motor Industry Software Reliability Association1 (MISRA) published
in 1998 a coding standard for the C language officially known as MISRA-C:1998 [77].
MISRA-C:2004 titled “Guidelines for the use of the C language in critical systems” [78]
was released and in 2013 the release of MISRA C:2012 [79] was announced. Nowadays
MISAR C has evolved into a de-facto coding standard for developing embedded software
not only in the automotive industry, but also in other industries such as aerospace,
railways, nuclear, defense and medical devices, to name just a few.
To promote the safest possible use of C, the MISRA C standard recommends a restricted
subset of C, which has already established practices in industry. MISRA-C:2004 contains
122 mandatory and 20 advisory rules. The most significant limitations of MISRA-C:2004
[78] are listed below:
Rule 16.2 (required): Functions shall not call themselves, either directly
or indirectly.
Rule 20.4 (required): Dynamic heap memory allocation shall not be used.
These two rules simplify the structure of the states of the target program. Generally, a
program state is identified by the following two parts [28]:
• a control component — a point of control PC, which is not simply the program
counter, but may contain a procedure-calling chain of the target program; and
• a data component — an assignment of values to all the variables, including input
data and internal data, at the given point of control of the target program.
1http://www.misra-c.com
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The points of control are located before (or after) the smallest execution units of the
source code of the target program. The data types declared in the program determine
the smallest distinguishable data components. The Cartesian product of the definition
ranges of all the state components form the state space of the target program. Notice that
this definition covers the states that may never be reached by the program’s execution
for any set of input data. It is indeed undecidable whether a given state may be reached
or not [28].
A program written in a language that allows dynamic memory allocation and (procedure)
recursion results in dynamic data structure and dynamic PC structure respectively for
identifying the states of the program. This increases the complexity of the monitoring
operations. In addition, the resulting state space is usually infinite.
On the contrary, a program written in a language that allows only static memory allo-
cation and no recursion produces a finite state space2 with simple state structure, which
is relatively easy to monitor, because the correspondence of the program variables to
the memory addresses can be established once and for all at compile-time.
To simplify the problem, we assume that the embedded software under consideration
is written in C and compliant to the MISRA C coding standard. Although in specific
cases some rules of MISRA C may be deviated from, in this thesis we suppose that the
above mentioned two rules are always obeyed.
5.3.2 Control Flow Graph
Among the points of control of the target program, we need to select some of them as
monitoring points for online model checking. This is done by analyzing the control flow
graph of the target program.
Given a sequential C program P with function calls (if any) managed by means of macro-
expansion. Since the statements of a sequential program are ordered one after another,
there is a unique entry point and a unique exit point for each statement, i.e., the smallest
execution unit of the source code. To avoid redundancy, the exit point of a statement
and the entry point of the following statement are merged into one. Together with the
entry and the exit points of the program P itself, we are able to uniquely label the entry
and the exit points of all statements of P [18, 80].
Without loss of generality, let’s represent the C program as P = (V, L, l0,T) [81], where
V is the set of typed variables that constitute the data component of the program state,
L is the set of locations, i.e., points of control in the target program, l0 is the entry
2Provided that all the data types are defined with finite ranges in the program.
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point of the program P, and T is the set of transitions between the control points. Each
transition is defined as a tuple (l, c, l′) with l, l′ ∈ L and c a constraint over the free
variables in V∪V′. The variables in V record the values at the (present) control location
l, while the variables in V′ record the values (of the variables from V) at the (next)
control location l′. Obviously, the set L of locations and the set T of transitions together
decide a directed (cyclic) graph (see Fig. 5.4 (a)), called the control flow graph3 (CFG)
of the program P, denoted as G(P) = (L,T).
In the terminology of (control flow) graph [82], we also call L the set of vertices and T
the set of edges of the graph G(P). G(P) contains a finite set of vertices and a finite
set of edges in it. A vertex li is said to dominate (or to be a dominator of) a vertex
lj if every path from the entry vertex l0 to lj must go through li. By definition, every
vertex dominates itself and the entry vertex l0 must be a dominator. A vertex li strictly
dominates a vertex lj if li dominates lj and li 6= lj . A immediate dominator of a vertex
lj is a vertex li that strictly dominates lj but does not strictly dominate any other vertex
between li and lj . The immediate dominator of a vertex (other than l0) is unique. E.g.,
in Fig. 5.4 (a) the vertices 1, 2, and 4 (strictly) dominates the vertices 5 and 6, while
the vertex 4 is an immediate dominator of the vertices 5 and 6.
Given a vertex l ∈ L, and an integer k > 0, we define G(l, k) as a k -bounded tree
obtained by unwinding the graph G(P) starting from l up to k steps (see Fig. 5.4 (b),
(c), and (d) for example). We call the vertices of this tree as nodes to distinguish them
from the vertices of the graph, from which the tree is derived. The vertex l is the root
node of the tree G(l, k). If a vertex in G(P) is reached along different paths within
k steps starting from l, there may exist several nodes in the tree G(l, k) representing
the same vertex in G(P). E.g., the node 4 occurs twice in the tree G(1, 3) in Fig. 5.4
(b). The maximum depth of a node li ∈ L with respect to the root node l, denoted as
δmax(l, li), is the number of edges on the longest path from l to li in the tree. Obviously,
δmax(l, li) ∈ [0, k]. E.g., in G(1, 3) (see Fig. 5.4 (b)) δmax(1, 4) = 3.
5.3.3 Graph Partitioning
As mentioned in subsection 4.1.4, we’d better select such a set of vertices in G(P) as
monitoring points that satisfy the following conditions: (i) any two adjacent monitoring
points are at distance at most k steps; (ii) any vertex other than monitoring point in
G(P) is at distance at most k steps from some monitoring point; and (iii) between any
two vertices with distance greater than k steps there must exist some monitoring point.
3Note that this definition is different from the traditional definition of control flow graph, where each
node represents a basic block (of code) and each (directed) edge a jump in the control flow.
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It is easy to reason that there always exists a solution, e.g., a trivial solution is to set all
the vertices in G(P) as monitoring points. Of course, the solution is not unique. Given
an integer k > 0, besides the entry point l0, we’d like to determine a smaller set of
vertices {l1, l2, · · · , ln} ⊂ L such that the trees G0(l0, k),G1(l1, k),G2(l2, k), · · · ,Gn(ln, k)
can cover the graph G(P) and have a similar size in terms of nodes and edges. In other
words, we hope to find out a smaller set of monitoring points that can be distributed in
G(P) as evenly as possible.
For this purpose, we’d like to partition G(P) into finite subgraphs in similar size (more
or less). There are two common approaches [83] to partitioning a graph: edge-cut and
vertex-cut. The former determines a set of edges (called edge-cut), while the latter
determines a set of vertices (called vertex-cut), whose deletion can make the graph
disconnected. Fig. 5.1 illustrates the difference of the two partitioning methods. For
each edge (x, y) in an edge-cut (see Fig. 5.1(a)), the two vertices x and y serves as the
exit- and entry-points of the respective partitions. For each vertex x in a vertex-cut
(see Fig. 5.1(b)), the vertex x serves as both the exit- and entry-points of the respective
partitions. In addition, a vertex can be cut in multiple ways as shown in Fig. 5.2, while
an edge can only be cut in one way.
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Figure 5.1: (a) Edge-cut partitioning vs. (b) Vertex-cut partitioning [83]
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Figure 5.2: Cutting a vertex in different ways [83]
Edge-cut partitioning is not suitable for us, because the edges in the cut does not belong
to any partition, e.g., the edge from x to y in Fig. 5.1(a), thus they can not be reached by
the online model checker without specifically dealing with them. Vertex-cut partitioning
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does not have this problem. The vertices in the cut belong to at least one partition (see
Fig. 5.1(b)). All the partitions together cover the whole graph with neither vertices nor
edges left outside. Therefore, we partition G(P) = (L,T) by vertex-cut partitioning.
It is usually NP-hard to find out a minimum vertex-cut that leads to partitions of similar
size. Here we give a simple procedure to produce a smaller vertex-cut for partitioning
G(P) into k-bounded trees. The vertices in the cut are then selected as monitoring points.
It is observed that for any vertex x in the vertex-cut, the tree G(x, k) must cover some
other vertices in the vertex-cut, and these vertices form a local cut of G(x, k). E.g., for
k = 3, a possible vertex-cut of the (control flow) graph in Fig. 5.4 (a) is {1,4,7}, then
the tree G(1, 3) covers the vertex 4 which forms a local cut in G(1, 3) (see Fig. 5.4 (b)),
and the same goes to the trees G(4, 3) and G(7, 3), where the vertex 7 forms a local cut
in G(4, 3) (see Fig. 5.4 (c)) and the vertex 4 a local cut in G(7, 3) (see Fig. 5.4 (d)).
Therefore, we aim to identify a smaller local cut (denoted by the dashed line) closer to
the bottom line of G(x, k) as illustrated in Fig. 5.3. That is, given a non-negative integer
ε (relatively far) less than k, we say that a local cut of G(x, k) is close to the bottom
line of G(x, k) with respect to ε, if for any node y in the cut, we have k− δmax(x, y) ≤ ε.
(b)(a)
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Figure 5.3: A smaller cut close to the bottom line of G(x, k)
We say that a node y in the tree G(x, k) is leaf node, if y is either an exit point of the
program P, or else δmax(x, y) = k. In the former case, δmax(x, y) ≤ k. E.g., in the tree
G(7, 3) (see Fig. 5.4 (d)) the leaf nodes are 5, 6, and 9, because δmax(7, 5) = 3 and
δmax(7, 6) = 3, but δmax(7, 9) = 2 which is less than k = 3, this is allowed, because the
node 9 is an exit point of the program.
The bottom line of G(x, k) consists of those non-trivial leaf nodes of G(x, k) that are not
exit points of the program P. Obviously, if all the leaf nodes of G(x, k) are exit points of
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the program P, then there is not need to cut G(x, k), because the tree G(x, k) can not
“grow” further, thus the bottom line is meaningless in this case.
The bottom line of G(x, k) itself can be seen as a local cut at the depth k relative to the
root node x. We’d like to evolve it into a smaller cut of G(x, k) by applying repeatedly
to it the following two rules:
rule 1: for a node y in the cut, if y dominates other node(s) in the cut, then
remove those nodes dominated by y from the cut;
rule 2: for a node y not in the cut, if y immediate dominates more than one
node in the cut and k − δmax(x, y) ≤ ε, then remove those nodes
immediate dominated by y from the cut and add y to the cut.
Let global cut be a set of nodes forming a vertex-cut of G(P) and local cut a set nodes
forming a vertex-cut of G(x, k). We partition G(P) in a way described in Algorithm 5.1.
First of all, global cut is initialized to {l0}, the entry point of the program P. For each
node x ∈ global cut, which has not been processed yet, the bottom line of G(x, k) with
respect to global cut is calculated in Algorithm 5.2. If the local cut of G(x, k) is not
empty, we try to reduced it to a smaller cut close to the bottom line of G(x, k) with
respect to ε. Afterwards, the smaller local cut is added to global cut. This procedure is
repeated until all the nodes in global cut have been processed. At this time, the nodes
in global cut are the vertex-cut of G(P).
Algorithm 5.1: Partition control flow graph G(P)
input : G(P), k, ε
output : global cut
1 begin
2 global cut = {l0} //initialize global vertex-cut
3 while ( there exists unprocessed node in global cut) do
4 let x be an unprocessed node in global cut
5 local cut = bottom line(G(x, k)) //see Algorithm 5.2
6 i f ( local cut 6= ∅) then //reduce the size of local cut
7 repeatedly apply rule 1 and rule 2 until fixed−point
8 add local cut to global cut
9 endif
10 endwhile
11 end
Let exit points be the set of exit points of the program P. Given global cut, i.e., a set
of thus far identified nodes in the vertex-cut of G(P), we say that a node z in G(x, k)
is a leaf node with respect to global cut, if z ∈ exit points, or z ∈ global cut, or else
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δmax(x, z) = k. That is, taking global cut into account, we redefine the bottom line of
G(x, k) as those non-trivial leaf nodes of G(x, k) that belongs neither to exit points nor
to global cut. Algorithm 5.2 returns such kind of nodes as local cut of G(x, k).
Algorithm 5.2: Calculate the bottom line of G(x, k) with respect to global cut
input : G(x, k), global cut, exit points
output : local cut
1 begin
2 current set = {x} //initialize local vertex-cut
3 next set = ∅
4 for (step = 1 to k ) do
5 while ( there exists unprocessed node in current set) do
6 let y be an unprocessed node in current set
7 for (each immediate successor z of y ) do
8 i f (z /∈ global cut) and (z /∈ exit points) then
9 add z to next set
10 endif
11 endfor
12 i f (next set == ∅) then return ∅
13 endwhile
14 current set = next set
15 next set = ∅
16 endfor
17 return current set
18 end
The for loop in Algorithm 5.2 iterates no more than k times. In each iteration, the suc-
cessor nodes of the nodes in current set are calculated, whose number is not more than
that of the nodes in the tree G(x, k). Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 5.2 is
linear in the number of nodes in the tree G(x, k). This algorithm returns either a empty
set or a set of nodes neither in global cut nor in exit points. In the latter case, the
algorithm ensures that for any leaf node y it returns, there exists at least one path from
the root node x to the leaf node y such that no nodes between them are in global cut
or exit points.
For each tree G(x, k) with a (non-empty) set of nodes returned by Algorithm 5.2, Al-
gorithm 5.1 tries to reduce the size of its local cut by applying repeatedly rule 1 and
rule 2 as long as possible. The size of the final local cut is not more than the number
of nodes on the bottom line of G(x, k). The nodes in the local cut are finally added to
global cut. As a consequence, the size of global cut increases monotonically. Since the
number of nodes in the graph G(P) is finite, Algorithm 5.1 can definitely terminate. On
the other hand, Algorithm 5.1 ensures that all the trees produced can cover the whole
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graph G(P). Therefore, the time complexity of this algorithm is linear in the number of
the vertices in G(P).
Let’s use the control flow graph G(P) illustrated in Fig. 5.4 (a) as an example to explain
our partitioning algorithm. The vertices of G(P) are named by numbering. Given k = 3
and ε = 1, we get the tree G(1, 3) shown in Fig. 5.4 (b) by unfolding 3 steps starting
from the vertex 1. Notice that the vertex 4 is duplicated twice in G(1, 3). According to
Algorithm 5.2, the bottom line of G(1, 3) consists of {4,5,6}. In Algorithm 5.1, local cut
is initially set to the bottom line of G(1, 3). Since the node 4 dominates the other two
nodes 5 and 6, it is safe to remove these two nodes from local cut (rule 1). Now the
local cut of G(1, 3) is reduced to {4}. No further reduction is possible, therefore, we add
it to the global vertex-cut, i.e., global cut = {1,4}. Similarly, we get the tree G(4, 3)
shown in Fig. 5.4 (c). The bottom line of G(4, 3) is {3,8}. Since the node 7 immediate
dominates these two nodes, it is safe to delete them and then add the node 7 to the
local cut of G(4, 3) (rule 2). As a result, we have global cut = {1,4,7}. Finally, we get
the tree G(7, 3) shown in Fig. 5.4 (d). The bottom line of G(7, 3) is empty (with respect
to global cut) because the node 4 ∈ global cut and the node 9 ∈ exit points (see the
lines 7-11 in Algorithm 5.2). By now all the nodes in global cut have been processed,
therefore, G(P) is partitioned into three components G(1, 3), G(4, 3) and G(7, 3). That
is, the monitoring points in the target program are located in {1,4,7}.
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Figure 5.4: Partition a control flow graph (a) into 3 components (b), (c) and (d).
In addition, there are two special cases in partitioning a CFG that need to be considered.
One is that the tree G(x, k) may cover a segment of the target program involving such
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computations that are more complex in control structure and/or data processing. This
indicates that the state space of the corresponding (behavioral) model may be too large
to be explored efficiently by means of online model checking. To reduce the state space
of the (behavioral) model, a possible solution is to cut G(x, k) vertically following the
dashed line or horizontally following the dotted line as illustrated in Fig. 5.5 (a). Cutting
G(x, k) vertically results in two (partial) models, which need to be checked currently
whenever the monitoring point x is reached. Cutting G(x, k) horizontally results in a
k′-bounded tree G(x, k′) with k′ < k. In fact, there is no need to make all the partitions
of G(P) k-bounded. We keep the bound k constant just for the sake of simplicity.
The other is that the length of a control loop in G(P) may be too short, e.g., the short
loop as illustrated in Fig. 5.5 (b). Obviously, the vertex x is the only monitoring point
according to our partitioning algorithm. That is, the program state is monitored at each
iteration of the loop during runtime. The shorter the loop, the higher the sample rate.
To reduce the sample rate, a possible solution is to syntactically unfold the loop up to
appropriate steps, say, 4 steps in this example. As a consequence, the state information
can be monitored every 4 steps, instead of every 1 step. Of course, the memory footprint
of the target program may be enlarged in this way.
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Figure 5.5: Two special cases in partitioning CFG
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we first introduce a platform-independent programming abstraction for
specifying such control software applications that exhibit time-periodic and multimodal
features. This kind of software is usually safety-critical due to its use in the automotive,
aerospace and other industries. A typical control application contains a set of periodic
(software) tasks together with a mode-switching logic for activating or deactivating tasks.
Our goal is to (online) check the correctness of the internal behaviors of the task that is
identified as important among the others in the task set.
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There are two ways to get the (behavioral) models at multiple levels of abstraction
and/or from different perspectives for the program to be checked: one is to reuse the
(design) models built during the software development phase; the other is to abstract the
models directly from the source code of the target program. For the sake of simplicity,
we suppose that the target program is written in a restricted subset of C that conforms
to the (mandatory) requirements of the MISRA-C coding standard, which allows only
static memory allocation and no function recursion.
The monitoring points for online model checking are determined by analyzing the control
flow graph of the target program. We present a partitioning algorithm to calculate a
smaller set of monitoring points that are distributed more or less evenly in the control
flow graph. The time complexity of the algorithm is linear in the number of the vertices
in the control flow graph.
Chapter 6
Integration of Online Model
Checking with RTOS
As mentioned in Section 5.1, a typical embedded control application may switch from
one operational mode to another during system execution. As a result, some tasks (in
the current mode) are removed while others are added in the target mode. In order to
ensure the correctness of the control software, in particular, the correctness of the tasks
identified as safety-critical, during system execution, we present a framework for inte-
grating the online model checking mechanism with the underlying real-time operating
system (RTOS). As a proof of concept, a prototype is implemented by Krishna Sudhakar
as his master thesis [84] cosupervised by the author. This work is later published in [85].
6.1 Integration Framework
Given a real-time operating system (RTOS), which manages one or more system ap-
plications running in a interleaved manner, we can deploy the online model checker as
verification service inside the RTOS (with dashed lines) or outside the RTOS (without
dashed lines) as illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
In both cases, an observer is needed to record the current state information while the
system application under investigation is running. For a system application evaluated
as safety-critical or ultra-reliable, we assume that its source code has already been in-
strumented with special system calls at the predetermined monitoring points in advance.
Thus, the observer can be implemented inside the system call handler of this type of spe-
cial system call. Whenever the special system call at some monitoring point is triggered,
the observer (inside the system call handler) goes to read the values of the variables of
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interest at the current state, say si, out of the local memory of the target application,
and then to apply the predefined mapping function to obtain the corresponding ab-
stract state ŝi = α(si) in the (behavioral) model of the target application. At this time,
a simple assertion checking can be done if necessary. In case of violation, the operating
system will be informed right away. Otherwise, ŝi will be written into the ring buffer
1,
which is allocated by the operating system to store the current state information for
online model checking. If the buffer is full, the oldest state will be overwritten by the
latest state.
Observer
Error found!
ring
bufer
write read
. . .
Figure 6.1: Integration Framework
On the other hand, the online model checker tries to take one (current) state out of the
ring buffer every T time units, where T is the time limit allocated to the online model
checker by the user. If the ring buffer is empty, the online model checker will either
resume the work of the last checking cycle, provided that the work has not finished yet;
or else simply wait until the next checking cycle starts. Otherwise, there is a state, say
ŝi, available, then within the given T time units, the online model checker tries to search
for an error path of length up to k steps starting from ŝi in the (bounded) state space
of the behavioral model of the target program. As a result, the following three possible
checking results may be reported to the operating system:
Case unsafe: the checking process is finished in time, and an error path is found. In
this case, an alarm will be sent to the operating system as quickly as possible.
Notice that the error path might be false negative. However, to avoid the error
really to happen, we have to conservatively choose to inform the operating system
the potential danger. In response, the operating system may raise an exception.
Considering that the exception handling is usually domain specific, thus we do not
1To reduce data misses, a (ring) buffer is used because the rate at which data is received and the rate
at which it can be processed are variable over time.
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discuss it here in a general sense. In addition, the error path can be recorded to
help the user to figure out the cause of the error later.
Case safe: the checking process is finished in time, but no error path is found. That
is, it is safe within the next k steps relative to ŝi. The operating system continues
its normal operation in this case.
Case unkown: the checking process is forcedly terminated due to timeout. Therefore,
the state space of the (bounded) model is not exhaustively explored. It is, however,
reasonable to believe that the probability is low of detecting errors near the current
state ŝi in this case. It is up to the operating system to deal with this case anyway.
Needless to say, monitoring state information during program execution has more or less
an influence on the performance of the target program as well as the underlying operating
system. By introducing a special type of system call and its system call handler to fulfill
the monitoring work, both the source code of the target application and the operating
system need not to be modified too much. Since the system call handler usually has
to consume some processing time, this in turn will limit the number of variables to be
monitored. In this case, only the most important variables are selected to be monitored
during runtime.
A variable is considered important, if it is used in a conditional statement of the target
program. That is, the value of such a variable may make a contribution in deciding the
control flow of the program’s execution at the control point, at which multiple branches
exist. Accordingly, the state space of the program model to be explored by the online
model checker is reduced, because only one branch, instead of all the branches, of the
program at this point needs to be taken into account.
Notice that the state information monitored for online model checking is used to reduce
the state space of the behavioral model to be searched. In order to decrease the monitor-
ing overhead by monitoring a subset of the state variables, this incomplete information
may not uniquely identify an individual state, but a set of states in the behavioral model
(see Section 4.1.4). As a consequence, the online model checker maybe needs to search
in a larger state space of the behavioral model. The checking result is, however, not af-
fected as long as the checking time is sufficient. This is different from online monitoring
whereby the analysis may still not be accurate no matter how much time is taken due
to the incomplete information collected during runtime.
In addition, the schedulability analysis for the target system with online model checking
integrated can be conducted oﬄine beforehand. Because the locations of the monitoring
points and the number of the variables to be monitored are known in advance, it is thus
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possible to estimate the monitoring overhead and then statically analyze the worst-case
execution time (WCET) of the source code of the system application during runtime.
By now we’ve explained the integration framework in a general sense at the conceptual
level. The development of embedded systems indicates a trend towards incorporating
more than one CPU, i.e., maybe multiple cores on a chip or multiple chips on a board or
any combination thereof [86]. For example, in the automotive industry, the AUTOSAR
OS specification published in 2011 added support for multicore systems [87]. The inte-
gration framework can then be implemented on different hardware architectures from
single-core or multicore processor to multiprocessor:
• Single Core Processor: One possible implementation is to make the online
model checker as a system service in the RTOS kernel [88]. In doing so, a fixed
time slot is reserved a priori for online model checking, say, at the beginning (or
end) of each scheduling cycle of the RTOS. This time slot is specifically reserved
for the (online) verification service. If no online checking task is active, the sched-
uler is allowed to allocate this slot to such preemptive low priority tasks that can
be moved or replaced by the online checking task at any time when the verifi-
cation service is triggered. The advantage of this way of integration is that the
communication overhead between the RTOS and the online model checker is very
low. However, including the online model checker in the kernel space increases
the footprint of the RTOS, even in the cases that the online checking service is
not requested. In addition, the online model checker is usually a computationally
intensive task, which requires additional memory and consumes additional energy.
Another possible solution is to introduce a hypervisor to build multiple virtual
machines, and then make the online model checker and the RTOS run on differ-
ent virtual machines. Of course, a hypervisor will play a more valuable role on a
multicore platform [86].
• Multicore Processor: From the software perspective, there are basically two
types of multicore designs: Asymmetric Multi-Processing (AMP) and Symmetric
Multi-Processing (SMP) [86, 89, 90]. In both cases, the online model checker can
be assigned to a (specific) core different from the one that runs the RTOS. In this
way, the memory footprint of the RTOS is reduced by deploying the online model
checker outside the RTOS kernel. This also does not affect schedulability so much,
as the only special additions to the RTOS are an “observer” and a function to
communicate with the online model checker. However, for a multicore platform,
special attention must be paid to ensure that the software running on different
cores, be it operating systems or applications, are properly separated from each
other so that they do not interfere with each other. Fortunately, there are different
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techniques, in particular, different virtualization techniques, such as container and
hypervisor [67], to fulfill this goal.
• Multiprocessor: The processors in a multiprocessor system may be tightly cou-
pled at the bus level or loosely coupled via Internet for communication. The
online model checker and the RTOS can thus be deployed on different processors
(or nodes). They communicate with each other via I/O ports. Of course, correct
delivery of messages needs to be guaranteed. In this way, the task(s) running on
the RTOS can be verified by the online model checker on a remote machine. The-
oretically, it is possible to verify distributed (real-time) applications by means of
online model checking. Since the RTOS and the online model checker are deployed
over a network, a number of factors comes into play when calculating the delay in
communication, such as, bandwidth, error rate, noise, and so on.
Which solution is the best choice? That depends on many factors, such as the workload of
the online model checker, the (real-time) operating system, the communication overhead,
and the performance of the underlying hardware, to name just a few.
6.2 ORCOS
Figure 6.2: Architecture of ORCOS [91]
Organic ReConfigurable Operating System (ORCOS) [91] is a small-footprint real-time
operating system2 designed to be configurable during design-time and even during run-
time [92]. Through a special configuration language based on XML, the user is able to
configure only the functionality which is actually needed and decide which functionality
to place in kernel and which in userspace [93]. The architecture of ORCOS is illustrated
in Fig. 6.2. ORCOS is implemented using fully object oriented programming with C++
2Developed at the University of Paderborn in the research group chaired by Prof. Franz Rammig.
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and suitable for most of the processors available to embedded systems, e.g., PowerPC405,
Sparc Leon3, ARMv4(t) and above, QEMU (emulating PowerPC405), OMAP3530 SOC
(Limited Support), etc..
The kernel of ORCOS is made up of several modules, which can be configured through
the XML-based configuration language SCL (Skeleton Customization Language) [94].
Now let’s break it down.
Processes The processes are called tasks in ORCOS. A task is just a resource con-
tainer, its executing entity is called thread. A thread is the unit of execution and
scheduling, not the task. In order to guarantee predictability, ORCOS introduces a spe-
cial type of task called worker task. In fact, there is only one worker task in ORCOS.
This worker task belongs to the kernel space and can spawn multiple worker threads.
Each worker thread has its own stack and shares the resource of the work task. The
worker threads can take over such kind of work that arrives non-deterministically, e.g.,
asynchronous IO interrupts, or that needs to be executed at a specific time, e.g., timed
calls or periodic calls to functions. The introduction of the worker threads allows these
activities to be scheduled like any other threads [95].
Scheduler The scheduler is in the core of the ORCOS kernel. ORCOS schedules based
on threads. The following scheduling strategies are implemented in ORCOS: Round
Robin (RR), Fixed-Priority Scheduling (FPS), Rate Monotonic Scheduling (RMS) [96],
Earliest Deadline First (EDF) [96] and EDF with Total Bandwidth Server (TBS) [97].
Thread Interrupthandler SyscallManager
syscall()
handleSyscall()
return value
Figure 6.3: Syscall processing of ORCOS [91]
System Calls The tasks as well as services in user space can use kernel functionalities
only through the system calls defined in the syscall API. The processing of a system call is
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illustrated in Fig. 6.3. Whenever a thread issues a system call, the related information
of the system call will be stored at the specific locations on the stack of the task.
Afterwards, a software interrupt is raised and then the kernel will take control, which
involves storing the context of the task and triggering an appropriate interrupt handler.
Thereafter, the SyscallManager will be invoked: the parameters as well as the syscall
number are loaded from the stack of the task and the functionality of the system call
is executed. Notice that there is no direct function call on the Interrupthandler.
Instead, the syscall() will cause a sequence of assembler instructions to be executed,
which react on the software interrupt and end up calling the Interrupthandler.
Communication ORCOS allows inter-node and inter-process communication. Two
processes or nodes communicate with each other using socket API. The socket design is
implemented using a configurable protocol stack. Each socket can be explicitly config-
ured (even at runtime) to define which protocol stack will be used.
Memory Management The memory management belongs to the core of the ORCOS
kernel. ORCOS follows the rule of separating the kernel and every task’s memory from
each other. Each task has its own memory manager. In addition, ORCOS is capable
of virtual addressing if the underlying hardware architecture is equiped with a Memory
Management Unit (MMU).
Filesystem The filesystem of ORCOS is inspired by the Unix filesystem. Whenever a
resource is created, it will automatically register itself at the Filemanager. Each device
is accessible by a unique path.
HAL The ORCOS kernel does not operate directly on the hardware in order to main-
tain portability to other hardware platforms. Instead, the kernel delegates the calls to
the hardware through a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), which offers an interface
independent of any hardware platform, which in turn delegates the calls to the real
underlying hardware.
Power Management ORCOS has built-in power management to control the power
consumption of the devices that support throttling or other power states through their
device drivers.
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6.3 Prototype Implementation
As a proof of concept, we’ve integrated the online model checker with ORCOS on top of
a (virtualized) multicore platform. Fig. 6.4 illustrates the architecture of our prototype
implementation. The whole system is built on a Linux platform (32 bit Ubuntu 12.04
LTS) with 3GHz Pentium 4 CPU and 2GB RAM. ORCOS runs on top of QEMU [98], a
open source machine emulator that emulates in our setting the microcontroller PowerPC
405EP with 333MHz CPU and 4KB on-chip memory. During the time when ORCOS was
developing, QEMU v1.5.0 was the highest version available for download. This version
of QEMU fails to emulate the networking capability of PowerPC 405EP, which makes
ORCOS impossible to communicate with the outside world. Therefore, a communication
helper3 is used to connect ORCOS with the outside world. The online model checker
is implemented as verification service on Linux because it adopts a tailored zChaff SAT
solver as its search engine, which needs to run on a general purpose operating system.
Linux (Ubuntu 12.04)
QEMU 1.5.0 CommunicationHelper
Online 
Model Checker
Kernel
task1 taskn● ● ●
ORCOS
Figure 6.4: Architecture of prototype implementation
In some sense, this implementation comes close to a productive system running on a mul-
ticore platform (as shown in Fig. 4.17 in Section 4.2.3), where the software application
on top of ORCOS and the online model checker on top of Linux run on different virtual
machines. In other words, ORCOS on top of QEMU (emulating PowerPC 405EP) is
running as a process on the host, i.e., the Linux platform. The online model checker is
running as another process on the same host. Notice that both processes can be seen
as an own virtual machine on top of a (virtualized) multi-core platform. In this sense,
the Linux platform also plays a role of hypervisor. The communication helper emulates
then a standard inter-VM (Virtual Machine) communication service of the hypervisor.
Fig. 6.5 illustrates the details of our implementation. In order to probe the state infor-
mation during runtime, we add a special system call monitor read(), an observer, a
3A plugin to QEMU developed in Java by Sijia Li, a student assistant in the research group chaired
by Prof. Franz Rammig.
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ring buffer and a special worker thread into the kernel of ORCOS. For a task to be
checked, we assume that the monitor read() system calls have already been inserted at
the monitoring points in the source code of the task at the software development phase.
The system call monitor read() is handled by the observer inside SyscallManager.
The observer is a snippet of code that copies the values of the variables being mon-
itored from the memory of the task into the ring buffer in the kernel space. The
ring buffer occupies a contiguous memory region, whose structure is decided by the
number and types of the variables to be monitored. The worker thread functions as a
delegate of the online model checker inside ORCOS. If the ring buffer is not empty,
the delegate does periodically the following work: it takes a (concrete) state from the
ring buffer, maps this state into the corresponding abstract state, and then delivers
the abstract state to the online model checker.
ORCOS
task1 taskn● ● ●
monitor_read()
SyscallManager
delegate of 
Online Model Checker
(WorkerThread)
Ring 
Buffer
write
read
Kernel
observer
Communication
Buffer
write read
QEMU
readBufferThread
listenServerThread
Communication Helper
Initialization
Receive State
Send Result
Execute 
Search Engine
Online 
Model Checker
encoder.c var_list.txt .elf of task
MonitorMemory.hh
Monitor_gen.hh MonitorMemory.cc
Monitoring Tool
Python
Script
Figure 6.5: Integration of online model checking with ORCOS
Monitoring Tool
A Python script is used to generate the monitoring tool for ORCOS. The Python script
takes three files (provided by the user) as input: var list.txt, encoder.c and the
.elf file of the task to be checked. The file var list.txt contains the variables to be
monitored. The file encoder.c contains the mapping functions. Each mapping function
defines as a predicate, which accepts the variables in var list.txt as parameters and
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returns a Boolean value. By disassembling the .elf file of the target program, we are
able to obtain the detail information about the variables of interest, such as data type,
memory address, and so on. Notice that the program is assumed to be written in C
and compliant to the MISRA C standard (see Section 5.3.1). In addition, for the sake
of simplicity we also assume that the program does not call such external function(s)
whose source code (in C) is not available. Because neither dynamic memory allocation
nor function recursion is allowed, the correspondence of variables to addresses can thus
be established once and for all at compile time [28].
CallableObject
+ ~CallableObject()
+ callbackFunc()
MonitorQueue
− _monitor_queue[ARRAY_SIZE]: Monitor_Node
− _front: int
− _rear: int
− _capacity: int = ARRAY_SIZE
− _cur_cap: int
# enqueue(incoming_struct: Monitor_Node): void
# dequeue(outgoing_struct: Monitor_Node*): void
# checkFullQueue(): int
# checkEmptyQueue(): int
+ MonitorQueue()
+ initialize(): void
+ writeIntoQueue(): void
+ readFromQueue(buffer: char*): void
wtReadFromQueue
+ callbackFunc()
MonitorMemory.hh
struct Monitor_Node {
   type1  var1;
   type2  var2;
   ∙∙∙ ∙∙∙ 
}
#define ARRAY_SIZE = 5
/*Monitor_gen.hh*/
bool mapping_function1(){∙∙∙}
bool mapping_function2(){∙∙∙}
∙∙∙ ∙∙∙ 
void enqueue(){∙∙∙}
void dequeue(){∙∙∙}
void writeIntoQueue(){∙∙∙}
void readFromQueue(){∙∙∙}
/*MonitorMemory.cc*/
Figure 6.6: Monitoring tool of ORCOS
The Python script produces two files Monitor gen.hh and MonitorMemory.cc as out-
put. These two files together with MonitorMemory.hh build the monitoring tool of
ORCOS as shown in Fig. 6.6. The header file Monitor gen.hh contains the structure
definition of Monitor Node and the macro definition ARRAY SIZE. The former defines
a row of the ring buffer, and the latter the length of the ring buffer. The header
file MonitorMemory.hh contains class MonitorQueue, which defines the ring buffer
(i.e., monitor queue) and its interface. This file is not generated by the Python script,
because the definition of class MonitorQueue is fixed. The ring buffer is declared as
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a static member, so that all the instances of class MonitorQueue and its subclasses
can operate on the same ring buffer. The source file MonitorMemory.cc contains
the mapping functions given in encoder.c as well as the definitions of the four in-
terface functions of the ring buffer: enqueue(), dequeue(), writeIntoQueue() and
readFromQueue().
The access to enqueue() and dequeue() is protected, while writeIntoQueue() and
readFromQueue() are publicly accessible. enqueue() adds one state entry to the end of
the ring buffer. When the buffer is full, the oldest state entry will be overwritten by
the newest one. dequeue() removes one state entry from the ring buffer and stores it
into a temporary location. writeIntoQueue() copies the current state entry from the
local memory of the task being checked in the user space into a temporary location in
the kernel space, and then puts it into the ring buffer by enqueue().
Worker Thread
ORCOS has to exchange information with the outside world through the communication
buffer shared with QEMU. A specific worker thread is used to transfer the data from
the ring buffer to the communication buffer and then send it to the online model checker.
The priority of the worker thread is set to lower than that of the task being checked.
The worker thread is an instance of class wtReadFromQueue. As illustrated in Fig. 6.6,
class wtReadFromQueue inherits class MonitorQueue in MonitorMemory.hh. It has
no member data but one member function callbackFunc(). This function is the main
function of the worker thread.
The worker thread calls readFromQueue() to take a (concrete) state from the ring
buffer by dequeue(), applies the mapping functions to this state to get an abstract one,
and then puts the abstract state into the communication buffer using sendwithQEMU().
After the online model checker sends the checking result back to the communication
buffer, the worker thread is also responsible for fetching the checking result from the
communication buffer using receivefrom(). In case that the result indicates unsafe,
the worker thread then tries to inform ORCOS as quickly as possible. sendwithQEMU()
and receivefrom() are member functions of class qemueth, which is implemented in-
side ORCOS. sendwithQEMU() writes the data into the communication buffer, while
receivefrom() reads the data out of the communication buffer.
The worker thread can be seen as a delegate of the online model checker inside ORCOS.
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Communication Helper
The communication helper acts as an intermediary between ORCOS and the outside
world for exchanging data. It is implemented in Java as plugin to QEMU. There are
mainly two threads readBufferThread and listenSeverThread. readBufferThread
reads a data out of the communication buffer and then sends it to a connected sever
using the TCP/IP protocol. listenSeverThread receives a data from a connected sever
using the TCP/IP protocol and then writes it into the communication buffer.
Online Model Checker
The online model checker can be seen as a server application, which is implemented as a
process of the Linux platform. We use a tailored zChaff SAT solver (see Section 4.2.4) as
its search engine. The (bounded) behavioral model of the task as well as the property to
be checked is encoded as CNF formula in DIMACS format. At the initialization phase,
the online model checker loads the model together with the property into memory. Once
the TCP/IP connection is established between the communication helper and the online
model checker, it waits for a state information sent from ORCOS. Upon receiving the
state information, it goes to search the state space of the behavioral model for an error
by the SAT solver within a predefined time limit. By timeout it terminates the search
anyway and sends the result (i.e., safe, unsafe, or unknown) back to ORCOS. Thereafter
the online model checker waits for a new state information and repeats the above steps
until an error is found or the task being checked terminates.
6.4 Evaluation
The integration of online model checking with RTOS introduces unavoidably additional
overhead for monitoring the state information and transferring the data between the
RTOS and the online model checker. We first analyze qualitatively the constitution of
the overhead to figure out the factors that may affect the performance of the RTOS as
well as the task under investigation during runtime. Afterwards, we provide a quantitive
measurement of the monitoring overhead and the communication overhead.
Although the Linux platform can not exactly reflect a real multicore system and QEMU
can not exactly emulate the target hardware as it is, it is still meaningful to implement
our online model checking mechanism on this virtual multicore platform. The imple-
mentation of the observer and the online model checker is mainly dependent on the
respective operating system. If the whole system is ported to a real hardware platform,
Chapter 6. Integration of Online Model Checking with RTOS 95
the only part of the implementation that needs to be modified is the code segment re-
sponsible for the communication between the observer (via the RTOS) and the online
model checker.
The experimental results are somewhat biased by our implementation using an emulator.
Therefore, the relative results (i.e., the time consumption as a function of bytes to be
processed) are more meaningful than the absolute values. To our knowledge, there should
exist a quasi linear relationship between the actual values and the measured results. In
this sense, a reasonable order of magnitude, to which the actual values may belong, can
be estimated based on the results measured on the emulator.
6.4.1 Overhead Analysis
Here we give an analytical estimation of the overhead introduced by the online model
checking mechanism, i.e., the monitoring overhead and the communication overhead.
The analysis aims to determine the factors that can help to reduce the overhead.
Monitoring Overhead
Without loss of generality, let taski be a safety critical task to be checked. Then, the
total execution time τi of taski holds
τi ∝ Ttask + (Tsyscall ×Nsyscall), for Nsyscall ≥ 1,
where Ttask is the WCET of taski without taking into account the online model checking,
Tsyscall is the processing time of the system call for monitoring variables, and Nsyscall
is the number of the special system calls (i.e., monitor read()) in taski.
Tsyscall is proportional to the number Nbyte of the bytes being copied, together with
some constant processing time of syscall, i.e., context switch, interrupt handling, etc.,
thus,
Tsyscall ∝ TcopyNbyte + Csyscall.
Therefore, the total execution time τi is defined as
τi = Ttask + (TcopyNbyte + Csyscall)×Nsyscall.
As a result, the monitoring overhead is calculated as
Poverhead =
Tsyscall ×Nsyscall
Ttask
.
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The monitoring overhead is proportional to the number of the system calls for monitoring
variables, provided that the number of the variables to be monitored is fixed. In order to
reduce the monitoring overhead, it is better to set the normal system calls as monitoring
points as long as possible. In this way, Csyscall needs not to be counted as a part of the
monitoring overhead, because these system calls belong to the normal behaviors of the
task. Now let’s define Nsyscall = N
′
syscall + N
′′
syscall, where N
′
syscall is the number of
the special system calls and N′′syscall the number of the normal system calls but set as
monitoring points. Then the monitoring overhead is defined as
Poverhead =
Tsyscall ×N′syscall + TcopyNbyte ×N′′syscall
Ttask
.
In particular, if all the monitoring points can be set in those places in which the normal
system calls locate, i.e., N′syscall = 0 and Nsyscall = N′′syscall, then, the monitoring
overhead is reduced to be
Poverhead =
TcopyNbyte ×Nsyscall
Ttask
.
Recall that the monitoring points are predetermined at the software development phase,
the only way to reduce the monitoring overhead is to reduce the number of the variables
to be monitored. For this purpose, it is better associate a weight to each variable by some
criteria such that the larger the weight of a variable, the more impact the variable has
on deciding the paths in the behavioral model of the program to be checked. However,
the incomplete state information may increase the workload of the online model checker
(see Section 4.1.4).
Communication Overhead
Recall that the communication between ORCOS and the online model checker is imple-
mented by a specific worker thread. For the sake of simplicity, the worker thread acting
as the delegate of the online model checker is called delegate in the sequel. The main
work of the delegate is to read the data from the ring buffer, apply it to the mapping
functions, and then send the results to the online model checker. In addition, it also
deals with the checking result sent back from the online model checker. Therefore, the
execution time τwt of the delegate is defined as
τwt = Tcomm + C,
where C is a constant time taken for context switches and for executing the remainder
code of the delegate.
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The time Tcomm taken for transferring the data between ORCOS and the online model
checker is made up of the following three factors:
• TORCOS to olmc: time taken for transferring the data from ORCOS to the online
model checker;
• Colmc: constant time taken for running the online model checker; and
• Tolmc to ORCOS : time taken for transferring the data from the online model checker
back to ORCOS.
It is worth pointing out that TORCOS to olmc and Tolmc to ORCOS are determined mainly
by how the data exchange between ORCOS and the online model checker is implemented
on what kind of system architecture. Given a real multi-core platform, TORCOS to olmc
and Tolmc to ORCOS should be much smaller than our implementation on top of QEMU
together with the communication helper.
TORCOS to olmc depends on TORCOS to QEMU , TQEMU to helper and Thelper to olmc as il-
lustrated in Fig. 6.7, where TORCOS to QEMU is the time taken for writing the data into
the communication buffer; TQEMU to helper is the time taken for reading the data out
of the communication buffer; and Thelper to olmc is the time taken for sending the data
from the communication helper to the online model checker using TCP/IP protocol. In
addition, there is also a constant time taken for sending an ACK from the online model
checker back to the communication helper. Therefore,
TORCOS to olmc = TORCOS to QEMU + TQEMU to helper + Thelper to olmc + C,
where C is a constant time taken for context switches, receiving ACKs, etc..
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Figure 6.7: Sending state information to online model checker
The time TORCOS to QEMU consists mainly of the following three factors:
• Tdeque: time taken for copying a (concrete) state out of the ring buffer inside
ORCOS;
• Tmap: time taken for mapping the concrete state into the corresponding abstract
state according to the given mapping functions; and
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• Tcopy to buf : time taken for copying the (abstract) state to the communication
buffer inside QEMU.
Further, Tdeque is proportional to the size of the data being monitored; Tmap depends
on the number of the mapping functions to be applied and the execution time of each
mapping function; Tcopy to buf is proportional to the number of the mapping functions,
because the return values of the mapping functions are the values being copied to the
communication buffer. Therefore, we have
Tdeque ∝ Nbyte,
Tmap ∝ Nmap func ×Tmap func, and
Tcopy to buf ∝ Nmap func.
The computation time Colmc of the online model checker is considered to be constant,
because the online model checker is always assigned by the user a predefined time limit
for its execution. In case of timeout it must terminate its execution anyway.
Tolmc to ORCOS depends on Tolmc to helper, Thelper to QEMU , and TQEMU to ORCOS as il-
lustrated in Fig. 6.8. Here Tolmc to helper is the time taken for sending the checking result
from the online model checker to the communication helper through the TCP/IP connec-
tion. In addition, there is also a constant time taken for sending an ACK from the com-
munication helper back to the online model checker. Thelper to QEMU is the time taken
for writing the checking result into the communication buffer. TQEMU to ORCOS is the
time taken for reading the checking result from the communication buffer. Therefore,
Tolmc to ORCOS = Tolmc to helper + Thelper to QEMU + TQEMU to ORCOS + C,
where C is a constant time taken for context switches, sending ACKs, etc..
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Figure 6.8: Receiving checking result from online model checker
Notice that the communication helper is in fact transparent to ORCOS and to the online
model checker. In order to send a data to the online model checker, what the delegate
needs to do is to put the data into the communication buffer; on the other hand, the
online model checker connects to a certain port and listen for the incoming connections.
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There are two ways to synchronize the communication between the delegate/ORCOS
and the online model checker: synchronous and asynchronous communication.
Synchronous Communication As illustrated on the left hand side of Fig. 6.9, after
sending the data to the online model checker, the delegate needs to wait for the checking
result sent back by the online model checker in the current execution cycle. This means
that the delegate has to enter the blocked state until the checking result has arrived. If
the delegate is set to the highest priority, it will move directly to the running state and
then preempt the currently running task. In case of a negative result, the alarm will be
sent to ORCOS by the same execution instance of the delegate as quickly as possible.
The WCET taken for synchronous communication is thus defined as
Tcomm = TORCOS to olmc + Colmc + Tolmc to ORCOS + C
where C is a constant time taken for context switches, sending ACKs, etc..
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Figure 6.9: Synchronous and Asynchronous Communication
Asynchronous Communication As illustrated on the right hand side of Fig. 6.9,
after sending the data to the online model checker, the delegate does not need to wait
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for the checking result sent by the online model checker in the current execution cycle.
Instead, the result is checked by a successive execution instance of the delegate. That
is, in each execution cycle, the delegate first checks the communication buffer for
the result from the online model checker with respect to the data sent in a preceding
execution cycle. If the result does not indicate an error, the delegate will send the new
data to the online model checker; otherwise, the delegate will inform ORCOS of the
potential error and then terminate its execution. Therefore, in case of a negative result,
the alarm will be sent to ORCOS in a successive execution instance of the delegate.
The WCET taken for asynchronous communication is thus defined as
Tcomm =
Tolmc to ORCOS + C, errorTolmc to ORCOS + TORCOS to olmc + C, otherwise
where C is a constant time taken for context switches, sending ACKs, etc..
Given the behavioral model to be checked, the number Nmap func of the mapping func-
tions is usually fixed. Consequently, the time Tdeque, Tmap and Tcopy to buf can not be
reduced. Notice that the checking result of the online model checker can be configured
to send back to ORCOS only when a violation against the property is detected. In this
way, Tolmc to ORCOS can be neglected, provided that the errors (if any) in the target
program are very few. This assumption is reasonable because a safety-critical program
should have been intensively checked before it is released. The only way to reduce the
execution time τwt of the delegate is to reduce the transmission time from ORCOS to
the online model checker, i.e., TORCOS to olmc.
6.4.2 Overhead Measurement
Based on our prototype implementation we’ve measured the execution time taken for
monitoring the variables (i.e., Tsyscall) and for transferring the data between ORCOS
and the online model checker (i.e., TORCOS to olmc and Tolmc to ORCOS). We have to
point out that the QEMU just emulates the target Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) as
well as the hardware interface of the peripheral devices [99]. That is, no timing model of
the target architecture is implemented in QEMU. The execution time measured depends
thus not only on the implementation of QEMU but also on the configuration of the host
computer, i.e., the type of the CPU, the size of the memory, the scheduling algorithm
and the workload of the host operating system, to name just a few. As a consequence,
the measured results do not exactly reflect the actual overhead produced on the native
PowerPC microcontroller for online model checking. In this sense, the relative results
(i.e., the time consumption as a function of bytes to be processed) are more meaningful
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than the absolute values. In addition, the measured results do provide us with a clue
of the order of magnitude, of which the actual values may be. Our primary goal is to
determine those factors that may affect the performance of the online model checking
so as to improve the online model checking mechanism.
Monitoring State Information
We’ve instrumented the source code of the task to be checked with the monitor read()
system calls in advance. Whenever monitor read() is executed, the “observer” (em-
bedded in the system call manager) will copy the values of the variables of interest from
the memory of the task to the ring buffer in the kernel space. We’ve measured the
time taken for copying the data of different size from 10 bytes up to 100 bytes stepping
increasingly by 10 bytes. For each setting, the measurement is done 50 times in order to
obtain an average value. The time is measured in microseconds by getting the difference
of the time from the start of the system call to its end.
Fig. 6.10 shows the average time taken for monitoring the state information in different
size settings together with the corresponding linear regression line defined by the linear
equation f(x) = 8.04x + 160.72, which indicates that by increasing every 10 bytes, the
time taken for monitoring increases approximately by 80.4µs.
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Figure 6.10: Time taken for monitoring state information
It is reasonable to believe that there should also exist a similar linear relationship between
the size of the data and the time consumption in case that the measurement is done on
a real hardware platform.
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Sending State Information to Online Model Checker
We’ve measured the time TORCOS to olmc taken for transferring the data of different size
from 10 bytes up to 100 bytes stepping increasingly by 10 bytes, too. The measurement
is also done 50 times for each setting in order to obtain an average value. The time is
measured in microseconds, which consists mainly of two parts: TORCOS to QEMU and
TQEMU to olmc.
The transmission time TQEMU to olmc from QEMU to the online model checker is almost
constant, i.e., about 50µs, for the data of different size from 10 bytes up to 100 bytes.
The result is obtained by getting the difference of the time at which the communication
helper begins to read the data from the (communication) buffer and the time at which
the data is sent to the online model checker using the TCP/IP protocol. The constant
transmission time lies in that the communication buffer is configured to accommodate
the date of at least 100 bytes and the data is sent off to its destination in one TCP/IP
packet. This transmission time depends largely on how the online model checker is
integrated with RTOS. Shared memory seems to be the best solution whereby the time
consumption can be neglected (to some degree).
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Figure 6.11: Time taken for transferring data from ORCOS buffer to QEMU buffer
The time TORCOS to QEMU = Tdeque + Tmap + Tcopy to buf , i.e., it covers the time taken
for reading the values (of the concrete state) from the ring buffer inside ORCOS, applying
the mapping functions to them, and then writing the resulting values (of the abstract
state) into the communication buffer inside QEMU. The measured time, as illustrated in
Fig. 6.11, varies between 150µs and 200µs in average for the data of size from 10 bytes
up to 30 bytes, while between 200µs and 250µs in average for the data of size from 40
bytes up to 100 bytes. Because the time Tmap depends mainly on the complexity of
the mapping functions, there should exist no linear relationship between the size of the
data and the time consumption. Considering that the variables to be monitored and the
mapping functions are given in advance, TORCOS to QEMU is hard to be reduced further.
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Receiving Checking Result from Online Model Checker
The checking result is usually one byte4 (say, 0 stands for safe, 1 for unsafe, and 2 for
unknown). Therefore, the transmission time Tolmc to ORCOS can be seen as constant.
The measurement is done 10 times in order to obtain an average result. The transmission
time in average is about 372.82µs. Although only one byte is sent back to ORCOS,
Tolmc to ORCOS is somewhat greater than TORCOS to olmc. The reason lies in that the
delegate (i.e., the worker thread) may not be active at the time when the checking result
is sent back to ORCOS. In this case, we have to wait until the delegate is activated by
the scheduler of ORCOS and then the checking result will be processed. In practice, it
is better to send the checking result back to ORCOS only when an error is detected.
Thus, the checking result can be used as signal to trigger a software interrupt with a
higher priority. In this way, the checking result can be processed earlier by ORCOS.
6.5 Discussion
In [12] four special requirements on the integration architecture are proposed for (online)
monitoring fault tolerant real-time systems:
• Functionality : the monitor does not modify the nominal functionality of the target
system, unless the target system itself violates the given (property) specification;
• Schedulability : the monitor does not interfere with the timeliness of the services
provided by the target system, i.e., the monitoring mechanism does not cause the
target system to violate its hard real-time guarantees, unless the target system
itself violates the given (property) specification;
• Reliability : the monitoring mechanism does not decrease the (required) reliability
of the target system, i.e., the reliability of the target system integrated with the
monitor is greater than or equal to the reliability of the target system alone;
• Certifiability : the monitoring mechanism does not make the re-certification of the
target system overly difficult, i.e., the monitoring mechanism does not add unduly
modifications to the source code (or object code) of the target system.
If the above criteria are met, the real-time system will benefit by introducing a monitor-
ing mechanism [12]. Obviously, the same goes for the integration of online model check-
ing with RTOS. In our case, the source code of the target program is instrumented with
predetermined finitely many monitoring points. The distance between any two adjacent
monitoring points is not more than k (steps), a predefined bound for online (bounded)
model checking. The state information is permitted to be probed only at these monitor-
ing points. No other additional modifications to the source code are needed. Therefore,
4In case that an error is detected, the online model checker can provide more information if needed.
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the functionality of the target system is not changed. Since the number of the monitor-
ing points is fixed, so is the size of the state information to be monitored, as well as the
time limit allocated to the online model checker, the additional monitoring overhead and
communication overhead can be estimated a priori. Consequently, the schedulability of
the target system can be decided ahead of time. The online model checker only needs
to “read” the state information at monitoring points of the target program, and then
informs the underlying operating system only when a violation is detected. Theoreti-
cally speaking, the reliability and the certifiability of the target system are not affected
by online model checking.
6.6 Summary
First of all, we present a general framework for integration of online model checking with
RTOS, such as ORCOS. This integration framework can be implemented on different
hardware architectures from single-core or multicore processor to multiprocessor. As a
proof of concept, we implement a prototype on top of a (virtualized) multicore platform.
The implementation of the observer and the online model checker is mainly dependent
on the respective operating system. If the whole system is ported to a real multicore
platform, the only part of the implementation that needs to be modified is the code
segment responsible for the communication between the observer (via the RTOS) and
the online model checker.
Thereafter, we analyze qualitatively the constitution of the overhead to determine the
factors that may affect the performance of the RTOS as well as the task to be checked
and then provide a quantitive measurement of the monitoring overhead and the commu-
nication overhead. Although the experimental results can not exactly reflect the actual
values produced on a native PowerPC microcontroller, the measured values do provide
us with a clue of the order of magnitude, of which the actual values may be. According
to our analysis, there are two ways to reduce the monitoring overhead: one is to set the
native system calls in the source code as monitoring points as long as possible; the other
is to limit the number of variables to be monitored. As to the communication overhead,
it depends mainly on the time taken for sending the data to the online model checker. If
the observer and the online model checker can communicate through a shared memory,
then the overhead will be much lower.
Finally, we discuss the influence introduced by online model checking on the system to
be checked with respect to the four criteria: functionality, schedulability, reliability, and
certifiability. It turns out that our online model checking mechanism does meet these
criteria well.
Chapter 7
Case Study
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is an on-board aircraft colli-
sion detection and resolution system aimed to reduce the incidence of mid-air collisions
between aircraft. TCAS is a well-known application in the domain of embedded systems,
which has been studied not only in academia but also in industry [100–104]. Therefore,
TCAS can be considered as “a benchmark for safety critical applications” [103].
In this chapter, we’d like to demonstrate the applicability of the online model checking
technique to a publicly available component of TCAS, which is responsible to provide a
solution for the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft.
7.1 TCAS
TCAS [105] is designed to work independently of the aircraft navigation equipment and
the ground systems, which are used to provide Air Traffic Control (ATC) services. An
aircraft equipped with TCAS interrogates periodically all other aircraft equipped with a
corresponding active transponder in a determined range (i.e., protected volume) about
their position. Based on the replies received, TCAS tracks the slant range, altitude, and
relative bearing of surrounding traffic. Whenever an intruder aircraft is entering the pro-
tected volume (as shown in Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2), TCAS issues a Traffic Advisory (TA)
to assist the pilot in the visual search for the intruder aircraft. TCAS then estimates a
time needed to reach the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) with the intruder. This time
value is used to calculate the vertical separation between the two aircraft. Depending
on the results obtained, TCAS may issue a Resolution Advisory (RA) to recommend
the pilot that he should either increase or maintain the existing vertical separation from
the intruder aircraft.
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Figure 14: TCAS II protected volume (vertical view). 
 
 
Figure 15: Example of TCAS/transponder panel (Boeing 737-700). 
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Figure 7.1: Protected volume (horizontal view) [106]
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Figure 14: TCAS II protected volume (vertical view). 
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Figure 7.2: Protected volume (vertical view) [106]
Hybrid surveillance is a method that decreases the rate of surveillance interrogations
made by the TCAS unit of an aircraft [106]: with active surveillance, TCAS transmits
interrogations to the intruder’s transponder, as a reply the transponder provides the in-
formation such as range, bearing, and altitude of the intruder; with passive surveillance,
position data provided by an onboard navigation source (typically based on GPS) is
broadcast from th intruder’s tra sponder.
Fig. 7.3 illustrates how the system transitions from passive surveillance to active surveil-
lance as a function of the collision potential [105]: when an intruder is far from being
a threat, it is tracked with passive surveillance, and the passive surveillance position is
validated once per minute with a TCAS active interrogation; when the intruder is a near
threat in either altitude or range, but not both, it is tracked with passive surveillance,
and the passive surveillance position is validated once every 10 seconds with an active
TCAS interrogation; when the intruder is a near threat in both altitude and range, it is
tracked with active surveillance at a 1 Hz interrogation rate, i.e., once per second. The
criteria for transitioning from passive to active surveillance is designed to ensure that
all TCAS advisories should be based on active surveillance.
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Figure 7.3: Transition from passive to active surveillance [105]
7.2 Source Code
In the Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository [107], there is a freely and publicly
available RA component of a preliminary version of TCAS in C, called tacs.c. The RA
component takes as input 12 parameters providing the positions of the two aircraft and
returns a single number as its output. The output can be 0, 1, or 2, where 0 means that
the situation is unresolved, 1 indicates an upward advisory, and 2 a downward advisory.
Based on this output, the aircraft operator is able to decide to increase or decrease the
aircraft’s altitude. The main function of the RA component is given in Algorithm 7.1.
From line 159 to line 170 the 12 state variables are set to the current values; line 172
is the special system call for monitoring these variables during runtime. In this case
study it is enough to set only one monitoring point. The complete source code of the
RA component is provided in Appendix A.1.
Algorithm 7.1: The main function of the RA component
input : Cur V ertical Sep,High Confidence, Two of Three Reports V alid, · · ·
output : 0, 1 , or 2
main ( int argc , char ∗argv [ ] )
{ · · · · · ·
157 initialize ( ) ;
158
159 Cur V ertical Sep = atoi ( argv [ 1 ] ) ; //int
160 High Confidence = atoi ( argv [ 2 ] ) ; //bool
161 Two of Three Reports V alid = atoi ( argv [ 3 ] ) ; //bool
162 Own Tracked Alt = atoi ( argv [ 4 ] ) ; //int
163 Own Tracked Alt Rate = atoi ( argv [ 5 ] ) ; //int
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164 Other Tracked Alt = atoi ( argv [ 6 ] ) ; //int
165 Alt Layer V alue = atoi ( argv [ 7 ] ) ; //int
166 Up Separation = atoi ( argv [ 8 ] ) ; //int
167 Down Separation = atoi ( argv [ 9 ] ) ; //int
168 Other RAC = atoi ( argv [ 1 0 ] ) ; //int
169 Other Capability = atoi ( argv [ 1 1 ] ) ; //int
170 Climb Inhibit = atoi ( argv [ 1 2 ] ) ; //int
171 //special system call for monitoring variables
172 monitor read (1 ) ;
173
174 fprintf ( stdout , "%d\n" , a l t s e p t e s t ( ) ) ;
175 exit (0 ) ;
176 }
The function call to alt sep test() at line 174 first tests the minimum vertical separa-
tion between two aircraft and then returns an advisory. The definition of this function
is given in Algorithm 7.2. First of all, it checks if an upward advisory is needed by
calling Non Crossing Biased Climb() and Own Below Threat() (line 124); afterwards,
it checks if a downward advisory is needed by calling Non Crossing Biased Descend()
and Own Above Threat() (line 125). If neither or both advisories are needed, it returns
value 0 (unresolved). Otherwise, it returns the advisory computed.
Algorithm 7.2: The definition of the function alt sep test()
int alt_sep_test ( )
{ · · · · · ·
116 enabled = High Confidence && (Own Tracked Alt Rate <= OLEV) &&
(Cur V ertical Sep > MAXALTDIFF) ;
117 tcas equipped = Other Capability == TCAS_TA ;
118 intent not known = Two of Three Reports V alid &&
(Other RAC == NO_INTENT) ;
119
120 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ;
121
122 i f (enabled && ((tcas equipped && intent not known) || ! tcas equipped))
123 {
124 need upward RA = Non Crossing Biased Climb() && Own Below Threat() ;
125 need downward RA = Non Crossing Biased Descend() &&
Own Above Threat() ;
126 i f (need upward RA && need downward RA)
127 /* unreachable: requires both Own Below Threat() and
128 Own Above Threat() to be true - that requires
129 Own Tracked Alt < Other Tracked Alt and
130 Other Tracked Alt < Own Tracked Alt, which isn’t possible */
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131 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ; //defined as 0
132 else i f (need upward RA)
133 alt sep = UPWARD_RA ; //defined as 1
134 else i f (need downward RA)
135 alt sep = DOWNWARD_RA ; // defined as 2
136 else
137 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ;
138 }
139
140 return alt sep ;
141 }
7.3 Mapping Functions
As explained in Chapters 4 and 6, we need to map the (concrete) states at the source
code level to the corresponding (abstract) state at the model level. For this case study,
the 10 mapping functions together with the 12 variables to be monitored are provided in
Appendix A.2. Of the 12 variables there are 10 int types and 2 bool types. The actual
values of the 10 int variables are passed as parameters to the 10 mapping functions to
get 10 bool values, as shown in Fig. 7.4. The 10 bool values together with the 2 original
bool values form an abstract state, which will be sent to the online model checker.
p_Cur_Vertical_Sep_GE_MINSEP()
p_Cur_Vertical_Sep_GT_MAXALTDIFF()
int Cur_Vertical_Sep
p_Own_Tracked_Alt_LT_Other_Tracked_Alt()
p_Other_Tracked_Alt_LT_Own_Tracked_Alt()
p_Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_LE_OLEV()int Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate
p_Up_Separation_GE_ALIM()
p_Down_Separation_GE_ALIM()
p_upward_preferred()
p_tcas_equipped()int Other_Capability
p_Other_RAC_EQ_NO_INDENT()int Other_RAC
int Own_Tracked_Alt
int Other_Tracked_Alt
int Alt_Layer_Value
int Up_Separation
int Down_Separation
int Climb_Inhibit
bool Two_of_Three_Reports_Valid
bool High_Confidence
bool v2
bool v3
bool v4
bool v5
bool v8
bool v9
bool v10
bool v1
bool v6
bool v7
bool v11
bool v12
concrete state mapping functions abstract state
Figure 7.4: From concrete state to abstract state
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A mapping function1 usually takes the values of one or more (concrete) state variables as
input and returns a bool value as output. A typical example is given in Algorithm 7.3.
The returned value will be stored into the variable p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV,
which is named after the corresponding mapping function. This naming convention can
make the mapping relationship more understandable.
Algorithm 7.3: Mapping function p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV()
input : Own Tracked Alt Rate
output : true or false
119 bool p_Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_LE_OLEV ( )
120 {
121 return (Own Tracked Alt Rate <= OLEV) ;
122 }
7.4 Abstract Model
In this case study, the mapping functions are deduced from the relational expressions oc-
curring in the function alt sep test(). By means of replacing the relational expressions
with the corresponding bool variables, we are able to obtain an abstract version of the
function alt sep test() defined in Algorithm 7.4. For example, the relational expression
(Own Tracked Alt Rate <= OLEV) at line 116 in Algorithm 7.2 is replaced by the bool
variable p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV at line 72 in Algorithm 7.4. Of course, the
four functions Non Crossing Biased Climb() and Non Crossing Biased Descend() as
well as Own Below Threat() and Own Above Threat() are also redefined in a similar way.
The complete definitions are given in Appendix A.3.
Algorithm 7.4: The abstract version of the function alt sep test()
int alt_sep_test ( )
{ · · · · · ·
72 enabled = High Confidence && p_Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate_LE_OLEV &&
p_Cur_Vertical_Sep_GT_MAXALTDIFF ;
73 tcas equipped = p_tcas_equipped ;
74 intent not known = Two of Three Reports V alid &&
p_Other_RAC_EQ_NO_INTENT ;
75
76 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ;
77
78 i f (enabled && ((tcas equipped && intent not known) || ! tcas equipped))
1In practice, it is better to define each mapping function as macro so as to improve the performance
of the mapping process.
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79 {
80 need upward RA = Non Crossing Biased Climb() && Own Below Threat() ;
81 need downward RA = Non Crossing Biased Descend() &&
Own Above Threat() ;
82 i f (need upward RA && need downward RA)
83 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ; //defined as 0
84 else i f (need upward RA)
85 alt sep = UPWARD_RA ; //defined as 1
86 else i f (need downward RA)
87 alt sep = DOWNWARD_RA ; // defined as 2
88 else
89 alt sep = UNRESOLVED ;
90 }
91 assert ( alt_sep != UNRESOLVED ) ;
92 return alt sep ;
93 }
In this abstract version of alt sep test(), the so called abstract state consists of the 12
bool variables illustrated in Fig. 7.4. Their values are dependent on the 12 (concrete)
variables in the target program and never changed by the program during its execution
cycle. If all the 12 variables in the target program are selected to be monitored, then
none of the 12 bool variables in the behavioral model becomes a free variable. In this
case, this abstract version is able to demonstrate the same behavior as the original
function. That is, if an error is detected in this abstract version, then there must be an
error in the source code of the function alt sep test().
However, if not all the 12 variables in the target program are monitored, the values
of some bool variables in the behavioral model may be undefined, i.e., they are free
variables. As a consequence, the abstract version is an over-approximation of the original
function. This means that an error detected in this abstract version may be spurious,
i.e., the checking result is false negative.
7.5 Experimental Results
The experiment is carried out using our prototype implementation on the Linux platform
(32 bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS) with 3GHz Pentium 4 CPU and 2GB RAM (see Section 6.3).
Monitoring State Information There are 12 variables of interest: 10 int2 types
and 2 bool (char) types. Therefore, we need to copy 42 bytes to the ring buffer
2The size of an int is supposed to be 4 bytes on a 32-bit platform.
112 Chapter 7. Case Study
whenever the monitoring point is reached. The time taken is measured in microseconds
for 50 times. On average it takes about 501.78µs for monitoring the state information
of 42 bytes, which is consistent with the result presented in Fig. 6.10 (in Section 6.4.2).
Monitoring Overhead We need to measure the execution time of the task (i.e., the
RA component) with and without the system call monitor read() added respectively.
The measurement is done 50 times for both cases. The execution time Ttask of the
task without monitoring state information is about 1319.14µs on average. Due to mon-
itoring state information, the average execution time of the task is increased by about
Tsyscall = 497.7µs. Therefore, the monitoring overhead Poverhead is Tsyscall/Ttask =
497.7/1319.14 = 37.7% in this case study.
Sending State Information to Online Model Checker By applying the 10 given
mapping functions we obtain 10 bool variables. Together with the two original bool
variables in the source code, we need to send only 12 bool (char) variables (12 bytes) to
the online model checker. The time TORCOS to olmc = TORCOS to QEMU +TQEMU to olmc
is measured in microseconds and the measurement is also done 50 times. On average we
have TORCOS to olmc = 189.16µs with TORCOS to QEMU = 142.3µs and TQEMU to olmc =
46.86µs in this case study.
Receiving Checking Result from Online Model Checker As mentioned in Sec-
tion 6.4.2, since the checking result is only one byte, the transmission time can be seen
as constant. We also do the measurement 50 times. On average the transmission time
is Tolmc to ORCOS = 368.62µs. This result is almost double the time taken for sending
the data to the online model checker, because the worker thread (i.e., the delegate) may
not always be active at the time when the checking result is sent back to ORCOS.
Online Model Checker The property to be checked is an assertion saying that the
function alt sep test() never returns 0, i.e., assert(alt sep != UNRESOLVED) (line
91 in Algorithm 7.4). By applying the tool CBMC [108] we are able to convert the
abstract version of alt sep test() together with the property into a boolean expression
in CNF format. In the original program tacs.c, the bool type is defined as int type,
which takes 32 bits. For the sake of simplicity, we redefine the bool type as char type,
which takes only 8 bits. The generated CNF file has 2348 (bool) variables and 5013
clauses.
Whenever the values of the 12 (abstract) variables are available, the online model checker
(with zChaff SAT solver as its search engine) will be invoked to decide whether the CNF
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formula is satisfiable or not. The measurement is done for 10 randomly generated test
cases. The SAT solver takes about 24ms on average to finish the checking work.
It is worth mentioning that the generated CNF formula is still highly redundant, because
each abstract (state) variable is represented by 8 bits, instead of one bit, in the formula.
Therefore, the 12 (abstract) variables need 96 bits, instead of 12 bits, to represent them.
The same goes for the other bool variables occurring in alt sep test(). That is, there’s
still much room to reduce the checking time.
Recall that whenever an intruder becomes a near threat, the rate of surveillance inter-
rogations made by TCAS units is at most 1 Hz, i.e., once per second. In this sense,
the monitoring overhead and the communication overhead as well as the model checking
overhead are acceptable in this case study.
Theoretically speaking, by applying the online model checking mechanism the property
is going to be checked whenever a monitoring point is reached. In this case study,
the assertion is going to be checked at line 172 in Algorithm 7.1 before the function
alt sep test() is invoked to run. On the other hand, by introducing the online model
checking method we are able to check different properties during program execution
without interfering with the target program too much, of course, except inserting mon-
itoring points once and for all in advance.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter we take the RA component of TCAS as case study to demonstrate the
applicability of the online model checking approach. In this case study, it is enough
to insert just one monitoring point into the source code. There are 10 int and 2 bool
variables that need to be monitored during program execution. By applying 10 mapping
functions to the 10 monitored int values we are able to obtain 10 bool values, which
together with the 2 original bool values are delivered to the online model checker. The
abstract (behavioral) model together with the property to be checked is converted into
a boolean expression in CNF format. The monitoring overhead and the communication
overhead as well as the model checking time are measured using our prototype imple-
mentation on the 32 bit Linux platform with 3GHz Pentium 4 CPU and 2GB RAM.
The experimental results indicate that the overhead introduced by online model check-
ing is acceptable in this case study. It would be much more efficient to implement our
online model checking mechanism including optimization (for this case study) on top of
a suitable real hardware platform.

Chapter 8
Online Model Checking for
Hybrid Systems
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the embedded applications are a kind of software designed
to monitor and control physical processes, which usually results in feedback loops. The
software systems are usually modeled by finite state machines, whereas the physical
systems are governed in general by differential equations. The former are discrete state
systems, while the latter are continuous state systems. Hybrid systems are the combi-
nation of the two different worlds. The safety requirements on the continuous dynamics
of such systems give rise to a new challenge. In this chapter, we’d like to tackle this
challenge by the online model checking mechanism.
8.1 Motivation
Hybrid systems arise in many aspects of our daily life [109], such as aerospace, trans-
portation systems, robotics, motion control, power electronics, and so on. The behaviors
of a hybrid system are characterized by the interaction of operating modes and control
laws. Each operating mode is associated with a control law in terms of partial or ordinary
differential equations or difference equations [110]. The modes are switched following a
discrete logic, i.e., a kind of finite state machine.
In hybrid systems, a control law models the behaviors (and disturbance if any) of the
physical plant under control. At a mathematical level of abstraction, the control en-
gineer derives from the behaviors of the plants the corresponding control laws as well
as the operating modes, which are then optimized and validated by means of analysis
and simulation [72]. It is worth mentioning that hybrid systems are often operating in
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safety-critical situations, such as embedded controllers used in the automotive and air-
plane industries, and medical devices for monitoring serious health conditions. They are
subjected to specific potential failures. Although simulation is an easy way to validate
a hybrid system under investigation, it checks only a single trajectory of the system at
a time. No matter how many individual trajectories have been checked by simulation,
some unsafe case in deep corner may still be missed.
Typical properties studied for hybrid systems are reachability, stability and equilibria,
to name only a few. From the perspective of computer science, more attention is paid to
the reachability analysis. A hybrid system is considered safe if the unsafe states defined
in terms of state constraints are not reachable from the initial (safe) states.
For a hybrid system involving continuous dynamics, it is usually difficult to compute and
represent the set of states reachable from some initial set [111]. Decidability holds only
for those systems with simple continuous dynamics, even the most efficient algorithms
for hybrid-system verification usually have exponential time complexity with respect to
the dimension of the state space [112]. Recent research [112–116] aims to falsify, instead
of verify, the safety of the hybrid systems under investigation, i.e., tries to search for a
witness trajectory from an initial state to an unsafe state in case that such a trajectory
exists.
In this chapter we focus on ensuring the safety of the continuous dynamics of a hybrid
system by means of online model checking. The goal is to falsify the target hybrid
system during runtime.
8.2 Hybrid Automaton
Hybrid automata are a kind of formal language for modeling and analyzing the compu-
tations consisting of both continuous and discrete dynamics. A hybrid system is usually
modeled as a hybrid automaton H = (Q,X, Inv,E,G, J, U, f, I, F ) [117], where
- Q is the discrete and finite set of (operating) modes;
- X maps each mode q ∈ Q to the continuous state space Xq ⊂ Rdim(Xq);
- Inv maps each mode q ∈ Q to the continuous invariant Invq ⊆ Xq;
- E ⊆ Q×Q is the set of (discrete) transitions between modes;
- G maps each transition (qi, qj) ∈ E to the guard condition G(qi,qj) ⊆ Xqi ;
- J maps each transition (qi, qj) ∈ E to the reset function J(qi,qj) : G(qi,qj) → Xqj ;
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- U maps each mode q ∈ Q to the set of input controls Uq ⊆ Rdim(Uq);
- f maps each mode q ∈ Q to the continuous dynamics x˙ = fq(x, u) with u ∈ Uq;
- I ⊂ Q×X is the set of initial states; and
- F ⊂ Q×X is the set of unsafe states.
Multicore processor
Hypervisor
RTOS
Safety
Application
RTOS
Safety
Application
General-
Purpose
Application
Linux /
Wind ws
General-
Purpose
Application
Linux /
Win ows
(q0,x1)
(q0,x0)
x = fq0(x,u)
q0 qi
.
. x = fqi(x,u)
.(qi,xti)
G(q0,qi)
G(q0,qi)
J(q0,qi)(q0,x0)'
'
(qi,xti)'
• • •
Figure 8.1: A hybrid system trajectory
Intuitively, a trajectory of a hybrid system consists of continuous trajectories interleaved
with discrete transitions, as illustrated in Fig. 8.1: starting from an initial state (q0, x0),
the system evolves continuously in time following the control law x˙ = fq0(x, u) as long
as the invariant Invq0 holds. A discrete transition from q0 to qi can be triggered if the
guard condition G(q0,qi) is satisfied. As a result, the state of the system is reset according
to the reset function J(q0,qi). Let the state now be (qi, xti). Then, the system evolves
continuously in time following the control law x˙ = fqi(x, u) until a discrete transition is
triggered. The hybrid system behaves repeatedly in this way.
A hybrid automaton is blocking if a trajectory has to leave a mode due to the violation
of the invariant associated to the mode, but no discrete transition is enabled. A hybrid
automaton is Zeno if an infinite number of mode switching within a finite time is allowed.
We restrict ourselves to non-blocking and non-Zeno hybrid automata in this chapter.
8.3 Online Falsification Problem
A hybrid system is considered unsafe if an unsafe state is reachable from an initial
state. For online falsification, we mean to check whether or not a hybrid system is safe
while the system is running by online searching for a trajectory of length up to k time
steps from an initial state to an unsafe state in the hybrid automaton of the system, as
illustrated in Fig. 8.2, where the symbol
⊗
represents the unsafe region.
To make online model checking available, we assume that the actual states of the hybrid
system under investigation can be probed periodically during runtime. Without loss of
generality, let’s monitor the actual state information every T = kdt time units, where dt
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is the progression of time in one step. The monitored states are stored in a predefined
ring buffer. The online model checker tries to take a state from the buffer every T time
units. If there is a state available, the online model checker then goes to search for a
trajectory from this state to an unsafe state in the hybrid automaton within the time
limit T . To reduce the workload of this online search, we compute oﬄine a backward
reachable set from the unsafe states up to n time steps beforehand, thus during runtime
the online model checker needs only to search in the near future (i.e., up to k time steps
for 0 < k < n) in the state space starting from each monitored state, as illustrated in
Fig. 8.3.
Figure 8.2: Online model checking problem
Operating Mode q
x = fq(x,u).
Figure 8.3: Online forward reachability checking
In each checking cycle, the online model checker may return the following three possible
checking results:
• unsafe: the checking process is finished in time, and an error trajectory is found;
• safe: the checking process is finished in time, but no error trajectory is found;
• unknown: the checking process is enforcedly terminated due to timeout.
In the unsafe case, where an error trajectory is found within ∆ (≤ T ) time units, ideally
the online model checker can predict the error ndt + kdt − ∆ time units in advance.
In the unknown case, where no error is found within T time units, it is reasonable to
believe that there should be no error at least in some neighborhood of the monitored
state.
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8.4 Oﬄine Backward Reachable Set Computation
Given a hybrid automaton H = (Q,X, Inv,E,G, J, U, f, I, F ), the target set F of the
unsafe states may include different subset(s) of the continuous state space associated to
each (discrete) mode. For a mode q ∈ Q, the set of unsafe states (if any) in Xq can be
represented as an implicit surface function φq : R
dim(Xq) → R such that φq(x) ≤ 0 if
(q, x) ∈ F and φq(x) > 0 if (q, x) 6∈ F .
The level set methods [118] are a collection of numerical algorithms for computing ac-
curately the evolution of the implicit surface functions following the dynamics defined
by Hamilton-Jacobi partial differential equations (PDEs).
The study [119] has proved that “the viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI)
PDE describes the continuous backward reachable set” and implemented the basic level
set methods in Matlab1 to calculate the backward reachable set for hybrid systems.
For a mode q ∈ Q with an unsafe subset inXq, according to [119], the backward reachable
set within Xq is G1 ∪G2 ∪G3 \ E1 as illustrated in Fig. 8.4, where
• G1 ⊂ F is the initial unsafe subset;
• G2 is the set of states that can reach the unsafe set(s) in neighbor mode(s) due
to uncontrollable input, i.e., disturbance from the environment or the actions of
other systems;
• G3 is the set of states backward reachable from the unsafe set G1 ∪G2;
• E1 is the subset of unsafe states in G3 that can reach the safe state(s) in neighbor
mode(s) due to controllable input.Fig. 10. Illustration of our algorithm for computing reachable sets for hybrid systems.
the algorithm detailed in Fig. 11, we note that, for itera-
tion , and
.
To implement this algorithm, we need to compute
, and . The computation of and
requires inversion of the transition relation subject to
the quantifiers and ; the existence of this inverse can
be guaranteed subject to conditions on the map . In our
examples, we perform this inversion by hand. The algorithm
for computing is a direct modification of
the reachable set calculation of Section III; the details are
presented in [8]. Finally, we remark that this algorithm is
semidecidable when the operators and
are computable: when the continuous state dynamics are
constant and the guards and resets are polyhedra, then the
algorithm reduces to that for linear hybrid automata [68].
V. FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXAMPLE
In this section, we demonstrate our hybrid systems anal-
ysis on an interesting and current example, the landing of
a civilian aircraft. This example is discussed in detail in [9]
and [10]. In addition to the examples presented here, we have
solved a range of multimode aircraft collision avoidance ex-
amples. Please refer to [8], [73] for these examples.
Fig. 11. Detail of the reach-avoid set from diagram 8 of Fig. 10.
The autopilots of modern jets are highly automated
systems that assist the pilot in constructing and flying
four-dimensional trajectories, as well as altering these tra-
jectories online in response to Air Traffic Control directives.
The autopilot typically controls the throttle input and the
vertical and lateral trajectories of the aircraft to automati-
cally perform such functions as acquiring a specified altitude
and then leveling, holding a specified altitude, acquiring a
specified vertical climb or descend rate, automatic vertical
or lateral navigation between specified way points, or
holding a specified throttle value. The combination of these
throttle–vertical–lateral modes is referred to as the flight
mode of the aircraft. A typical commercial autopilot has
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Figure 8.4: Computing backward re chable set [120]
In this chapter, we assume that the extended target set, denoted as F ∗, has already
been oﬄine calculated by the level set methods or any other efficient methods.
1www.mathworks.com
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8.5 Online Forward Reachability Checking
Given a hybrid automaton H with an extended target set F ∗, we need to decide whether
or not F ∗ is reachable within the predefined k time steps starting from each actual state
monitored during runtime (see Fig. 8.3). As a proof of concept, we’ve implemented an
online reachability checker based on the iSAT solver.
iSAT [121] is a SATisfiability checker for Boolean combinations of arithmetic constraints
over real- and integer-valued variables, which can handle not only linear constraints but
also non-linear constraints involving transcendental functions. Thanks to a tight integra-
tion of DPLL-style SAT solving with interval-based arithmetic constraint propagation,
the iSAT solver is able to deal with large Boolean combinations of multiple thousand
arithmetic constraints over some thousands of variables.
Given a formula to be checked, iSAT solver may terminate in the following three cases:
• unsatisfiable : the formula is actually unsatisfiable;
• satisfiable : the formula is satisfiable2 and a solution may be generated;
• unknown : a candidate solution may be given, but no guarantee for correctness.
The iSAT solver can conduct bounded reachability checking for hybrid systems, but it
can not be directly used for online reachability checking. In cooperation with Karsten
Scheibler, a developer of the iSAT solver from the University of Freiburg, an interface for
online reachability checking has been developed. Here we introduce mainly the following
two functions:
• isat3 register trans and target(is3, trans, target, k): this function un-
rolls the transition relation trans (of the hybrid system model) up to k time steps,
combines it with the set target of the unsafe states, and then registers the gener-
ated formula with the iSAT solver is3;
• isat3 solve with init(is3, init, T): this function reads an actual state init
monitored during system execution, and then tries to determine at runtime whether
or not there exists a trajectory from init to target within the predefined T time
units. The learned knowledge is shared by the subsequent calls to this function so
as to reduce the computation time.
2However, iSAT solver is not able to give a definite answer for some formulas being checked, because
interval arithmetic combined with splitting intervals leads to an incomplete deduction calculus.
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Let the actual states monitored during system execution be stored in a buffer. The online
reachability checking algorithm is straightforward as shown in Algorithm 8.1 below.
Algorithm 8.1: Online Bounded Reachability Checking
input : trans , target , k , T
output : safe , unsafe , unknown
1 begin
2 formula = isat3 register trans and target(is3, trans, target, k)
3 formula = isat3 node simplify detroy(is3, formula) //simplify the formula
4 while (buffer 6= ∅) do
5 init←− buffer //read a new actual state
6 result = isat3 solve with init(is3, init, T )
7 i f (result == satisfiable) then output unsafe
8 e l s e i f (result == unsatisfiable) then return safe
9 else output unknown
10 endif
11 endwhile
12 end
Recall that F ∗ is obtained by calculating the reachable set from F backward up to n
time steps. It is easy to reason that the larger the n, the smaller the k, thus the shorter
the online checking time, and the higher the sampling rate for the actual states. It is up
to the user to set a proper value to k. Ideally, it is better to make n be a larger value
so that errors if any can be predicted in time in most cases.
It is worth pointing out that there exist other efficient tools that can perform forward
reachability checking. However, they need to be tailored for online reachability checking.
We adopt the iSAT solver mainly because it is convenient for us to cooperate with the
developers of the iSAT project so as to tailor the tool for our needs. The implementation
details of the iSAT tool is beyond the scope of this thesis.
8.6 Experimental Results
Case Study
The RailCab Project [122] (founded at the University of Paderborn in 1997) aims to
develop a novel on-demand traffic system for the mobility in the future, whereby small,
driverless vehicles (called RailCabs) are able to transport on demand passengers and
goods directly to their destination. The RailCabs are equipped with steerable wheels.
They can build convoy automatically [123, 124], i.e., driving within small distances with-
out mechanical coupling, so as to reduce the air resistance and the power consumption.
A test track in a reduced scale of 1 : 2.5 was built at the University of Paderborn in
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2003. Two RailCabs can operate simultaneously at a maximum speed of 10m/s. The
motor can provide the vehicle with acceleration of ±0.8m/s2 on planar tracks.
Needless to say, driving in a convoy manner is a safety critical operation. In order to
demonstrate the applicability of online model checking to hybrid systems, we design
intentionally a simplified case study as illustrated in Fig. 8.5: two vehicles RailCab1
and RailCab2 brake along a straight line. The initial distance between the two ve-
hicles is d0 = 2.22m. RailCab1 brakes at the speed v1 = 10m/s with the constant
deceleration a1 = −0.8m/s2, while RailCab2 brakes at the speed v2 = 9.87m/s with
a2 = [−0.8,−0.7]m/s2.
RailCab 2 RailCab 1
d0
x2,v2 x1,v1
0 reference point
Figure 8.5: Case study
RailCab1
RailCab2
m
(s)
Figure 8.6: Distance change over time between the two vehicles
Figure 8.7: Speed change over time of the two vehicles
Chapter 8. Online Model Checking for Hybrid Systems 123
Fig. 8.6 shows the distance change over time between the two vehicles. Fig. 8.7 shows
the speed change over time of the two vehicles. That is, the two vehicles should collide
with d = 0m, v1 = 0m/s and v2 = 0.5m/s. In other words, (d = 0, v1 = 0, v2 = 0.5) is
an unsafe state.
Oﬄine Backward Reachable Set
In cooperation with Kathrin Flaßkamp from the Department of Mathematics at Univer-
sity of Paderborn, we calculate the reachable set target starting from the unsafe state
(d = 0, v1 = 0, v2 = 0.5) backward up to n = 20 time steps with each (integration) step
being dt = 0.05s. Since the continuous dynamics of the two vehicles is simple, instead of
using the level set methods, we get the backward reachable set using a usual numerical
integration algorithm. The numerical solution is illustrated in Fig. 8.8 as a set of points,
from each of which there exists a trajectory to the unsafe state (d = 0, v1 = 0, v2 = 0.5).
Backwards Reachable Set
Figure 8.8: Backward reachable set
By applying the Matlab program vert2lcon to the backward reachable set target in
terms of points in Fig. 8.8, we obtain a polyhedron (i.e., a convex hull) illustrated in
Fig. 8.9 that covers exactly the points in the backward reachable set. The convex hull
determines an implicit surface function, denoted as φ : R3 → R, such that φ(x) ≤ 0 if the
point x ∈ target; otherwise, φ(x) > 0. The convex hull is defined by the conjunction
of 42 linear inequalities of the form c1 · d+ c2 · v1 + c3 · v2 ≤ c4, where c1, c2, c3 and c4
are constants, as shown in the following list:
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0.000000d+ 1.000000v1 +−0.000000v2 ≤ 0.800000
0.694524d+ 0.243083v1 +−0.677161v2 ≤ −0.305591
0.716920d+ 0.215076v1 +−0.663151v2 ≤ −0.300927
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
−0.893641d+ 0.443749v1 + 0.067023v2 ≤ 0.033512
−0.879463d+ 0.475460v1 + 0.021987v2 ≤ 0.010993
0.000000d+ 0.658505v1 +−0.752577v2 ≤ −0.376288
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Figure 8.9: Convex hull of the backward reachable set
Online Forward Reachability Checking
The transition relation trans of the hybrid system model is encoded as a conjunction
of the following five expressions:
x′1 = x1 + v1dt+ 0.5a1dt2
(v′1 = v1 + a1dt) or (v′1 = 0.0 and v1 + a1dt ≤ 0.0) or (v′1 = vmax and v1 + a1dt ≥ vmax)
x′2 = x2 + v2dt+ 0.5a2dt2
(v′2 = v2 + a2dt) or (v′2 = 0.0 and v2 + a2dt ≤ 0.0) or (v′2 = vmax and v2 + a2dt ≥ vmax)
t′ = t+ dt
where x1 and x2 are the positions of the two vehicles relative to a predefined reference
point; dt = 0.05s is a constant indicating that the progression of time in one step is dt
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seconds. In addition, the primed version of each variable in the above formulas represents
the value of the same variable in the next (time) step.
The transition relation describes the behaviors of the two vehicles in one step from the
current state (x1, v1, x2, v2, t) to the next state (x
′
1, v
′
1, x
′
2, v
′
2, t
′) with two constraints: (i)
if vi + aidt ≤ 0.0 for i = 1 or 2, then v′i remains zero; (ii) if vi + aidt ≥ vmax, then v′i
remains vmax = 10m/s.
The reachability problem in this case study is encoded as a formula by unwinding the
trans up to k = 10 time steps and combining it with the target (line 2 in Algorithm 8.1).
Initially, we set x1 = 37.5m, v1 = 10.0m/s, x2 = 35.27575m, v2 = 9.87m/s and t = 0.0s.
The current state information (d = (x1−x2), v1, v2) is monitored every 0.5s by simulating
the movement of the two vehicles using a Matlab program. The generated trajectory
is illustrated in Fig. 8.10.
1
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Figure 8.10: Online forward reachability checking
We need to check the formula during runtime to see whether or not the unsafe target
is reachable from some monitored state within k = 10 time steps (i.e., kdt = 0.5s). This
is conducted on a Linux platform with 3GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU and 4GB RAM.
The experimental results are listed in Table 8.1.
As for the former 22 monitored states, the checking results are all unsatisfiable, indicating
that the unsafe target can not be reached within 500ms. Thus, the online model checker
outputs safe. The actual time taken for each checking round is not more than 45ms. As
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for the 23rd monitored state (d = 0.69, v1 = 1.20, v2 = 1.62), the iSAT solver does find
a solution, indicating that the unsafe target may be reached within 500ms. The online
model checker outputs unsafe in this case. The actual time taken for this checking round
is 110.990ms.
Table 8.1: Experimental results of online forward reachability checking
Time (ms) Variables Clauses Decisions Deductions Conflicts Result
1 28.815 12358 9852 0 13056 11 safe
2 28.049 12412 9895 0 12715 11 safe
3 26.832 12458 9938 0 12745 11 safe
4 27.086 12500 9981 0 12833 11 safe
5 26.695 12535 10019 0 12883 11 safe
6 27.509 12565 10052 0 12901 11 safe
7 26.968 12613 10095 0 12958 11 safe
8 26.915 12659 10138 0 12947 11 safe
9 26.729 12703 10181 0 12907 11 safe
10 26.584 12794 10224 0 12769 11 safe
11 27.168 12777 10257 0 12673 11 safe
12 28.015 12819 10300 0 13165 11 safe
13 28.219 12974 10343 0 13200 11 safe
14 29.283 13177 10386 0 13578 11 safe
15 31.379 13541 10429 0 14572 11 safe
16 32.612 13883 10462 0 15206 11 safe
17 36.017 14101 10505 0 16590 11 safe
18 37.314 14089 10548 0 17032 11 safe
19 40.483 14030 10591 0 18228 11 safe
20 42.964 13597 10629 0 19144 11 safe
21 38.913 13307 10662 0 18597 11 safe
22 31.174 13009 10705 0 15679 11 safe
23 110.990 35289 10764 28604 31814 26 unsafe
Recall that we set n = 20 and k = 10 steps with each step dt = 50ms in this case study.
In the 23rd checking round the error is detected within ∆ = 111ms. In ideal case, the
online model checker is able to predict the error ndt+ kdt−∆ = 1, 389ms in advance.
8.7 Related Work
The work in [125–127] is also concerned with online model checking for the time-bounded
behaviors of a hybrid system in the short-run future. The basic idea is to sample during
runtime the numeric values of the observable system state parameters periodically, e.g., a
set u of input controls (see Section 8.2). Let the period be T time units. The behavioral
model of the hybrid system can thus be reduced by regarding the monitored parameters
Chapter 8. Online Model Checking for Hybrid Systems 127
as constants for the next T time units. Obviously, the resulting model is only valid within
T time units. As a consequence, the online model checker has to provide an answer within
T time units whether or not the reduced model may violate the (safety) properties being
checked. To do this, a path-oriented reachability analysis [116] is applied, whereby a
feasibility problem of a set of linear constraints is derived and solved by the linear
programming (LP) approach.
It is worth pointing out that the state variables of the the reduced behavioral model
are not monitored at all while doing model checking during runtime. In this sense, this
online checking method is also called scenario based verification [125].
E.g., for a communication based train control (CBTC) system under investigation, the
radio block center sends the control parameter, i.e., the movement authority3 (MA), to
the onboard system of the trains nearby in every T = 500ms. Upon receiving the MA,
the onboard computer of each train needs to calculate a legal operation speed range
taking into account of the current speed of the train, the status of the track, the wind
speed, and others. Notice that the MA keeps unchanged within the next 500ms. Thus,
the behavioral model of the CBTC system can be reduced by regarding the MA as
constant. The resulting model is valid within the next 500ms. Hence, the online model
checker needs to provide an answer within 500ms whether or not the reduced model may
violate the safety property being checked. In this example, the MA is the only variable
monitored whenever it is generated or updated. The other state variables in the reduced
model are not monitored at all while doing model checking during runtime.
Our online model checking method is different from this work mainly in two aspects as
illustrated in Fig. 8.3.
On the one hand, we do not reduce the behavioral model by regarding the monitored
parameters as constants and then apply model checking to the reduced model. Instead,
we simply sample the state variables of interest in every k (time) steps with each step
being dt time units. The online model checker then tries to answer within T = kdt
time units whether or not the unsafe target state is reachable within k steps from each
monitored state. In our case, the monitored states are supposed to be unchanged within
dt time units (i.e., one integration step), instead of T time units. Here the parameters
k and dt are determined by the user.
On the other hand, we calculate oﬄine a n-step backward reachable set F ∗ to reduce
the workload of the online model checker.
3The distance that a train is authorized to move forward within T time units.
128 Chapter 8. Online Model Checking for Hybrid Systems
8.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we extend the application of the online model checking mechanism to
hybrid systems. Our goal is to falsify, rather than verify, the safety of the hybrid system
under investigation by online reachability analysis. For this purpose, we search for a
witness trajectory from each monitored state to an unsafe state in the hybrid system
model during system execution. Analogous to the case of discrete state systems, we also
calculate oﬄine a n-step backward reachable set from the unsafe states to speed up the
reachability checking process during runtime. Of course, parallel computing can also be
used to accelerate the reachability checking for hybrid systems. But this is not the focus
of this chapter.
As a proof of concept, we’ve implemented an online reachability checker for hybrid
systems using the tailored iSAT solver as its search engine. A simplified case study
based on two vehicles operating in a convoy manner demonstrates the applicability of
online model checking to hybrid systems. The experimental results indicate that in
theory the online model checker is able to predict errors before the errors actually occur.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
Nowadays our world depends more and more on embedded systems. They are widely
used in industry and are reshaping the way we live. Many of us use embedded systems
every day without even knowing it. In this thesis, we concern ourselves with such kind
of embedded systems that are safety-critical, whose failure or malfunction may result in
severe damages, including loss of life.
9.1 Conclusion
Modern embedded systems are a kind of special-purpose computer systems, which are
becoming more complicated due to the advances in electronic techniques. They may fail
due to external reasons, such as mechanical stress and faulty input, or due to internal
reasons, such as design errors and physical faults. An increasing number of computer
system failures are caused by design errors in software [2]. New software technology
tends to enhance the “intelligence” of modern embedded systems. This increases the
complexity of embedded software and makes subtle errors extremely difficult to figure
out. In practice, no single checking technique, such as testing, simulation, model check-
ing, monitoring, etc., or any combination thereof, is able to completely ensure that the
embedded software does behave as desired after it is released or deployed. Against
this background, we present our online model checking mechanism as a complementary
method.
By doing model checking during system execution, we are able to monitor the actual
state information so as to reduce the state space to be explored by the online model
checker. The state space explosion problem is thus avoided to some degree by making
the online model checker look ahead in each checking cycle only finitely many steps in
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the state space of the behavioral model of the system under investigation. Online model
checking is a lightweight and incomplete method that can falsify, rather than verify,
the behavioral model of the target system. The goal is to ensure the correctness of the
actual execution trace, instead of the universal correctness, of the target system during
runtime (with respect to the property to be checked).
For this purpose, the actual state information is monitored periodically during system
execution. Starting from each monitored state in the given behavioral model, the online
model checker attempts to find an error path of bounded length within an allocated
time limit. The property to be checked is specified in LTL. A nontrivial LTL formula
is either safety or liveness or a conjunction of the two. It is sufficient to make the
online model checker solve the safety checking problem as well as the liveness checking
problem. To this end, we reduce the problem of safety checking and liveness checking
to the corresponding invariant checking problem, which can be solved by reachability
analysis. As a consequence, our online model checking is in effect a kind of online
reachability checking. Because of checking on the model level, the online model checker
is able to predict potential errors during runtime.
Reachability checking is also a challenge for large complex systems, not to mention doing
it during runtime, which suffers from the limited time allocated to it. We speed up the
online reachability checking process by reducing the workload and adopting the symbolic
state-based search algorithm as well as using parallel computing. The workload of the
online model checker can be reduced by calculating oﬄine a m-step transition relation
Rm and a n-step backward reachable set F ∗ from the target set of error states. According
to our experience, making two symbolic state-based model checkers work in parallel can
obtain a better price/performance ratio.
We need to instrument the source code of the target system with a finite set of moni-
toring points once and for all in advance. During system execution, once a monitoring
point is reached, the state information at this point will be recorded in a (ring) buffer.
In each checking cycle, the online model checker tries to take a state from the buffer and
then conducts reachability analysis starting from this state. The monitoring points are
determined by analyzing the control flow graph of the target program. We present a par-
titioning algorithm to calculate a smaller set of monitoring points, which are distributed
more or less evenly in the control flow graph.
We present a general framework for integration of online model checking with a real-time
operating system, such as ORCOS. This integration framework can be implemented on
different hardware architectures from single-core, or multi-core to multiprocessor. We
implement a prototype on top of a (virtualized) multicore platform. At each monitoring
point, a special system call is introduced together with its system call handler to record
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the actual state information. In this way, both the source code of the target program
and the underlying operating system only need minor modifications. We analyze quali-
tatively the additional overhead introduced by online model checking. According to our
experience, the monitoring overhead can be reduced by setting the native system calls
in the source code as monitoring points as long as possible or by limiting the number
of variables to be monitored; the communication overhead between the target program
and the online model checker depends largely on the underlying system architecture.
We take the RA component of TCAS as case study to demonstrate the applicability
of our online model checking method. In this case study, only one monitoring point is
inserted into the source code. 10 int and 2 bool variables are monitored during program
execution. By applying 10 mapping functions to the 10 int values monitored, we get 10
bool values, which together with the original 2 bool values are sent to the online model
checker. The property to be checked is an assertion. The experimental results indicate
that the overhead introduced by online model checking is acceptable in this case study.
We extend the application of our online model checking mechanism to hybrid systems.
Analogous to the case of discrete state systems, our goal is to falsify, rather than verify,
the safety of the hybrid system under investigation by the online reachability analysis.
We search for a witness trajectory of length up to k time steps from each monitored state
to an unsafe state in the hybrid system model during system execution. To speed up
this reachability checking process, we also calculate oﬄine a n-step backward reachable
set from the unsafe states. A simplified case study based on two vehicles operating
in a convoy manner demonstrates the applicability of online model checking to hybrid
systems. The experimental results indicate that in theory the online model checker is
able to predict errors before the errors actually occur.
Online model checking has the following advantages over oﬄine checking techniques:
• Avoid the state space explosion problem to some degree: in each checking cycle,
the online model checker tries to search for an error path of bounded length in the
state space;
• Detect errors ultra deep in the state space: theoretically, the online model checker
is able to reach those states that locate arbitrarily deep in the state space;
• Predict errors before they actually happen: due to checking on the model level, the
online model checker is able to predict errors, even if it falls behind the execution
of the target system.
Compared with online monitoring, online model checking has the following advantages:
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• The behavioral model bridges the semantic gap between the requirements and the
source code of the target program;
• Monitoring points are placed in fixed locations in the source code independent of
the properties to be checked;
• The distance of any two adjacent monitoring points is not more than k steps;
• Look ahead up to k steps on the model level from each monitored state;
• Liveness properties can be checked on the model level during runtime.
When applying the online model checking mechanism to an embedded software system,
the schedulability analysis of the target system can be conducted oﬄine beforehand.
The above mentioned advantages indicate that the online model checking method is
complementary to, but can not be replaced by, the existing checking techniques.
9.2 Future Work
Before the online model checking mechanism can be applied to real world applications,
there are several basic issues that remain to be investigated:
First, given a monitored state in the behavioral model M , how to calculate efficiently
the exact starting points in the state space of M × B¬f for the new checking cycle is a
topic worth further research.
Second, many programming languages allow dynamic memory allocation and function
recursion, which result in dynamic data structures and dynamic function-calling chains
respectively. How to monitor the variables stored in the memory allocated dynamically
during runtime as well as how to determine the monitoring points in the source code
written in such programming languages is worth further study.
Third, whenever an error is detected by the online model checker, how to evaluate the
severity of the error is a topic worth further consideration.
Last but not least, once the detected error is identified as a severe error, how to deal
with this error during runtime is also worth further investigation.
Appendix A
Case Study: TCAS
A.1 RA Component of TCAS
1 /∗ −∗− Last−Edit : Fr i Jan 29 11 : 13 : 27 1993 by Tarak S . Goradia ; −∗− ∗/
2 /∗ $Log : t ca s . c , v $
3 ∗ Revis ion 1 .2 1993/03/12 19 : 29 : 50 f o s t e r
4 ∗ Correct l o g i c bug which didn ’ t a l low output o f 2 − hf
5 ∗ ∗/
6
7 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
8
9 #d e f i n e OLEV 600 /∗ in f e e t s /minute ∗/
10 #d e f i n e MAXALTDIFF 600 /∗ max a l t i t u d e d i f f e r e n c e in f e e t ∗/
11 #d e f i n e MINSEP 300 /∗ min sepa ra t i on in f e e t ∗/
12 #d e f i n e NOZCROSS 100 /∗ in f e e t ∗/
13
14 typede f i n t bool ;
15
16 /∗ v a r i a b l e s ∗/
17 i n t Cur Ver t i ca l Sep ;
18 bool High Conf idence ;
19 bool Two of Three Reports Val id ;
20
21 i n t Own Tracked Alt ;
22 i n t Own Tracked Alt Rate ;
23 i n t Other Tracked Alt ;
24
25 i n t Alt Layer Value ; /∗ 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 ∗/
26 i n t Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh [ 4 ] ;
27
28 i n t Up Separation ;
29 i n t Down Separation ;
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30
31 i n t Other RAC ; /∗ NO INTENT, DO NOT CLIMB, DO NOT DESCEND ∗/
32 #d e f i n e NO INTENT 0
33 #d e f i n e DO NOT CLIMB 1
34 #d e f i n e DO NOT DESCEND 2
35
36 i n t Other Capab i l i ty ; /∗ TCAS TA, OTHER ∗/
37 #d e f i n e TCAS TA 1
38 #d e f i n e OTHER 2
39
40 i n t C l imb Inh ib i t ; /∗ t rue / f a l s e ∗/
41
42 #d e f i n e UNRESOLVED 0
43 #d e f i n e UPWARDRA 1
44 #d e f i n e DOWNWARDRA 2
45
46 void i n i t i a l i z e ( )
47 {
48 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh [ 0 ] = 400 ;
49 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh [ 1 ] = 500 ;
50 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh [ 2 ] = 640 ;
51 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh [ 3 ] = 740 ;
52 }
53
54 i n t ALIM ( )
55 {
56 re turn Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh [ Alt Layer Value ] ;
57 }
58
59 i n t Inh ib i t B ia s ed Cl imb ( )
60 {
61 re turn ( Cl imb Inh ib i t ? Up Separation + NOZCROSS : Up Separation ) ;
62 }
63
64 bool Non Cross ing Biased Cl imb ( )
65 {
66 i n t upward pre fer red ;
67 i n t u p w a r d c r o s s i n g s i t u a t i o n ;
68 bool r e s u l t ;
69
70 upward pre fer red = Inh ib i t B ia s ed Cl imb ( ) > Down Separation ;
71 i f ( upward pre fer red )
72 {
73 r e s u l t = ! ( Own Below Threat ( ) ) | | ( ( Own Below Threat ( ) ) &&
( ! ( Down Separation >= ALIM( ) ) ) ) ;
74 }
75 e l s e
76 {
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77 r e s u l t = Own Above Threat ( ) && ( Cur Vert i ca l Sep >= MINSEP) &&
( Up Separation >= ALIM( ) ) ;
78 }
79 re turn r e s u l t ;
80 }
81
82 bool Non Cross ing Biased Descend ( )
83 {
84 i n t upward pre fer red ;
85 i n t u p w a r d c r o s s i n g s i t u a t i o n ;
86 bool r e s u l t ;
87
88 upward pre fer red = Inh ib i t B ia s ed Cl imb ( ) > Down Separation ;
89 i f ( upward pre fer red )
90 {
91 r e s u l t = Own Below Threat ( ) && ( Cur Vert i ca l Sep >= MINSEP) &&
( Down Separation >= ALIM( ) ) ;
92 }
93 e l s e
94 {
95 r e s u l t = ! ( Own Above Threat ( ) ) | | ( ( Own Above Threat ( ) ) &&
( Up Separation >= ALIM( ) ) ) ;
96 }
97 re turn r e s u l t ;
98 }
99
100 bool Own Below Threat ( )
101 {
102 re turn ( Own Tracked Alt < Other Tracked Alt ) ;
103 }
104
105 bool Own Above Threat ( )
106 {
107 re turn ( Other Tracked Alt < Own Tracked Alt ) ;
108 }
109
110 i n t a l t s e p t e s t ( )
111 {
112 bool enabled , tcas equ ipped , intent not known ;
113 bool need upward RA , need downward RA ;
114 i n t a l t s e p ;
115
116 enabled = High Conf idence && ( Own Tracked Alt Rate <= OLEV) &&
( Cur Vert i ca l Sep > MAXALTDIFF) ;
117 t ca s equ ipped = Other Capab i l i ty == TCAS TA;
118 intent not known = Two of Three Reports Val id && (Other RAC ==
NO INTENT) ;
119
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120 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
121
122 i f ( enabled && ( ( tcas equ ipped && intent not known ) | | ! t ca s equ ipped ) )
123 {
124 need upward RA = Non Cross ing Biased Cl imb ( ) && Own Below Threat ( ) ;
125 need downward RA = Non Cross ing Biased Descend ( ) &&
Own Above Threat ( ) ;
126 i f ( need upward RA && need downward RA )
127 /∗ unreachable : r e q u i r e s Own Below Threat and Own Above Threat
128 to both be true − that r e q u i r e s
129 Own Tracked Alt < Other Tracked Alt and
130 Other Tracked Alt < Own Tracked Alt , which i s n ’ t p o s s i b l e ∗/
131 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
132 e l s e i f ( need upward RA )
133 a l t s e p = UPWARDRA;
134 e l s e i f ( need downward RA )
135 a l t s e p = DOWNWARDRA;
136 e l s e
137 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
138 }
139
140 re turn a l t s e p ;
141 }
142
143 main ( argc , argv )
144 i n t argc ;
145 char ∗argv [ ] ;
146 {
147 i f ( argc < 13)
148 {
149 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ” Error : Command l i n e arguments are \n” ) ;
150 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ” Cur Vert i ca l Sep , High Confidence ,
Two of Three Reports Val id \n” ) ;
151 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ”Own Tracked Alt , Own Tracked Alt Rate ,
Other Tracked Alt \n” ) ;
152 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ” Alt Layer Value , Up Separation ,
Down Separation\n” ) ;
153 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ”Other RAC , Other Capabi l i ty , C l imb Inh ib i t \n” ) ;
154 e x i t (1 ) ;
155 }
156
157 i n i t i a l i z e ( ) ;
158
159 Cur Vert i ca l Sep = a t o i ( argv [ 1 ] ) ;
160 High Conf idence = a t o i ( argv [ 2 ] ) ;
161 Two of Three Reports Val id = a t o i ( argv [ 3 ] ) ;
162 Own Tracked Alt = a t o i ( argv [ 4 ] ) ;
163 Own Tracked Alt Rate = a t o i ( argv [ 5 ] ) ;
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164 Other Tracked Alt = a t o i ( argv [ 6 ] ) ;
165 Alt Layer Value = a t o i ( argv [ 7 ] ) ;
166 Up Separation = a t o i ( argv [ 8 ] ) ;
167 Down Separation = a t o i ( argv [ 9 ] ) ;
168 Other RAC = a t o i ( argv [ 1 0 ] ) ;
169 Other Capab i l i ty = a t o i ( argv [ 1 1 ] ) ;
170 Cl imb Inh ib i t = a t o i ( argv [ 1 2 ] ) ;
171
172 monitor read (1 ) ; /∗ s p e c i a l system c a l l f o r monitor ing v a r i a b l e s ∗/
173
174 f p r i n t f ( stdout , ”%d\n” , a l t s e p t e s t ( ) ) ;
175 e x i t (0 ) ;
176 }
A.2 Monitored Variables and Mapping Functions
1 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
2
3 typede f i n t bool ;
4
5 /∗ monitored v a r i a b l e s ∗/
6 i n t Cur Ver t i ca l Sep ;
7 bool High Conf idence ;
8 bool Two of Three Reports Val id ;
9
10 i n t Own Tracked Alt ;
11 i n t Own Tracked Alt Rate ;
12 i n t Other Tracked Alt ;
13
14 i n t Alt Layer Value ; /∗ 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 ∗/
15
16 i n t Up Separation ;
17 i n t Down Separation ;
18
19 i n t Other RAC ; /∗ NO INTENT, DO NOT CLIMB, DO NOT DESCEND ∗/
20 i n t Other Capab i l i ty ; /∗ TCAS TA, OTHER ∗/
21 i n t C l imb Inh ib i t ; /∗ t rue / f a l s e ∗/
22
23 #d e f i n e OLEV 600 /∗ in f e e t s /minute ∗/
24 #d e f i n e MAXALTDIFF 600 /∗ max a l t i t u d e d i f f e r e n c e in f e e t ∗/
25 #d e f i n e MINSEP 300 /∗ min sepa ra t i on in f e e t ∗/
26 #d e f i n e NOZCROSS 100 /∗ in f e e t ∗/
27
28 #d e f i n e NO INTENT 0
29 #d e f i n e DO NOT CLIMB 1
30 #d e f i n e DO NOT DESCEND 2
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31
32 #d e f i n e TCAS TA 1
33 #d e f i n e OTHER 2
34
35 #d e f i n e UNRESOLVED 0
36 #d e f i n e UPWARDRA 1
37 #d e f i n e DOWNWARDRA 2
38
39 #d e f i n e Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 0 = 400
40 #d e f i n e Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 1 = 500
41 #d e f i n e Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 2 = 640
42 #d e f i n e Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 3 = 740
43
44 /∗ mapping f u n c t i o n s ∗/
45 bool p Cur Vertical Sep GE MINSEP ( )
46 {
47 re turn ( Cur Ver t i ca l Sep >= MINSEP) ;
48 }
49
50 bool p Own Tracked Alt LE Other Tracked Alt ( )
51 {
52 re turn ( Own Tracked Alt < Other Tracked Alt ) ;
53 }
54
55 bool p Other Tracked Alt LE Own Tracked Alt ( )
56 {
57 re turn ( Other Tracked Alt < Own Tracked Alt ) ;
58 }
59
60 bool p Down Separation GE ALIM ( )
61 {
62 i n t Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh ;
63
64 switch ( Alt Layer Value )
65 {
66 case 0 :
67 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 0 ;
68 break ;
69 case 1 :
70 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 1 ;
71 break ;
72 case 2 :
73 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 2 ;
74 break ;
75 case 3 :
76 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 3 ;
77 break ;
78 d e f a u l t :
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79 break ;
80 }
81
82 re turn ( Down Separation >= Posit ive RA Alt Thresh ) ;
83 }
84
85 bool p Up Separation GE ALIM ( )
86 {
87 i n t Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh ;
88
89 switch ( Alt Layer Value )
90 {
91 case 0 :
92 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 0 ;
93 break ;
94 case 1 :
95 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 1 ;
96 break ;
97 case 2 :
98 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 2 ;
99 break ;
100 case 3 :
101 Pos it ive RA Alt Thresh = Pos i t ive RA Alt Thresh 3 ;
102 break ;
103 d e f a u l t :
104 break ;
105 }
106 re turn ( Up Separation >= Posit ive RA Alt Thresh ) ;
107 }
108
109 bool p upward pre fe r red ( )
110 {
111 re turn ( ( C l imb Inh ib i t ? Up Separation + MINSEP : Up Separation ) >
Down Separation ) ;
112 }
113
114 bool p tca s equ ipped ( )
115 {
116 re turn ( Other Capab i l i ty == TCAS TA) ;
117 }
118
119 bool p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV ( )
120 {
121 re turn ( Own Tracked Alt Rate <= OLEV) ;
122 }
123
124 bool p Cur Vertical Sep GT MAXALTDIFF ( )
125 {
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126 re turn ( Cur Ver t i ca l Sep > MAXALTDIFF) ;
127 }
128
129 bool p Other RAC EQ NO INTENT ( )
130 {
131 re turn (Other RAC == NO INTENT) ;
132 }
A.3 Abstract Model
1 typede f i n t bool ;
2
3 /∗ abs t r a c t v a r i a b l e s ∗/
4 bool p Cur Vertical Sep GE MINSEP ;
5 bool p Cur Vertical Sep GT MAXALTDIFF ;
6 bool p Own Tracked Alt LT Other Tracked Alt ;
7 bool p Other Tracked Alt LT Own Tracked Alt ;
8 bool p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV ;
9 bool p Up Separation GE ALIM ;
10 bool p Down Separation GE ALIM ;
11 bool p upward pre fe r red ;
12 bool p tca s equ ipped ;
13 bool p Other RAC EQ NO INTENT ;
14
15 bool High Conf idence ;
16 bool Two of Three Reports Val id ;
17
18 #d e f i n e UNRESOLVED 0
19 #d e f i n e UPWARDRA 1
20 #d e f i n e DOWNWARDRA 2
21
22 bool Own Below Threat ( )
23 {
24 re turn p Own Tracked Alt LT Other Tracked Alt ;
25 }
26
27 bool Own Above Threat ( )
28 {
29 re turn p Other Tracked Alt LT Own Tracked Alt ;
30 }
31
32 bool Non Cross ing Biased Cl imb ( )
33 {
34 bool upward pre fer red ;
35 bool r e s u l t ;
36
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37 upward pre fer red = p upward pre fe r red ;
38 i f ( upward pre fer red )
39 {
40 r e s u l t = ! ( Own Below Threat ( ) ) | | ( ( Own Below Threat ( ) ) &&
! ( p Down Separation GE ALIM ) ) ;
41 }
42 e l s e
43 {
44 r e s u l t = Own Above Threat ( ) && p Cur Vertical Sep GE MINSEP &&
p Up Separation GE ALIM ;
45 }
46 re turn r e s u l t ;
47 }
48
49 bool Non Cross ing Biased Descend ( )
50 {
51 bool upward pre fer red ;
52 bool r e s u l t ;
53
54 upward pre fer red = p upward pre fe r red ;
55 i f ( upward pre fer red )
56 {
57 r e s u l t = Own Below Threat ( ) && p Cur Vertical Sep GE MINSEP &&
p Down Separation GE ALIM ;
58 }
59 e l s e
60 {
61 r e s u l t = ! ( Own Above Threat ( ) ) | | ( ( Own Above Threat ( ) ) &&
p Up Separation GE ALIM ) ;
62 }
63 re turn r e s u l t ;
64 }
65
66 i n t a l t s e p t e s t ( )
67 {
68 bool enabled , tcas equ ipped , intent not known ;
69 bool need upward RA , need downward RA ;
70 i n t a l t s e p ;
71
72 enabled = High Conf idence && p Own Tracked Alt Rate LE OLEV &&
p Cur Vertical Sep GT MAXALTDIFF ;
73 t ca s equ ipped = p tcas equ ipped ;
74 intent not known = Two of Three Reports Val id &&
p Other RAC EQ NO INTENT ;
75
76 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
77
78 i f ( enabled && ( ( tcas equ ipped && intent not known ) | | ! t ca s equ ipped ) )
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79 {
80 need upward RA = Non Cross ing Biased Cl imb ( ) && Own Below Threat ( ) ;
81 need downward RA = Non Cross ing Biased Descend ( ) &&
Own Above Threat ( ) ;
82 i f ( need upward RA && need downward RA )
83 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
84 e l s e i f ( need upward RA )
85 a l t s e p = UPWARDRA;
86 e l s e i f ( need downward RA )
87 a l t s e p = DOWNWARDRA;
88 e l s e
89 a l t s e p = UNRESOLVED;
90 }
91 a s s e r t ( a l t s e p !=UNRESOLVED) ;
92 re turn a l t s e p ;
93 }
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